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Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015 Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop (2009) / Chapter Skim
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NUCLEAR SECURITY IN 2015: THE CASE OF NORTH KOREA
Pages 237-244

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From page 237...
... There may also be other locations related to nuclear weapons development, assembly, storage and even deployment. In my meetings with North Korean nuclear scientists, they state that they do not know where the nuclear material goes once it leaves their installation.
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From page 238...
... Key issues remaining include: convincing North Korea to disclose whether it has an HEU program, to dismantle its nuclear weapons, ship its spent fuel and weapons-grade plutonium out of the country, and put in place extensive verification measures. Moreover, if there is a price to be paid, it will be high and may include the provision of light-water reactors (LWRs)
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From page 239...
... Another important issue might be the fate of North Korean nuclear weapons scientists who could flee the country, including to states that Pyongyang has maintained close ties with over the years, such as Iran and Syria, that also present proliferation concerns. All of this speculation lends itself to a matrix, which combines different outcomes for the denuclearization process and the political evolution of North Korea.
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From page 240...
... In that context, given North Korea's limited financial and technical capabilities and the abundant resources of the other Six Party Talks participants, international cooperation in achieving a nuclear-free North is inevitable. Moreover, the international community can bring to bear its extensive experience cooperating in many of the areas necessary for denuclearization: dismantling nuclear weapons, shipping spent fuel and weapons-grade plutonium, dismantling nuclear facilities, conducting environmental remediation, redirecting nuclear scientists, and verification.
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From page 241...
... U.S.-RUSSIAN COOPERATION Looking at the range of tasks required by denuclearization -- removal of North Korea spent fuel and plutonium, dismantlement of nuclear weapons, environmental remediation, redirection of North Korean nuclear weapons scientists, and establishment of an effective verification regime -- it is clear that Moscow and Washington could cooperate on a number of denuclearization tasks. For example, the redirection of North Korean nuclear weapons scientists will become an important priority as denuclearization proceeds.
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From page 242...
... The Libyan reactor conversion was carried out under the auspices of the U.S.-Russian Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors Program and included the repatriation of 17 kg of HEU and the provision of new LEU fuel by Russia.335 • reestablishing international ties with North Korean nuclear institutes, such as the Institute for Atomic Energy, which has a number of units and 600 scientists and technicians focusing on cyclotron operations, radio isotopic production, radiation detection, nuclear fusion research, and nuclear electronic engineering.336 Russia, working closely with the United States and other participants in the Six Party Talks, might make other significant contributions to the denuclearization process. Such activities might include participating in: 1)
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From page 243...
... But both countries share a common interest in ensuring that any future demise of North Korea does not result in the leakage of WMD stockpiles, materials or scientists. Moreover, if denuclearization proceeds as a result of the Beijing Six Party Talks, close bilateral cooperation on key issues where each could bring to bear extensive technical and historical experience would seem to serve the interests of both Washington and Moscow as well as the other parties to those discussions.
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Key Terms

  • north korean
  • spent fuel
  • korean nuclear
  • six party
  • party talks

  • south korea
  • international cooperation
  • denuclearization process
  • threat reduction
  • international community

  • weapons scientists
  • weapons program
  • nuclear arsenal
  • dismantling nuclear
  • nuclear scientists

  • nuclear material
  • inside north
  • wmd stockpiles
  • korean peninsula
  • close ties

  • redirection program
  • particularly difficult
  • american experts
  • korean political
  • denuclearization proceeds

  • environmental remediation
  • plutonium production
  • maintained close
  • include nuclear
  • denuclearizing north


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