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Problems of Biological Security in Agriculture--Georgy A. Safonov and Vladimir A. Gavrilov
Pages 51-60

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From page 51...
... The plant was part of the special system of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture intended for organizing and carrying out efforts to respond to emergency situations arising in the agricultural sphere during outbreaks of especially dangerous diseases. Leading specialists at the plant include scientists working on matters related to eliminating the consequences of unforeseen situations, including biological terrorism.
From page 52...
... One must also consider the additional costs of maintaining personnel to monitor the appearance of infection foci, diagnose animal diseases, quarantine infected individuals, restrict the transport of animals, test the quality of meat and milk, and certify these and other livestock-related products as unfit for sale if necessary. This is a far from complete list of the economic costs borne by the state and counted on by the terrorists.
From page 53...
... Today, the overwhelming majority of states and their leaders actively oppose the use of pathogens as a means for the mass destruction of people, plants, and animals. Thanks to the activism of many politicians advocating controls over work with especially dangerous pathogens, you will not hear any strategists of warfare or terrorist acts saying that biological weapons are not only the most economically accessible, but also the most humane of weapons from the standpoint of preserving material valuables or the environment.
From page 54...
... joint expert committee on veterinary sanitation.3 However, in certain cases this system is ignored for reasons of economic constraints, which usually follow after the issuance of official FAO notifications on the presence of quarantine infections in a country. This creates a precedent for the wide-scale spread of especially dangerous infections.
From page 55...
... It took years to eliminate this outbreak, and the country's economy suffered significant damage. We are well aware of the fact that industrial or research work with pathogens also requires special safety equipment and technical conditions, depending on their individual properties.4 Today in Russia, not only technologies, but also pathogen strains used in production are being sold off.
From page 56...
... Highly infectious material can be produced in quantities sufficient for the commission of terrorist acts even in the most primitive conditions -- barns, caves, or even animal pens. Doing this would require just 1-2 ml of a pathogen and a susceptible animal.
From page 57...
... First, legislative limits must be placed on the number of scientific institutes and biological enterprises that are authorized to work with especially dangerous pathogens and with infectious materials in general. The international community must develop methods for monitoring the safe operation of biological enterprises regardless of their ownership.
From page 58...
... It is also essential to strengthen the 1972 convention on the prohibition of biological weapons, first of all by creating an atmosphere of international trust. From the first years of its production activity, the Pokrov Biological Preparations Plant of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture operated on a self-financing basis, requiring no budget support from the government.
From page 59...
... These infections have really appeared on the horizon of the twenty-first century in connection with the growth of international trade, tourism, ethnic conflicts, natural and technological catastrophes, and an ever-increasing number of militarized conflicts. Given the real threat of biocatastrophes, efforts must be stepped up to create international institutions that will focus their activities on rendering practical assistance to states in eliminating even small foci of especially dangerous exotic diseases.
From page 60...
... 1968. Thermonuclear, chemical, and biological weapons: means of mass destruction.


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