Countering Biological Threats Challenges for the Department of Defense's Nonproliferation Program Beyond the Former Soviet Union (2009) / Chapter Skim
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3 Applicability of Biological Threat Reduction Approaches in the Former Soviet Union to Other Developing Countries
3 Applicability of Biological Threat Reduction Approaches in the Former Soviet Union to Other Developing Countries
Pages 59-90
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From page 59... ...
This objective includes reducing the risk of bioterrorism. In 2008, BTRP received funding to explore the expansion of its activities to developing countries outside the FSU.
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From page 60... ...
2007. The Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense: From Foreign Assistance to Sustainable Partnerships.
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From page 61... ...
It was believed that such illegitimate activities could be undertaken by the Russian government or by individuals previously involved in the Soviet weapons program who might develop connections to criminal or terrorist organizations. The legacy of a robust Soviet biological weapons program loomed large, and the U.S.
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From page 62... ...
a sudden shift from a stable, centrally planned economy to economic chaos as the transformation to market economies began. While South Africa established and then dismantled a biological weapons capability and may have residual capabilities of concern, it is an exception among developing countries. When BTRP began its activities and even today, the conditions in the FSU were and continue to be different from the environments encountered in developing countries outside the FSU.
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From page 63... ...
, 2006b Physicians per 10,000 population, 2000- 37 36 47 39 31 27 2006b Persons employed in research and n/a 10,195 11,997 11,910 85,211 n/a development, 2006c Gross tertiary enrollment rate, 2006c,d n/a 14.81 38.20 51.18 72.78 9.80 Computers per 1,000 people, 2005c n/a 20 50 n/a 50 30 Internet users per 1,000 people, 2007a n/a 120 80 120 220 40 Exports of goods and services as percent of n/a 72.50 45.30 50.60 48.20 38.40 GDP, 2006b aThe World Bank Group World Development Indicators; www.worldbank.org. Accessed January 12, 2009.
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From page 64... ...
, 2006b Improved sanitation facilities (percent of 31 94 81 72 58 59 urban population with access) , 2006b Physicians per 10,000 population, 2000- 1 7 20 5 8 8 2006b Persons employed in research and n/a 12,669 33,484 n/a 12,689 17,915 development, 2006c Gross tertiary enrollment rate, 2006c,d n/a 28.58 26.08 11.83 4.52 15.41 Computers per 1,000 people, 2005c n/a 220 140 20 10 80 Internet users per 1,000 people, 2007a n/a 560 220 240 110 80 Exports of goods and services as percent of n/a 117.10 31.90 37.80 15.50 29.10 GDP, 2006b aTheWorld Bank Group World Development Indicators; www.worldbank.org.
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From page 65... ...
2. Consolidate especially dangerous pathogens into safe, secure repositories at central reference laboratories (CRLs)
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From page 66... ...
Changes observed in that report that seem to be desired outcomes of BTRP programs that might be carried out in other areas of the world include the following: • Transparency at important facilities with dual-use capabilities that had not been open to foreign specialists on a regular basis • Sharing of local databases involving pathogens with international collaborators • Improved biosecurity and biosafety programs at research and surveillance institutions, particularly with regard to consolidation and physical protection of pathogen strains • Development of national regulations and related training programs concerning the safety and security of biological materials and good laboratory practices that meet international standards • Construction and equipping of modern research, public health, and agricultural facilities where disease-related activities of interest to both local and international specialists are carried out • Adoption by local institutions with responsibilities for controlling diseases of U.S.-style approaches to facility and project management, to fiscal accountability, and to inventory control • Attraction and retention of highly talented young specialists to upgraded local facilities carrying out research and providing services in the fields of public health and agriculture • Capabilities of local specialists to use effectively modern diagnostic and research equipment • Enhanced disease surveillance and response capabilities that become an integral part of the national effort • Participation in scientific conferences and training programs abroad by local specialists interested in infectious diseases who had not previously traveled abroad • Publication by local scientists in peer-reviewed international journals of their disease-related research findings that demonstrate their capabilities to participate effectively in international scientific activities • Enhanced quality of local research projects and technology transfer activities that build on the experience and expertise of participation in international collaboration BTRP presentation to the committee, July 2008.
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From page 67... ...
Multifaceted Approach In recent years, BTRP has increasingly recognized the importance and benefits of a multifaceted approach to international engagement as an essential aspect for achieving overlapping biosecurity, public health, and agriculture objectives. Developing countries outside the FSU have little history of deliberate misuse of biological assets for weapons or for bioterrorism purposes.
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From page 68... ...
As a primary example of responding to multiple biological threats, strengthening the entire health system is essential, as indicated in Box 3-1, although programs other than BTRP must carry most of the burden in this regard. The wide variety of recommendations throughout the reports of the World Bank reflects the importance of a multifaceted approach to upgrading biosecurity capabilities.
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From page 69... ...
Recommendation 3-2: BTRP should develop in cooperation with each partner government a Strategic Plan that describes the security situation and particularly vulnerabilities relevant to biological assets in the country, disease burdens and trends, local capabilities to detect and respond to outbreaks, and plans for cooperative threat reduction activities within the context of national plans and capabilities of both countries. Development of country-specific Strategic Plans should begin during the process of BTRP's selection of countries for engagement.
