Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

3 SUSTAINING U.S. TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES UNDER THE CTBT
Pages 77-94

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 77...
... technical capabilities under the CTBT are the nuclear weapons program, including both DOE/NNSA and DOD components, and the treaty monitoring and verification program. Both are coupled to an important U.S.
From page 78...
... ; • Managers should identify the skills base essential to sustain current systems and to design, develop, and operate replacement systems (DSB, 2008; Congressional Commission, 2009; Task Force, 2009) ; • Gaps in the skill base for assessing foreign nuclear programs should be filled (DSB, 2008)
From page 79...
... The aging physical infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex is a bottleneck limiting both progress towards sustainability and the requirement of exercising the workforce in state-of-the art competencies (also discussed in Chapter 1)
From page 80...
... The layoffs resulted in a decline in morale among the retained employees and inevitably make future recruiting and retention more difficult. Finding 3-1: A decreasing fraction of the budget for the nuclear weapons program is available for the actual technical work that must be accomplished to sustain the U.S.
From page 81...
... DOE/NNSA and its contractors will need to take all of the traditional measures for recruiting and retaining high quality staff discussed above, but those are not sufficient. For example, doing a better job of involving nuclear capable personnel in related national security projects (e.g., nuclear forensics, intelligence, nonproliferation, threat reduction programs, and basic science application of stewardship facilities)
From page 82...
... In addition, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States concluded that NNSA needs to change its approach to oversight and management radically. The Commission noted that although the NNSA has authority for the nuclear weapons facilities, DOE independently imposes its health, safety, and security requirements.5 Management concerns are paralleled by the disturbing trend of reducing resources needed for the technical mission of the laboratories, which is amplified by the Performance Evaluation Plans used by NNSA to manage the contracts for the sites in the nuclear weapons complex.
From page 83...
... An alternative management approach embodying this principle is described in Box 3-2. BOX 3-2 An Alternative Management Approach The committee's judgment on the damaging impact of the present rigidity of the nuclear weapon laboratory governance, funding, and direction was reinforced by interviews and a presentation on the United Kingdom's nuclear weapon program centered at Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE)
From page 84...
... and international technical monitoring capabilities achieved since 2000. Though impressive, continuing improvements in monitoring technology for treaty verification and related field procedures are needed to stay ahead of possible evasion attempts by proliferators.
From page 85...
... National security programs, including treaty monitoring and verification, need access to the unique computational and experimental facilities at the national labs. This access must be balanced across the needs of intelligence, defense, and science, as well as the nuclear weapons program.
From page 86...
... IMS monitoring stations following entry into force of the CTBT. Specialized work in the 1970s and 1980s needed to estimate the yields of large Soviet underground nuclear explosions using teleseismic signals was supported by R&D programs typically at the level of $15M annually for projects submitted by academia and industry.
From page 87...
... Government should fund a robust R&D program to maintain ongoing operational capabilities and to support achievable improvements. As the operator of the USAEDS, AFTAC needs continued access to highly trained and experienced technical experts in treaty monitoring and to advanced technologies and systems.
From page 88...
... FIGURE 3-1: DOE/NNSA/NA-222 Ground-based Nuclear Explosion Monitoring R&D program has declined in constant dollars and is highly variable from year to year. SOURCE: William Walter, Seismology Subcommittee member The DOE/NNSA and the U.S.
From page 89...
... satellite nuclear detonation detection capability are necessary to adequately monitor the CTBT. Even without the CTBT, these enhancements to the USNDS capability are important to maintaining and improving the USAEDS.
From page 90...
... Under real circumstances, the timeframe for organizing an inspection will be much tighter than was the case for the IFE, which also may drive up costs. Finding 3-10: The OSI capability of the CTBTO lags behind the readiness of the IMS; however, steps have been taken, such as the 2008 Integrated Field Exercise, which have improved OSI capabilities significantly.
From page 91...
... E) The continuing development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities and operations to ensure accurate and comprehensive information on worldwide nuclear arsenals, nuclear weapons development programs, and related nuclear programs.
From page 92...
... Given this fact, the committee judges that it is both appropriate and necessary for the United States to periodically conduct a formal review of whether safeguards remain effective. The committee is impressed with the utility of the annual stockpile assessment letters prepared by the three weapons laboratory directors and the Commander of U.S.
From page 93...
... This annual report by the President of the United States should be comparable in detail to the annual stockpile assessment letters and should be informed by the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy, and the Director of National Intelligence and should be advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the directors of the appropriate national laboratories, the Committee of Principals established under National Security Presidential Directive-28 (NSPD-28) 9 and the Commander of U.S.


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.