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Tsunami Warning and Preparedness An Assessment of the U.S. Tsunami Program and the Nation's Preparedness Efforts (2011) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix F: June 14, 2005: A Case Study in Tsunami Warning and Response
Pages 243-248

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From page 243...
... Officials in southern California were faced with the potential of a locally damaging tsunami striking San Diego county that would not impact Tijuana, Baja California, a few miles to the south. By 8:19 PM, after further analysis, the Gorda earthquake was judged as not likely to be tsunamigenic (the earthquake magnitude was refined to measure M7.2 and was located in the middle of the Gorda Plate, not on the Cascadia subduction zone (CSZ)
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From page 244...
... , a teletype service connecting local law enforcement agencies to the California Department of Justice. At the same time that official notification to the CSWC and local governments was occurring, the WC/ATWC notification was being automatically transmitted over the Weather Wire to subscribers of email and pager notification services, over the Emergency Managers Weather Information Notification (EMWIN)
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From page 245...
... Given the short time span in Humboldt and Del Norte counties between earthquake shaking, issuance of the tsunami warning by the WC/ATWC, and possible tsunami wave arrival, this demand made it difficult for the CSWC and OES to expedite the warning process, a problem that was exacerbated by overloaded wire and cell telephone systems, inadequate staffing at the state and local government emergency operations centers, and limited training at the local government level. Despite the confusion that was prompted by the conflicting message sent by the Pacific Tsunami Warning and Mitigation System (PTWS)
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From page 246...
... At 8:40, an official State EMD Public Information Officer spoke to several radio and television stations regarding the evacuation suggestions, reminding citizens and officials that the warning of evacuation was only set in place for those living "on the beach" or in "low lying areas." Approximately 20 minutes later, the State EOC received the tsunami cancellation message, which it transmitted to the public via NAWAS 5 minutes later. Fortunately, no major tsunami occurred and the events of June 14 served as a "stress test" for the notification system technology, the training of warning personnel, and the response of the public to a potential tsunami.
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From page 247...
... • An earthquake will severely disrupt telecommunications and challenge even redun dant systems to perform their dissemination responsibilities.
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Key Terms

  • local government
  • law enforcement
  • del norte
  • warning center
  • local law

  • government emergency
  • crescent city
  • norte counties
  • emergency managers
  • pacific tsunami

  • initial notification
  • enforcement agencies
  • weather wire
  • local emergency
  • operations centers

  • emergency operations
  • earthquake shaking
  • five minutes
  • local officials
  • california law

  • tsunami waves
  • gorda plate
  • american plate
  • hawaii issued
  • verifying receipt

  • dispatch center
  • local levels
  • information service
  • staff residences
  • service connecting


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