Future of the Nuclear Security Environment in 2015 Proceedings of a Russian-U.S. Workshop (2009) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
APPENDIX D: JOINT STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENTS VLADIMIR V. PUTIN AND GEORGE W. BUSH AND INTERNATIONAL STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR SECURITY
APPENDIX D: JOINT STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENTS VLADIMIR V. PUTIN AND GEORGE W. BUSH AND INTERNATIONAL STATEMENTS ON NUCLEAR SECURITY
Pages 272-298
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 272... ...
To this end the United States and Russia will continue and expand their cooperation on emergency response capability to deal with the consequences of a nuclear/radiological incident, including the development of additional technical methods to detect nuclear and radioactive materials that are, or may be, involved in the incident. We will work together to help ensure full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and early adoption of an International Convention on Nuclear Terrorism and the amended Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
|
From page 273... ...
The United States and Russia will continue our cooperation on security upgrades of nuclear facilities and develop a plan of work through and beyond 2008 on joint projects. Recognizing that the terrorist threat is both long-term and constantly evolving, in 2008 our countries will assess the joint projects and identify avenues for future cooperation consistent with our increased attention to the security culture in both countries.
|
From page 274... ...
We call on all States not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Hague Code of Conduct Against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles, to accede without delay. We remain ready to assist States to this end.
|
From page 275... ...
We reaffirm our full support for the IAEA. We are working for the implementation of a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol to become the universally accepted norm for verifying compliance with NPT safeguards obligations.
|
From page 276... ...
14. We believe that strengthened conditions on the supply of sensitive technology should be accompanied by new measures to ensure that those states which forgo the nuclear fuel cycle and meet all nuclear non-proliferation obligations enjoy assured access to the market for nuclear fuel and related services.
|
From page 277... ...
We continue to support full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including its non-proliferation aspects. While acknowledging the obligation to destroy chemical weapons within the time limits provided for by the chemical weapons convention and to destroy or convert chemical weapons production facilities, we recall that States Party agreed in 2003 to an Action Plan which requires all to have national implementing measures in place by the time of the Conference of States Party scheduled for this November.
|
From page 278... ...
We welcome the results of the IAEA's International Conference on Nuclear Security which was held in London in March. We have all signed the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management and urge others to join us.
|
From page 279... ...
proposal for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership to develop innovative nuclear reactor and fuel cycle technologies. Following up on these initiatives, the United States and the Russian Federation intend to work together, actively involving the IAEA, to allow all nations to enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy without pursuing uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing capabilities.
|
From page 280... ...
We applaud the extension of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the decision by the States Parties to strengthen the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
|
From page 281... ...
The Russian Federation and the United States are actively working for the unity among the UN Security Council members on these sensitive issues. We will continue consultations with our G8 partners to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime Through our cooperation in the field of nuclear non-proliferation we seek to improve the security of our own peoples and of all others in the world community.
|
From page 282... ...
Building on our earlier work, the Global Initiative reflects our intention to pursue the necessary steps with all those who share our views to prevent the acquisition, transport, or use by terrorists of nuclear materials and radioactive substances or improvised explosive devices using such materials, as well as hostile actions against nuclear facilities. These objectives are reflected in the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities as amended in 2005, the Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, and other international legal frameworks relevant to combating nuclear terrorism.
|
From page 283... ...
We trust that, through their participation in this new Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, all countries that share our common goals of suppressing and mitigating the consequences of acts of nuclear terrorism will - on a voluntary basis and on the basis of independent responsibility of each country for the steps taken within its jurisdiction - reinforce the joint efforts to increase international cooperation in combating this threat. The United States and the Russian Federation reaffirm that issues related to safeguarding nuclear weapons and other nuclear facilities, installations and materials used for military purposes remain strictly the national prerogative of the nuclear weapons state parties to the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT)
|
From page 284... ...
In this context we urge all states that have not yet done so, to sign, ratify and implement these instruments promptly. We are actively engaged in efforts toward this goal, with a view to make comprehensive safeguards agreements together with an Additional Protocol the universally accepted verification standard.
|
From page 285... ...
In this regard, it is important to develop and implement mechanisms assuring access to nuclear fuel related services to states as an alternative to pursuing enrichment and reprocessing activities. In this respect we appreciate the recent potentially complementary Initiative of the President of the Russian Federation on multinational centres to provide nuclear fuel cycle services and the Initiative of the President of the United States on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership as well as the recent initiative tabled at the IAEA by France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States regarding a concept for a multilateral mechanism for reliable access to enrichment services for nuclear fuel.
|
From page 286... ...
