Achieving Effective Acquisition of Information Technology in the Department of Defense (2010) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
2 The Acquisition Process and Culture
2 The Acquisition Process and Culture
Pages 28-46
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 28... ...
There have also been repeated efforts, most recently in December 2008, to reform the process defined by the DOD 5000 series in order to address persistent challenges in the acquisition system. The DOD has struggled to provide affordable and effective military capabilities through the defense acquisition system (and not just for IT systems)
|
From page 29... ...
A recent review conducted by the DOD Obama-Biden Presidential Transition Team noted unanimous agreement among the chief information officers (CIOs) of the DOD and the Military Services that the ability of the DOD acquisition process to deliver needed IT systems was "fundamentally broken." The CIOs cited the inability of the DOD acquisition system to field systems based on commercial technology while it was still state of the art.
|
From page 30... ...
As an example, one of the characteristics of most IT programs is their dependence on COTS technologies -- thus technology development and many other pre-Milestone B activities specified in the DOD 5000 series are unnecessary. Unfortunately, the tendency in the DOD has been to force-fit DOD 5000 processes, including pre-Milestone B activities -- onto COTS-based IT programs and to require that the programs conduct technology demonstrations with mature (or legacy)
|
From page 31... ...
It should also be noted that the nature of the current oversight process for DOD acquisition programs tends to encourage the aggregation of many requirements into larger programs, further exacerbating cycle time mismatches. This requirements aggregation is driven by such factors as a desire to avoid the cost of separate program documenta tion, a desire to minimize acquisition oversight reviews (see below)
|
From page 32... ...
Conversely, the evolution of weapons systems platforms reflects longstanding and timehonored operational methods that relate to the inherently long times cales involved in the design and building of platforms, in training, and so forth. An early emphasis on setting detailed requirements often results in IT systems failing to meet user needs or meeting, too late, a user require ment that has long since changed.
|
From page 33... ...
The resistance in the federal government to COTS solutions has softened over the past few years, but use of these kinds of COTS products in the federal government is still in the adoption phase. The DOD has also been slow to adopt COTS products on the basis that "the DOD is different." When the DOD selects a COTS product for application, the acquisition process often devolves into a significant modification of the COTS product to meet DOD-unique requirements.
|
From page 34... ...
OVERLy LARGE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGy PROGRAMS INCREASE RISk Current IT systems acquisition processes in the DOD encourage the bundling of many capabilities into a single program activity. A premise for such bundling is that once a team is in place, it will be able to deliver the desired capabilities without the overhead of assembling a new team.
|
From page 35... ...
FUNDING PROCESS IMPEDES FLExIBILITy The DOD's process for obtaining funding for new acquisition programs typically takes multiple years. To address a DOD capability short fall, the shortfall must be linked to a request to Congress for funding that would be provided in a future year.
|
From page 36... ...
This approach can ensure appropriate justification of funding needs tied to mission requirements during budget submission as well as the rapid allocation of appropriated funding consistent with the pace of evolving mission requirements and technology advancements. Currently the DOD uses a process similar to this concept for funding maintenance upgrades to aircraft avionics software.
|
From page 37... ...
There are notable counterexamples to the trends discussed above. Several large and complex DOD programs without high degrees of institutional oversight have been demonstrably successful in rapidly delivering useful capability to the field by following tailored, focused, proactive, accountable oversight of the kind advocated in this report; see the examples given in Box 2.1 and detailed in Appendix D
|
From page 38... ...
Collectively, these success stories provide evidence that changes of the nature proposed in this report can have dramatically positive impacts. Common characteristics among these programs include the following: • Support by a senior "champion" or advocate providing "top cover"; • Urgent operational need; • Their iterative incremental development approach; • The early and continuing involvement of the end users in the develop ment process; • Field experiments with early testing, rapid feedback, and rapid fixes (e.g., Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration of Army Digitization Experi ments)
|
From page 39... ...
It is a multimedia reporting system for soldiers at the patrol level, allowing users to collect and share information to improve situational awareness and to facilitate collaboration and information analysis among junior officers. It is based on commercial information technology and was developed using rapid and agile acquisition processes without going through the normal oversight process.
|
From page 40... ...
new programs structured at dollar levels that permit designation as ACAT II and ACAT III with the same dollar thresholds used for weapons systems and with oversight by the Services, agencies, or program executive officers. CULTURAL IMPEDIMENTS TAkE PRECEDENCE OVER RAPID DEVELOPMENT The DOD's perceived need for caution over speed is understandable.
|
From page 41... ...
Such an environment does not lend itself to rapid innovation or to rapid development processes. Meaningful assessment becomes nearly impossible when large, com plex programs have long time spans between significant milestones.
|
From page 42... ...
INADEQUATE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGy ACQUISITION WORkFORCE Under the leadership of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisi tion, Technology and Logistics, and as specified in DOD acquisition regu lations, the DOD Acquisition Corps is charged with procuring systems and services to meet warfighters' needs in a timely fashion as required to satisfy national security objectives. The Acquisition Corps includes many highly trained specialists in areas of engineering, science, testing, and business and program management who act as acquisition executives, program managers, and contracting officers.
|
From page 43... ...
a smart-buyer capability is a neces sary complement to efforts to strengthen the acquisition workforce or to reform DOD acquisition processes.11 10 For example, a PM fielding a COTS-based capability might attempt to argue that the Technical Readiness Assessment pertinent to the program should assess the integrator's ability to build and deploy components based on past performance rather than the COTS ability to support common infrastructure requirements. In today's environment, the likely result of such a discussion would require the PM to do both: demonstrate that widely deployed COTS works as advertised and provide data supporting the integrator's ability to build and deploy components on the infrastructure.
|
From page 44... ...
One approach to solv ing the problem of highly centralized oversight with its attendant delays would be to use the same dollar thresholds in effect for major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) for the designation of ACAT levels to MAIS programs.
|
From page 45... ...
-- For software development and commercial off-the-shelf integra tion programs, fielding capability within the product cycle of major COTS components. -- For COTS hardware, software, and service programs, fielding pace comparable to COTS cycles (for example, no more than 12 to 18 months for COTS hardware)
|
From page 46... ...
Corresponding, specific target metrics could be developed for each portfolio and project or program funded by the portfolio at the initiation of a program and defined incrementally for each iteration within a project or program. (For example, a performance metric might be tightened over successive increments of a program.)
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.