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U.S. AND RUSSIAN COLLABORATION IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR FORENSICS
Pages 179-202

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From page 179...
... Kristo,* Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory260 Nuclear forensics261 has become increasingly important in the fight against illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials.262 The illicit trafficking of nuclear materials is, of course, an international problem; nuclear materials may be mined and milled in one country, manufactured in a second country, diverted at a third location, and detected at a fourth.
From page 180...
... Important markers for traditional forensics (fingerprints, stray material, etc.) can be eliminated or obscured, but many nuclear materials have inherent isotopic or chemical characteristics that serve as unequivocal markers of specific sources, production processes, or transit routes.
From page 181...
... By encouraging the participation of those states where nuclear materials originate, the international community of nuclear forensics scientists gain important insights into the material required to deter future acts of nuclear smuggling. DEFINITIONS Historically, the terms "nuclear forensics" and "nuclear attribution" have been used interchangeably.
From page 182...
... There are a number of groups within the State Department with an interest in nuclear forensics, including the Nuclear Trafficking Response Group, the Nuclear Smuggling Outreach Initiative, the Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program, the Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, a part of the Department of Defense, primarily funds activities in post-detonation nuclear forensics, that is, activities aimed at providing information for attribution of a detonated nuclear device (nuclear yield)
From page 183...
... International Technical Working Group Many international nuclear forensics laboratories are cooperating to develop common technical strategies and knowledge bases that catalog nuclear processes for use in interpretation. The Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG)
From page 184...
... We still may be able to make progress, despite these concerns, in two ways. First, we can start by working together to identify signatures for lower-threat nuclear materials, e.g., uranium ores, uranium ore 184
From page 185...
... We hope that the signatures discovery process will be able to reduce the number of properties required for adequate identification, but, until that proves to be the case, nuclear forensic data is likely to include as many properties as can be measured, given time and funding. In addition to raw nuclear forensics data, we also need the ability to store information about production processes and locations throughout the history of nuclear materials production.
From page 186...
... Future Nuclear Fuel Cycles The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, recently announced by DOE Secretary Samuel Bodman,268 poses significant new challenges with regard to securing, safeguarding, monitoring and tracking nuclear materials. In order to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, new technologies must be developed to reduce the risk that nuclear material can be diverted from its intended use.
From page 187...
... Bi-lateral cooperation in this area would improve technical capabilities, by bringing together our countries excellent expertise in the area of nuclear forensics. Such cooperation would also set a significant precedent that might encourage greater international cooperation and sharing in this important non-proliferation and counterterrorism arena, particularly as the future international nuclear fuel cycle framework evolves.
From page 188...
... Through its political, legal, and financial frameworks, the ISTC contributes to Fundamental Research, International Programs and Innovation and Commercialization, by linking the demands of international markets with the exceptional pool of scientific talent available in Russian and Commonwealth of Independent States' institutes. There are several bilateral and international agreements that support the ultimate goal of nuclear forensics, i.e., the deterrence of nuclear smuggling and ultimately nuclear proliferation and terrorism.
From page 189...
... national laboratories and Russian institutes on a real nuclear forensics case. They established an action item during their meeting on July 22-23, 2003, for the United States to provide a portion of the "Bulgarian" HEU sample to a Russian institute for nuclear forensic analysis, including confirming laboratory analyses, reactor modeling, and material identification.
From page 190...
... At the post-project meeting, both sides agreed on the following areas for future cooperation: • better understanding of each other's methodologies and techniques • improved data sets (databases) • Bochvar's participation in nuclear forensic analytical round robins • enlightening both country's policy makers on areas in which mutual cooperation is possible and areas in which mutual cooperation is not possible Identifying Characteristics of Research Reactor Fuel LLNL collaborated with the Federal State Unitary Enterprise-Russian Federal Nuclear Center, All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF)
From page 191...
... LLNL Collaboration with the Former Soviet Union Over the past fifty years, Central Asia has supplied the majority of uranium to the military and civilian nuclear fuel cycle of the Soviet Union and subsequently to the republics of the former Soviet Union. Therefore, uranium ores, ore concentrates, and reactor fuels collected from Central Asia are critical elements for any sample reference library for nuclear forensics.
From page 192...
... PART III: THE NUCLEAR FORENSIC PROCESS273 Incident Response IAEA-TECDOC-1313 "Response to events involving the inadvertent movement or illicit trafficking of radioactive materials" provides detailed recommendations for the initial response to the interdiction of illicit nuclear material.274 There are 3 key goals to any response: • minimization of any radiation hazards associated with the incident site • control of the nuclear or other radioactive material • preservation of both nuclear and associated traditional forensic evidence From the standpoint of nuclear forensics, preservation of the evidence is vital. All activities should be sequenced to minimize destruction or contamination of the evidence.
From page 193...
... In this way, radioactive materials analysis applied to nuclear forensics proceeds in a manner not unlike that of traditional forensic analysis. It is important to emphasize that all sampling and analysis must be performed with due regard for preservation of evidence and perpetuation of the chain-of-custody.
From page 194...
... at the nuclear forensics laboratory. Traditional Forensic Analysis Traditional forensic analysis, like radioactive materials analysis, is an iterative process, in which the results from one analysis are used to guide the selection of subsequent analyses.
From page 195...
... If the tests show that the signature is present, then either a unique interpretation has been achieved or additional tests must be devised to exclude the other possible scenarios. At the beginning of the nuclear forensics process, the results from the radioactive materials analysis and traditional forensic analysis will most likely be consistent with many scenarios.
From page 196...
... Nuclear forensic experts use both an empirical approach, through the previous analysis of nuclear and other radioactive materials, and a modeling approach, based upon the chemistry and physics of nuclear processes to predict relevant signatures from those processes. They also use their knowledge of analytical science to select the appropriate methods to verify the presence or absence of predicted signatures.
From page 197...
... Sharing of information between international nuclear forensics laboratories leverages the extensive experience and newly developed capabilities of each laboratory to derive new and valuable information from the material analysis. The participation of other nuclear forensics laboratories also allows for a peer review of the nuclear interpretation process, increasing confidence in the validity and impartiality of the interpretation effort.
From page 198...
... These knowledge bases are presently maintained by a variety of international, national, and non-governmental entities. There are current efforts to develop and organize knowledge bases that catalogue nuclear processes for use in nuclear forensics investigations.
From page 199...
... Then, the old material can be re-analyzed by the new analytical methods and the resulting data analyzed for the presence or absence of the newly discovered signatures. Sample archives can include "real world" nuclear forensic samples, reactor fuel stock, other nuclear materials, and industrial radiation sources.
From page 200...
... Proper quality assurance and quality control procedures within the nuclear forensics laboratory will ensure confidence in the analytical data. Nuclear forensic laboratories typically implement a recognized quality system, such as ISO 9000, ISO 17025, or ASCLD International.276 A quality system encourages the establishment of documented procedures for sample control and analysis, which improves the repeatability of results and provides an enabling mechanism for continuous quality improvement.
From page 201...
... Figure 3 The Effect of Improved Precision on the Quality of Nuclear Forensics Conclusions Potential Sources & Processes Technique A Improved Precision Technique A Original Precision Figure 4 The Effect of Multiple Types of Analyses on the Quality of Nuclear Forensics Conclusions Potential Sources & Processes Technique B Technique A Technique C 201
From page 202...
... Ideally, there should be an unambiguous method of specifying the confidence in the conclusions to decision-makers. The international nuclear forensics community has not yet reached a consensus on such a method.


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