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From page 70... ...
disease-related problems, including disease burdens throughout the country, the significance of these burdens, and current and recommended approaches to responding to the diseases. • The plan should address the four common weaknesses in developing countries discussed in Chapter 2: human resources, policy frameworks, physical infrastructures, and host-government commitments to biosecurity.
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From page 71... ...
It is unlikely that many countries outside the FSU will be attracted by a short list of especially dangerous pathogens or by even the entire Select Agent List of 72 pathogens. Indeed, in the United States and other industrialized countries, the Select Agent List is too limited as a focal point in establishing priorities, as has been demonstrated with the emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome.
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From page 72... ...
Recommendation 3-3: As BTRP considers engagement in developing countries outside the FSU with little or no history of biological warfare or bioterrorism activities, BTRP should continue to expand its list of pathogens of interest to include pathogens of high-priority local interest. Other DOD programs have projects devoted to HIV/AIDS and to malaria and other tropical diseases that are threatening populations.
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From page 73... ...
With individual integrating contractors now receiving hundreds of million of dollars, the pressure has increased within DOD for these contractors to perform well, although BTRP does not have the personnel to work with them as often as is desirable.
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From page 74... ...
Recommendation 3-4: Projects requiring renovation and construction activities should be an important aspect of BTRP activities in countries outside the FSU. To the extent possible, BTRP contractors should involve appropriate local institutions in all aspects of design and construction activities while of course continuing to provide quality control and accounting oversight.
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From page 75... ...
The U.S. government could publish standards for reference laboratories and central instrumentation centers and have BTRP work actively with these multilateral development banks on laboratory upgrade programs.
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Now CBR projects are increasingly justified as contributing in both the short term and the longer term to improved disease surveillance and response. Such coupling may also be appropriate in countries outside the FSU that are upgrading surveillance and response capabilities.
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academic community through the integrating contractors and directly when appropriate. It can enhance transparency of approaches to biological threat reduction and build trust in BTRP's
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From page 78... ...
and international organizations in addressing related issues should be helpful to BTRP. Bilateral Agreements, Executive Agents, and Appropriate Partners In the FSU, BTRP has signed formal agreements with ministries and other government organizations as the basis for undertaking programs.
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From page 79... ...
Also, developing formal agreements may be very time consuming and raise politically difficult issues, whereas less formal arrangements may facilitate prompt beginnings of important engagement activities. Of course, in some cases, agreements and executive agents may be necessary, particularly if large construction projects are to be undertaken.
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From page 80... ...
Also, the primary and secondary school systems in the FSU, despite a decrease in quality in recent years, are still much stronger than systems in almost all developing countries outside the FSU. As recommended in Chapter 2, BTRP should be prepared to support a variety of education programs and related training programs in the countries of interest for an extended period of time.
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From page 81... ...
In dealing with countries outside the FSU that have only a handful of interlocutors who are experienced with foreign providers of goods and services, BTRP should be more adept in reacting promptly with more flexibility in embracing good project ideas. Otherwise, excessive correspondence concerning BTRP may remain for months in in-boxes of a few overworked local officials who are the only empowered decision makers.
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From page 82... ...
P 62 in The Biological Threat Reduction Program of the Department of Defense: From Foreign Assistance to Sustainable Partnerships.
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From page 83... ...
and the unique contributions of BTRP to reducing biological threats. One approach is for BTRP to support continuing assessments of BTRP impacts by both a group of specialists within BTRP in Washington and a counterpart group of local specialists in the host country focused on risk reduction.
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From page 84... ...
At the same time, the current midcourse review of the effectiveness of the TADR system in Georgia is a step in the right direction, even though the assumption that TADR is an appropriate approach is not being challenged by the external evaluators -- a shortcoming that should be corrected in the future. Recommendation 3-9: BTRP should continue to develop improved metrics that will help guide evaluations of the impacts of BTRP and provide information for setting priorities for activities designed to reduce proliferation of biological weapons as well as related risks from naturally occurring contagious disease agents.
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From page 85... ...
The partner governments and local specialists will undoubtedly have to go through a lengthy education period concerning BTRP objectives and approaches. But excessive BTRP control over activities in the name of efficiency could degrade the likelihood of sustainability.
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From page 86... ...
, where human and veterinary facilities are combined and a national response team is headquartered (see below) • BSL-2 diagnostic and detection laboratories at existing human and veterinary laboratories for disease surveillance and epidemiological analysis, case investigations involving sample transport capabilities, and disease detection and diagnostics by molecular and classic methods • Region-level support stations for disease surveillance and epidemiological analysis, case investigations, and disease reporting by veterinarians and epidemiologists Some aspects of this system are obviously important for many developing countries.
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From page 87... ...
This review should emphasize the risk-reduction potential of TADR, including its ability to strengthen local response to disease outbreaks and indications that TADR is achieving this goal. Central Reference Laboratories A special concern is the plan of BTRP to construct within the TADR system central reference laboratories with BSL-3 capabilities in one or more countries of the FSU (at a cost of up to $90 million each, plus operational costs of $5-10 million annually)
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From page 88... ...
Much of this at the Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of Experts at Geneva, Switzerland, August 18-22, 2008, and available online at www.bwpp.org/2008MX/documents/PresentationWHO20080819.pdf.) A more complete survey would undoubtedly indicate the presence of many more BSL-3 laboratories throughout the developing countries.
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From page 89... ...
Also, BTRP should ensure that its activities are carried out within the framework of the overall U.S. government approach to biological threat reduction, including the selection of countries and problems within countries that need attention.
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