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4 Cost-Benefit Analysis
Pages 44-53

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From page 44...
... likely is not the case for ASP deployments. FINDING Because DNDO's preliminary estimates indicate that the cost increases from replacing the PVT/RIID combination with ASPs outweigh the cost reductions from operational efficiencies, it is important to consider carefully the conditions under which the benefits of deploying ASPs justify the program costs.
From page 45...
... FINDING DHS' definition of "significant increase in operational effectiveness" is a modest set of goals: The increases in operational efficiency do not by themselves appear to outweigh the cost increases from replacing the PVT/RIID combination with ASPs, based on DNDO's preliminary estimates, and the criteria do not require significantly improved ability to detect special nuclear material in primary screening (see Sidebar 3.1)
From page 46...
... It may be difficult to justify a threat detection program based on only easily quantifiable benefits such as the benefits of reduced man-hours spent scanning cargo. However, a major benefit of threat detection programs is an increase in security, and careful consideration needs to be given to addressing these benefits in a thorough way.
From page 47...
... In particular, this will involve considering how the ASP's capabilities contribute to the larger context of the threat detection system intended to prevent nuclear and radiological threat material from entering the United States, known as the "Global Architecture." Radiation portal monitors (RPMs) detect threat materials entering the United States in cargo containers on trucks via land border crossings and seaports, and constitute one piece of this system.
From page 48...
... When this occurs, the conveyance is pulled aside for a secondary screening using a second PVT (the truck passes through the detector at a slower rate) and a hand-held RIID operated by a CBP officer.
From page 49...
... Another alternative could be to maintain current CONOPS, but deploy alternative technologies, such as improved RIIDs. The use of newly available RIIDs and associated software could improve the performance of secondary screening: newer, more sensitive models of RIIDs are available.
From page 50...
... A well-performed CBA that helps in procurement decisions for ASPs is not going to be a simple analysis following standard formulae commonly used in other kinds of procurements. DNDO expressed its difficulty in assessing two of the cost-risk elements in the cost-benefit analysis with respect to equipment performance: assessing the probabilities of failure to detect threat material, and factoring in potential consequences of such a failure.
From page 51...
... For example, circumstances could include different types of nuclear materials, use of different shielding or masking methods, technology performance now or in the future, different operating environments, different numbers of weapons available to the adversary, or failure of primary and secondary inspection 43 Other parts of DHS have conducted expert elicitations of threat probabilities with members of the intelligence community. A recent report by the National Research Council cautioned about limitations of this approach for the bioterrorism risk assessment.
From page 52...
... demonstrated the public policy opportunity that exists in commercial aviation because of tipping effects that would lead to mass adoption of baggage screening technologies under the right policy incentives. Researchers who have used game theory to assess protection of critical infrastructure from terrorism are just beginning to explore the utility of these approaches to decisions about radiation portal monitors (Bier and Azaiez 2009; Dighe et al.
From page 53...
... In security applications, these conditions could be a required reduction in overall risk (see Willis and LaTourrette 2008 analysis of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative) or a baseline estimate of a threat of attack that exists (see Martonosi et al.


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