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Introduction
Pages 13-24

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From page 13...
... on "the prevention of proliferation of biological weapons." This study, which is the topic of this report, was to identify areas for future cooperation with developing countries outside the former Soviet Union (FSU) within the framework of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
From page 14...
... This report sets forth the findings and recommendations of the Committee on the Prevention of Proliferation of Biological Weapons in States Beyond the Former Soviet Union, which was established by the NRC to undertake the study. Also included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Section 1306) was a provision calling for an NAS study of new initiatives for the CTR Program.
From page 15...
... These capabilities include technical expertise of specialists who are trained or who have experience in addressing disease-related issues; methodologies that are used to characterize and manipulate biological systems; biological materials that are used for disease-related activities in laboratories, clinics, production facilities, and field investigations; and equipment that is essential for a wide range of biologyrelated activities. Unfortunately, many of these capabilities can be used for malevolent purposes.
From page 16...
... Most developing countries outside the FSU are not capable of conducting dual-use research designed to alter the properties of existing organisms through molecular technologies, but many of these countries conduct or could conduct applied research using organisms of concern for biological warfare or bioterrorism. Thus, NSABB reports provide useful guidance for addressing long-term research problems throughout the world.
From page 17...
... There may be no need to scale fences or pass armed guards to obtain the product, which could be abundant in nature and routinely encountered in areas where the associated disease is endemic. Trained microbiologists might easily acquire suitable organisms from the environment or from a rural health clinic or veterinary station to create a bioterrorism event.
From page 18...
... physical security measures to preclude unauthorized access to or use of especially dangerous pathogens and protection of knowledge and intellectual property; (3) safe and secure acquisition, storage, handling, maintenance, transportation, inventory management, and disposal of especially dangerous pathogens; (4)
From page 19...
... See, for example, International Biological Threat Reduction Program, Sandia National Laboratories.
From page 20...
... Rather, funding for those organizations for nonproliferation purposes will continue to be provided from appropriations to the Department of State or DOD when those organizations consider such funding to be appropriate. However, the related report by the NRC Committee on Strengthening and Expanding the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program suggests that, alternatively, nonproliferation funds might be appropriated directly to HHS and USDA.
From page 21...
... Several issues are identified that should be addressed in initiating BTRP activities designed to help counter the proliferation of biological weapons. • Chapter 2 addresses the capacities of developing countries to take advantage of achievements in the life sciences while containing potentially dangerous materials, expertise, and technologies.
From page 22...
... Significant reports have been prepared by development agencies and independent specialists concerning human resource development, health and agriculture programs, and physical infrastructure deficiencies in developing countries. Consultations with specialists associated with the World Bank, the private sector, and the NGO community helped fill gaps in the published literature.
From page 23...
... Information developed at the workshops was available to the committee. Finally, comments by knowledgeable specialists from around the world set forth in the boxes throughout the report present a limited sampling of views that are relevant to past activities of BTRP and its future activities beyond the FSU.


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