Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015 Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop (2009) / Chapter Skim
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NUCLEAR TERRORISM THREATS AND RESPONSES
NUCLEAR TERRORISM THREATS AND RESPONSES
Pages 153-162
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From page 153... ...
indicates that al-Qa'ida will remain the most serious threat to the United States and that the group will continue attempts to acquire and deploy unconventional weapons: "We assess that al-Qa'ida will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate to use them if it develops what it deems is sufficient capability."191 This general 190 The definition of an "improvised nuclear device" used by the U.S. Department of Energy is: "a device, incorporating fissile materials, designed or constructed outside of an official Government agency and which has, appears to have, or is claimed to have the capability to produce a nuclear explosion." DOE Order 457.1, approved February 7, 2006, available at http://www.directives.doe.gov/pdfs/doe/doetext/neword/457/o4571.pdf; accessed May 1, 2008.
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From page 154... ...
terrorists access to the materials, expertise, and other enabling capabilities required to develop WMD," mentioning in particular weapons-usable fissile materials -- a fact that points to construction of a nuclear explosive, not a radiological device, as the greatest concern.193 Like in the United States, there is a great deal of official concern in Russia about the possibility of nuclear terrorism. However, over the past few years the threat of sabotage to nuclear facilities and radiological terrorism appears to have been seen as more of a threat than that of a nuclear device, in contrast to the U.S.
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From page 155... ...
nuclear weapons experts agree that some terrorist groups would be technically capable of constructing a primitive nuclear device, if they were able to obtain the necessary fissile materials. Former director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Siegfried Hecker, has noted that some Russian weapons experts agree that from a technical point of view the construction of the simplest type of first-generation nuclear device is within the capabilities of certain non-state actors.198 In examining the steps for terrorist acquisition of such a device, experts from the U.S.
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From page 156... ...
The DHS Nuclear Assessment Program concerns include reactor attacks, as well as illegal dumping and scams, noting that scams too can pose health and safety risks, as well as waste and/or divert time and effort from more significant threats or enlarge search areas.206 However, DHS concludes that radiological devices would create panic, but are not weapons of mass destruction, while it views a nuclear attack as "a real possibility," noting that "there are no insurmountable technical barriers to designing and building an IND."207 203 Stanislav Rodionov, "Could Terrorists Produce Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons? " High-Impact Terrorism: Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002)
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From page 157... ...
. One of the first international actions came at the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit in 1996, when a program was announced "on preventing and combating illicit trafficking in nuclear material to ensure increased cooperation among our governments in all aspects of prevention, detection, exchange of information, investigation and prosecution in cases of illicit nuclear trafficking."208 There have been many additional agreements since, which have publicly committed Russia and the United States to sharing intelligence on illicit trafficking incidents.209 However, the exchange of information in cases involving nuclear and radiological materials remains inadequate, both bilaterally and with international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
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From page 158... ...
Where nuclear trafficking is concerned, for example, convictions and sentences in accordance with strict laws requiring serious penalties are necessary if they are to have any impact on the terrorist threat. Furthermore, these sentences must be publicized to have the desired deterrent effect.214 FUTURE MEASURES, FUTURE THREATS As noted above, DOE and DHS experts do not believe that terrorists are capable of enriching uranium, the material needed to create the simplest type of nuclear device.
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From page 159... ...
fter operations of three years or perhaps less, the Sandia Pulsed Reactor will no longer be needed, since computer simulations will be able to assume its mission.… When its mission is complete, this reactor's fuel will be removed from Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico, allowing us to reduce security costs at Sandia and further consolidate our nuclear materials." "Remarks Prepared for Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham for the Security Police Officer Training Competition," May 7, 2004. 216 For further information, see Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return Program, available at http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/rrrfr.shtml; accessed May 1, 2008.
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From page 160... ...
At a Russian State Duma seminar on nuclear terrorism issues on September 27, 2007, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Safonov observed that while it is probably impossible to prevent all terrorist attacks, governments must at least be able to tell their publics that they can prevent nuclear terrorist attacks -- and to do so must prevent access to WMD components.220 219 The Nuclear Energy Agency defines the stages of the fuel cycle as follows: "a) the so-called front-end which extends from the mining of uranium ore until the delivery of fabricated fuel elements to the reactor site; b)
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From page 161... ...
This insightful statement goes to the heart of the matter: can we agree on the nature of the attack we seek to prevent, the measures that can potentially be taken to prevent it, and ways to prioritize and coordinate our preventive efforts? Terrorism at Russian Duma," October 4, 2007, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/071005.htm; accessed May 1, 2008.
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