The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Technical Issues for the United States (2012) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
5 COMPLETE LIST OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5 COMPLETE LIST OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Pages 119-128
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 119... ...
Finding 1-4: Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stewardship are in place, the committee judges that the United States has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing. Sustaining these technical capabilities will require at least the following: • A Strong Scientific and Engineering Base.
|
From page 120... ...
Recommendation 1-2: To maintain a test readiness posture of 24-36 months, NNSA should: • Preserve the Nevada Test Site's ability to host a nuclear-explosion test; • Support the containment capability unique to underground nuclear-explosion testing; • Maintain seismic data necessary to meet U.S. obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty should testing resume; • Maintain the radiochemistry laboratory infrastructure and drill-back capability; • Support fast readout requirements and prompt diagnostic equipment; • Maintain a library that includes testing methods, containment rack designs, procedures, processes; and other relevant information; • Maintain nuclear-certifiable emplacement cranes; • Maintain field-test neutron generators;
|
From page 121... ...
More work is needed to better quantify regional monitoring identification thresholds, particularly in regions where seismic waves are strongly attenuated. Recommendation 2-2: AFTAC should study the extent to which detection thresholds could be improved by making fuller use of the authenticated data from the IMS as well as targeted use of calibrated non-IMS seismic stations to help characterize special events of high concern.
|
From page 122... ...
Finding 2-8: AFTAC has demonstrated notable achievements over the past decade, including major enhancements in all aspects of radionuclide monitoring. Recommendation 2-5: The United States should continue to actively support radionuclide collection, including R&D activities to better discriminate nuclear-test signature radionuclides from background, thus improving the ability to detect wellcontained and lower-yield nuclear-explosion tests.
|
From page 123... ...
Finding 2-23: There are many opportunities for confidence-building measures to support nuclear explosion monitoring, particularly through engaging scientists and engineers in cooperative efforts. Recommendation 2-10: The United States should pursue bilateral (and, to the extent justified and politically feasible, limited multilateral)
|
From page 124... ...
Recommendation 3-1: The Administration, in concert with Congress, should formulate and implement a comprehensive plan that provides a clear vision and strategy for maintaining the nation's nuclear deterrence capabilities and competencies, as recommended in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and related studies. Finding 3-3: The current contract system for the nuclear weapons laboratories has not produced a more innovative, efficient, and cost-effective approach to carrying out the tasks of the nuclear weapons program.
|
From page 125... ...
Recommendation 3-8: The United States should support the CTBTO in its annual assessed and voluntary contributions to ensure that the IMS is fully installed and, with the IDC, is ready to meet CTBT entry-into-force obligations, including support for operating costs and long-term maintenance and repair of monitoring stations. Finding 3-10: The OSI capability of the CTBTO lags behind the readiness of the IMS; however, steps have been taken, such as the 2008 Integrated Field Exercise, which have improved OSI capabilities significantly.
|
From page 126... ...
Chapter 4 Finding 4-1: The Nuclear Weapon States have been able to maintain their nuclear weapons programs under a nuclear-explosion-test moratorium and are likely to be able to make nuclear weapons modifications that fall within the design range of their test experience without resorting to nuclear-explosion testing. Finding 4-2: Hydronuclear tests would be of limited value in maintaining the United States nuclear weapon stockpile in comparison with the advanced tools of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
|
From page 127... ...
Finding 4-11: The value of low-yield evasive underground testing to a particular country depends on that country's nuclear-explosion test experience and/or design sophistication. • Nuclear Weapon States could use low-yield evasive testing to partially validate design codes and modernize their arsenals.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.