Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015 Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop (2009) / Chapter Skim
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APPROACHES TO REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR MULTI-POLARITY
APPROACHES TO REDUCING THE RISK OF NUCLEAR MULTI-POLARITY
Pages 229-236
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From page 229... ...
The United States has always been one of the main initiators of efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, but these initiatives have always stemmed more from the United States' own priorities and interests rather than from the nuclear weapons proliferation problem itself. When it first developed nuclear weapons, Washington's initial nuclear policy goal was to maintain its monopoly over these arms.
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From page 230... ...
Iraq had nuclear ambitions, and a complex situation has now arisen regarding the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. Through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,333 the United States has made an important contribution to ensuring safe and reliable transport, storage, and destruction of Soviet nuclear weapons in the interests of non-proliferation of these weapons following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
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From page 231... ...
preventing efforts by countries overtly or tacitly seeking to obtain nuclear weapons to manufacture or acquire such weapons 3) reducing the likelihood that countries possessing nuclear weapons will use them The current nuclear arms control system is focused primarily on only one of these objectives – preventing non-nuclear countries from developing nuclear weapons.
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From page 232... ...
The situation is different in the case of countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons in order to consolidate regional leadership, restore the balance of power with a hostile state that already has nuclear weapons, or both. Countries driven by these motivations could act by any means, including in violation of international law, International Atomic Energy Agency control, or international sanctions etc., to acquire nuclear weapons or develop their own nuclear fuel cycle technology to a level that would enable them to rapidly manufacture a nuclear weapon if the political situation called for it (thus putting themselves in the group of ‘latent' nuclear powers)
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From page 233... ...
• an effective missile defense system cannot be built within just one country because of the unpredictability of potential missile threats and the need to be able to destroy the targets at various stages of the flight trajectory • establishing components of a missile defense system outside a country's own territory requires joint efforts by countries to build the system; failure to ensure cooperation would lead to concern among neighbors of the countries where missile defense components are to be installed that the system could be directed against them • building a missile defense system on an international basis requires a command and operation system that would give countries joint use of national information and weapons systems; the system's command structure would have to enable military units from the participating states to take part in the system's operation. With regard to existing missile defense and systems, a collective missile defense system would have to include: • national missile attack warning systems • national missile defense systems such as the S-400, Patriot, and IGIS systems to destroy targets during the active phase of the trajectory • ground-based missile defense systems, including radar facilities, to destroy the warheads during the passive phase of the trajectory • command facilities enabling the system to function as a collective whole and pool together national information and weapons systems There is probably no sense in including weapons systems to destroy warheads during the final phase of the trajectory in the collective missile defense system, but information coordination between the national and collective missile defense systems will be essential.
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From page 234... ...
The main motivations driving Iran seem to be aspirations for regional leadership and the fact that Israel possesses nuclear weapons. The fact that Israel does not officially admit to possessing nuclear weapons creates a situation in which it offers no negative guarantees to non-nuclear states and this acts as an added incentive for other countries to obtain nuclear weapons.
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From page 235... ...
Furthermore, in taking on a share of the responsibility for Iran's security, the international community has the right to assume that this reduces the motivations for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. As for Iran's potential participation in the work of the data exchange center, this would give it the chance to receive full information on the missile situation within the framework of the existing missile attack warning systems and the agreed procedures for informing on all kinds of upcoming missile launches.
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From page 236... ...
The conclusion, therefore, is that during their consultations on establishing a European missile defense system, Russia, the United States, and NATO should focus not on neutralizing potential threats to Russia from the American system, but on designing the system for the priority missions of preventing nuclear weapons proliferation and preventing the use of nuclear weapons. Traditionally, the United States has never been inclined to share command with anyone else, and this is true also of the elements of the proposed European missile defense system in Europe.
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