We note the commitments India has made, and encourage India to take further steps towards integration into the mainstream of strengthening the non-proliferation regime, so as to facilitate a more forthcoming approach towards nuclear cooperation to address its energy requirements, in a manner that enhances and reinforces the global non-proliferation regime. BTWC We look forward to a successful 6th BTWC Review Conference dedicated to the effective review of the operation of the Convention.
|
From page 287... ...
Libya The international community's positive response to Libya's renunciation of weapons of mass destruction demonstrates the benefits that follow a strategic decision to cooperate with the international community and be a part of the global non-proliferation mainstream. Iran We remain seriously concerned over the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear programme and we remain united in our commitment to see those implications resolved.
|
From page 288... ...
Iran has failed to take the steps needed to allow negotiations to begin, specifically the suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities, as required by the IAEA and supported in the United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement. The Ministers therefore decided to return the issue to the United Nations Security Council.
|
From page 289... ...
Much has been accomplished in all areas but more has to be done to increase the efficiency of our cooperation. We reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of all G8 Global Partnership objectives.
|
From page 290... ...
We are prepared to support expansion of nuclear energy in the following ways, consistent with national law and international legal frameworks. These efforts build on, reinforce, and complement a range of existing activities, including the work at the IAEA for reliable access to nuclear fuel, the initiative of the Russian Federation on developing Global Nuclear Infrastructure, including the nuclear fuel center in the Russian Federation, the initiative of the United States to establish the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, the IAEA International Project on Innovative Nuclear Rectors and Fuel Cycles, and the Generation IV International Forum.
|
From page 291... ...
Providing nuclear fuel services, including taking steps to ensure that the commercial nuclear fuel market remains stable and that states are assured of reliable access to nuclear fuel and fuel services for the lifetime of reactors, including through establishment of international nuclear fuel cycle centers, to provide nuclear fuel cycle services, including uranium enrichment, under IAEA safeguards. Supporting negotiation of long-term contracts for power reactors and research reactors, including assured supply of fuel and arrangements for management of spent fuel.
|
From page 292... ...
The strengthening and universalisation of WMD related treaties, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, are therefore a key priority. These three treaties continue to be essential instruments to maintain international peace and security and are the cornerstones of the international regime for non-proliferation and disarmament.
|
From page 293... ...
To that end we need to strengthen verification and enforcement. We are committed to continue our efforts to make the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol the universally accepted verification standard for the peaceful use undertakings of the NPT.
|
From page 294... ...
In this context, we reaffirm our commitment to ensure that the highest possible non-proliferation, safety and security standards for the peaceful use of nuclear energy are observed. We appreciate suggested initiatives in the field of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the Russian initiative on multinational centres to provide nuclear fuel cycle services, the US initiative on the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, the Six-Party proposal of a standing mechanism for reliable access to nuclear fuel, the Japanese initiative on an IAEA standby arrangements system for the assurance of nuclear fuel supply, the UK proposal for non-revocable advanced export approval and the German initiative to establish a special territory under the exclusive control of the IAEA where enrichment could take place on a commercial basis.
|
From page 295... ...
We urge States that have not done so to sign and to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials in its amended version.
|
From page 296... ...
It is our common interest to maintain and if necessary to improve nuclear safety, radiation safety, waste management, nuclear security and nuclear liability in our respective countries, and we call upon all other States to do the same. Nuclear Regulatory Infrastructure In view of the continuous safety and security challenges, we will continue to support measures to promote nuclear (safety and security)
|
From page 297... ...
We welcome continued cooperation with relevant international organizations active in this area. Priority actions are: • Use of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management for open and critical peer review and a source for learning about the best safety practices of others; • Promote utilization of IAEA Safety Standards for the modernisation of national safety regulations, to the extent feasible; • Promote exchange of operation experience for improving operating and regulatory practices; and • Multinational cooperation in the safety review of nuclear power plant designs.
|
From page 298... ...
This evolving global nuclear safety network is based on considerable work of international organizations in particular the IAEA and OECD-NEA. It will substantially contribute to maintain competence and to continuously develop effective protection against nuclear hazards.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.