Russian Views on Countering Terrorism During Eight Years of Dialogue Extracts from Proceedings of Four U.S.-Russian Workshops (2009) / Chapter Skim
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Methodology for Assessing the Risks of Terrorism--Nikolay A. Makhutov
Methodology for Assessing the Risks of Terrorism--Nikolay A. Makhutov
Pages 221-236
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From page 221... ...
The threat of terrorist acts must be included in the system of studies of possible scenarios of how emergency situations might develop. In particular, event trees used in risk analysis at critically important infrastructure sites must be augmented with scenarios taking into account possibilities of terrorist attacks, which substantially change the scenarios themselves as the structure of primary initiating factors in emergency situations.
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From page 222... ...
In order to analyze risk and security with the possibility of terrorist actions, it is first necessary to compare the initiation stage of the extreme situation through terrorist actions and the changes and structure of impact factors of the terrorist act with those in a traditional emergency caused by a natural or industrial disaster. It should also be noted that the modern strategy for ensuring natural and industrial safety, which calls for focusing efforts not on eliminating the consequences of extreme situations but on predicting and preventing them, must also be extended to cover situations in which emergencies are triggered through terrorist actions.
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From page 223... ...
This paper includes a number of simplified equations that are used for assessing risks and risk factors. These include a basic equation for risk assess
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From page 224... ...
For Russia the probability of the occurrence of national and regional natural-technogenic extreme situations differ by 1.4 times and are approximately an order of magnitude lower than the risk for local situations; the likelihood of local and facility-level accidents differs by 5 times. The results of the studies that have been conducted have been reflected in the fundamental multivolume series Russia's Safety3 and in issues of the journal Problems of Safety and Emergency Situations.4 The assessment of the probability P, damages U, and risks R of accidents and catastrophic situations involves a group of risk identification methods, including various methods for analyzing statistical information on natural and technogenic catastrophes of a particular type in the region being studied, as well as methods for analyzing the reliability of equipment and technological processes and the effectiveness of management and control.
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From page 225... ...
Here the TERRORISM Types of Terrorism Traditional Technological Terrorism Intellectual Terrorism Terrorism Initiating Actions Impact Factors Initial -- 100% Initial -- 1–10% Initial -- <0.1% Secondary -- 90–99% Secondary -- <10% Cascading -- >90% FIGURE 2 Types of terrorism and impact factors.
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From page 226... ...
These factors are capable of creating secondary impacts and damages leading to a cascade of tertiary impact factors. The appearance and development of primary, secondary, and cascading impact factors of terrorism are subject to practically the same natural processes that shape traditional accidents and catastrophes at technosphere facilities that create extreme situations of a technogenic nature.
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From page 227... ...
In this case the catastrophe initiated by a terrorist act is realized on a substantially shorter time interval tTR not linked with the time to needed to achieve a dangerous condition according to existing design norms and operating rules for the potentially dangerous facility. The time trajec
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From page 228... ...
If one analyzes the systemic risks of natural and technogenic catastrophes (or risks of extreme situations of a natural and technogenic character) , then taking these into account in determining the probability of systemic threats using the functional FPS, we may write Formula 5 as follows:
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From page 229... ...
It is well known that probabilities P0 depend on manifestations of dangerous natural processes, on the condition of the critical infrastructure site, and consequently on PT . Here the probability of terrorist impacts on special facilities in the technosphere (dams, mines, dangerous chemical storage facilities, mine tailing dumps at mining complexes)
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. Terrorist acts are primarily manifested in increasing statistics regarding victims of the terrorist acts themselves UNTR.
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From page 231... ...
where ns is the safety coefficient for systemic risks, [PS]
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From page 232... ...
than the damages USTR inflicted on the economy by the unprotectedness of critical facilities against terrorist acts. In developing the fundamentals of state policy, the regulatory and legal base, draft plans for federal programs and pilot industry-wide and facility-wide projects to protect critical facilities, the population, and the vital infrastructure against threats of a technogenic, natural, and terrorist nature, the following areas of scientific research and development have the greatest significance: • developing a base of scientific criteria for assessing the status of critical facilities and preparing a state registry of such facilities appropriate for protection against terrorist actions • creating scientific foundations and principles for the design, construction, and operation of facilities and building systems for their protection • creating theories and methods for control, diagnostics, monitoring, and forecasting of terrorism risks for critical facilities, operators, and personnel at the stages of their design, construction, operation, and removal from service • developing educational and methodological foundations for training and retraining specialists and managers at all levels in ensuring protection for critical facilities and analyzing and managing risks of terrorism BUILDING A SYSTEM TO PROTECT AGAINST TERRORISM Based on the experience of the atomic energy and missile/aerospace technology industries in analyzing extreme situations of a technogenic nature, including those initiated by terrorist acts, it has been proposed to classify accident situations according to the degree of protection against them.
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From page 233... ...
or accident situations technological terrorism accidents and catastrophes 1 Normal conditions Not conducted Heightened 2 Deviations from Not mandatory Sufficient normal conditions 3 Design-related accidents Mandatory Partial 4 Not designed accidents Necessary Insufficient 5 Hypothetical accidents Important Low of accidents and catastrophic situations in the technogenic sphere may be represented as follows (see Table 2) according to their degree and likelihood of occurrence at potentially dangerous facilities: • operational -- under normal operating conditions, occur during staff operation of potentially dangerous facilities; have predictable consequences; high degree of protection against them • design-related -- occur when ordinary operating regimes are exceeded; have predictable and acceptable consequences; sufficient protection against them • not designed -- occur as a result of irreversible damages to key components with heavy damages and high numbers of casualties; insufficient degree of protection against them; require subsequent reconstruction work at the facility • hypothetical -- can occur as a result of previously unforeseeable scenarios of development and entail the maximum possible damages and casualties; low degree of protection against them; direct restoration of facilities impossible Whereas until recently it was believed that major acts of terrorism could primarily create hypothetical accident situations, now in a number of cases analysis of the risks of terrorism must be extended to not designed and design-related accidents as well.
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From page 234... ...
: • rigid protection -- protection requiring the expenditure of a large amount of energy to overcome • continuous functional protection -- protection that in an accident or deviation from normal operational status for the elements of a complex technical system could take on certain system functions for a limited time or could prevent an accident from progressing further • natural protection -- protection that involves the use of passive natural phenomena and processes aimed at curtailing accidents and reducing the level of impact factors • security guards Circles 1, 2, and 3 stand for separate types of protection systems. Areas of intersection (1-2, 2-3, 1-3, and 1-2-3 correspond to a combination of correspondent types of protection systems.
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From page 235... ...
One of the most important factors in overcoming all of the types of terrorism discussed in this paper has been and remains that of direct counteractions against those who organize and carry out terrorist acts. ADDITIONAL REFERENCES General Council of the Russian Federation Scientific Research Institute of Problems of Reinforcing Law and Order.
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