Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015 Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop (2009) / Chapter Skim
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF RUSSIAN – U.S. COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR ARENA: A REVIEW OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF RUSSIAN – U.S. COOPERATION IN THE NUCLEAR ARENA: A REVIEW OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS
Pages 13-26
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From page 13... ...
It is in this environment that a series of negotiations regarding reductions in the numbers of nuclear and other weapons began between the United States and the U.S.S.R., eventually leading to several arms control treaties. This initial period of nuclear disarmament coincided with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
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From page 14... ...
23 For further information regarding the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, see http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/forasst/nunn_lug/overview.htm; accessed April 8, 2008. 24 For further information regarding the HEU Agreement, see http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/fissmat/heudeal/heudeal.htm; accessed April 6, 2008.
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From page 15... ...
strategic data exchange information, in January 2006, Russia had 771 delivery vehicles and 3,319 nuclear munitions in its strategic nuclear triad, and the United States had 1,079 delivery vehicles and 4,986 nuclear munitions.26 Many hundreds of missiles (specifically, 1,846 in Russia and 846 in the United States) have been eliminated in compliance with the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces.27 A large number of nuclear-powered submarines (148)
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From page 16... ...
Nuclear Strategy, a new strategic triad was unveiled.29 It is different from the classic triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarinelaunched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers in that it also includes an offensive non-nuclear component, active and passive defenses including an ABM defense, and a responsive defense infrastructure. This bespeaks a clear desire on the part of the world's most powerful country to secure a technological breakthrough in new weapons systems.
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From page 17... ...
These are products that other nuclear weapons states do not have now and will not have in the foreseeable future."38 Russia's responses are based on the military threats to its national security with which it is faced. These threats were defined in a speech by the Chairman of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, General Yuri Baluyevsky in early 2007.39 In his opinion, the most tangible military threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in the near future will continue to be dominated by the following factors: 32 To read the text of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, see http://www.ctbto.org/; accessed April 6, 2008.
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From page 18... ...
It could take additional nuclear disarmament steps without jeopardizing its security. This would serve as an example to other countries.
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India and Pakistan have since become nuclear weapons states. It is generally believed that Israel also possesses an unacknowledged nuclear weapons program.
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This rift causes resentment among non-nuclear weapons states, undermines any attempts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, makes this regime unstable, and leads to delays in implementation of Article VI of the NPT (i.e., negotiations regarding nuclear disarmament)
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From page 21... ...
Iran has signed the NPT, accepted the Additional Protocol that allows the IAEA to visit any facility at any time without prior notice, placed its facilities under IAEA safeguards and pledged, alongside Russia, to return spent nuclear fuel to Russia. The United States does not find these commitments sufficient and demands that Iran shut down its nuclear program completely, suspecting it of nuclear weapons ambitions.
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From page 22... ...
. Russia has done a lot in the course of these years to instill order in its nuclear complex and has proven by deeds that it is a responsible country (there have been no recorded cases of theft or loss of weaponsgrade nuclear materials -- much less nuclear munitions -- or leaks of nuclear experts or technologies)
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From page 23... ...
In particular, the following opportunities for joint work have been identified: • development of means of detecting signs of undeclared nuclear activities • development of technical means to combat terrorism • design of highly sensitive devices to monitor small quantities of nuclear materials and explosives • development of instruments for remote monitoring of reactors and nuclear fuel cycle facilities • risk assessment with respect to the proliferation of nuclear technologies • identification of nuclear material • other specific proposals Additionally, lab-to lab collaboration could expand to include other counties and take on such areas of research as nuclear fusion, computers and programming, laser technologies, and nanomaterials. This could also contribute to the building of trust and goodwill among weapons scientists and the redirection of their activities to peaceful pursuits.
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From page 24... ...
President Jimmy Carter called on nuclear power countries to give up reprocessing activities to curb the proliferation of nuclear materials, most notably plutonium, that can be extracted from spent nuclear fuel produced by nuclear power plants. However, restricting the transfer of peaceful nuclear technologies to non-nuclear member states in good standing with the NPT or prohibiting them from development of such sensitive technologies as uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuels reprocessing would be yet another step in broadening the gap between the "haves" and the "have-nots." It goes without saying that prohibitive measures will not stop technological progress.
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From page 25... ...
A better way to proceed would be through the development of comprehensive methods for the detection of undeclared nuclear activities. For example, we could develop techniques for remote monitoring of nuclear fuel cycle facilities and nuclear reactors to prevent any unauthorized modifications or other proscribed activities.
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