Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities (2009) / Chapter Skim
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9 Speculations on the Dynamics of Cyberconflict
9 Speculations on the Dynamics of Cyberconflict
Pages 302-317
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From page 302... ...
In the language of defense policy, deterrence is an often-used and highly elastic concept, and it is hard to find an authoritative statement of its precise meaning. For purposes of this document, the definition provided by the U.S.
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From page 303... ...
Antiballistic missile defenses, for example, are intended to prevent hostile ballistic missiles from striking friendly targets. Chemical protective suits are intended to reduce the effectiveness of chemical weapons against friendly forces.
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might be required. Possible actions to be deterred include: • Nuclear attack • Attack with conventional forces • ttack with biological or • Cyberattack A chemical weapons • Adversary interventions in other locales 3.
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From page 305... ...
That is, each side could, in principle, use kinetic weapons to attack physical targets, and these targets might be military or dual purpose in nature as long as they are legitimate targets This statement is NOT intended to indicate acceptance or rejection of the counterforce argument in the nuclear domain -- it is only to say that regardless of whether the counterforce argument is valid in the nuclear domain, it has little validity in the cyber domain.
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From page 306... ...
9.2.1 Crisis Stability Where kinetic weapons are concerned, crisis stability refers to that condition in which neither side has incentives to attack first. Crisis stability is especially important for nuclear weapons, where the existence of an invulnerable submarine-based nuclear missile force means that an adversary could not escape retaliation no matter how devastating or successful a first strike it could launch against the United States.
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From page 307... ...
A second relevant scenario is one in which Zendia is planning a kinetic attack on Ruritania. Intelligence information, such as photographs of troop movements, might well indicate that preparations for such an attack were being made.
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From page 308... ...
Or Nation A may do X, expecting it to be seen as a minor action intended only to show mild displeasure and thinking that Nation B will do Y in response, where Y is also a relatively mild action. But due to a variety of circumstances, Nation B sees X as a major escalatory action and responds accordingly with Z, an action that is much more significant than Y
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From page 309... ...
An extreme case is that in the event of a cyberattack of sufficient scale and duration to threaten a nation's ability to function as a modern society, the attacked nation might choose to respond with kinetic force to the nation causing such problems. On the other hand, the attacked nation may have an interest in refraining from a kinetic response -- for example, it may believe that a kinetic response would be too provocative and might result in an undesired escalation of the conflict.
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From page 310... ...
9.2.3 Complications Introduced by Patriotic Hackers Past experience strongly indicates that conflict or increased tension between two nations will result in the "patriotic hackers" of both nations (and perhaps their allies) taking action intended to harass or damage the other side.
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From page 311... ...
, their geographic locations, their strategic significance, and so on. A second set of incentives is based on concerns about "blowback" -- the possibility that a cyberattack launched by the United States against Zendian computers might somehow affect U.S.
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9.2.6 The Role of Transparency Where kinetic weapons are concerned, transparency and confidencebuilding measures such as adherence to mutually agreed "rules of the road" for naval ships at sea, prenotification of large troop movements, and non-interference with national technical means of verification have been used to promote stability and mutual understanding about a potential adversary's intent. Secrecy surrounding cyberattack policy works against transparency.
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From page 313... ...
Thus, one might plausibly consider, in addition to the usual law enforcement efforts, a different response paradigm that could call for cyberattacks to terminate or attenuate their activities. Against non-state parties, deterrence by retaliation may be particularly ineffective.
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For example, kinetic terrorism usually has dramatically visible effects, whereas the effects of a sustained guerilla campaign of cyberattacks may be far less visible, especially against the background noise of daily cyberattacks from myriad sources. Uncertainty and an undermining of confidence in information technology may be the most likely result of a cyber campaign.
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From page 315... ...
Because the locus of an attack can be shifted arbitrarily and essentially instantaneously, active threat neutralization would provide at best transient relief, if any at all. Moreover, enlisting the assistance of foreign national authorities is problematic because a shifting geographic locus can easily negate the effectiveness of any assistance offered.
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From page 316... ...
Under such circumstances, the reputations of the different parties in the eyes of each other are likely to play a much larger political role. • The United States plants software agents in some of Zendia's critical networks to collect intelligence information.
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From page 317... ...
Initially, no definitive technical attribution can be made regarding the perpetrator of the attack, but in a matter of weeks, an all-source attribution -- depending on somewhat uncertain human and signals intelligence -- suggests that the perpetrator could be Zendia. The United States decides on a mixed kinetic and cyber response against Zendia but must persuade allies and the rest of the world that its attack on Zendia is in fact justified.
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