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1 Introduction
Pages 11-32

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From page 11...
... The workshop resulted from a request by the U.S. Department of State to the IAP, the Global Network of Science Academies, which is committed to making the voice of science heard on issues of crucial importance to the future of humankind.1 The State Department provided funding through its Biosecurity Engagement Program, which is committed to developing cooperative international programs that promote the safe, secure and responsible use of biological materials that are at risk of accidental release or intentional misuse.
From page 12...
... The two academies and IAP shared the organizing and arrangements, and were joined by two international scientific unions -- the International Union of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology and the International Union of Microbiological Societies -- as partners in the project. The NRC followed its normal practices and appointed an ad hoc com­ mittee to help organize the workshop with the partner organizations and be responsible for the report.
From page 13...
... THE BROAD CONTEXT OF SCIENCE AND SOCIETY Science is not conducted in a social vacuum; as the most recent edi ­ tion of On Being a Scientist, the widely used introduction to responsible conduct of research from the National Academies notes: The standards of science extend beyond responsibilities that are internal to the scientific community. Researchers also have a responsibility to reflect on how their work and the knowledge they are generating might be used in the broader society.
From page 14...
... . More generally, the ability to conduct science depends on public trust and support, not least because a substantial portion of research fund­ ing comes from governments.
From page 15...
... The fundamental question in developing standards for responsible conduct of research may be one of degree: whether the social responsibility 3 For a brief but insightful discussion of internalized and externalized obligations see Kuhlau et al.
From page 16...
... The attention devoted to social responsibility by scientific societies, advocacy groups, and aca ­ demic communities has helped to establish conventions and norms, as well as a theoretical grounding for training and education in these areas. A number of high­level declarations and statements in recent years have reinforced the ethical imperatives involved in scientific research across the global scientific community.
From page 17...
... . Among these specific concerns is the potential security risk that states or terrorist groups or even individuals could misuse the knowledge, tools and techniques gained through life sciences research for 6 The ICSU statement on the universality of science may be found at http://www.icsu.
From page 18...
... Concerns about the potential security risks posed by life sciences research can be seen in the context of rising concerns -- and sometimes sharp disagreements -- about the more general risks of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) , including biological weapons and bioterrorism, following the end of the Cold War (see, for example, Carter, Deutch, and Zelikov 1998)
From page 19...
... Some have expressed concern that this development, intended to improve the ease of use and rate of compliance among diabetic users of insulin, could be adapted to allow aerosol sprays to cover wider areas in an attack.6 Nonlaboratory research may also lend itself to possible misuse. Investigation of the potential effects of a deliberate release of botulinum toxin into the U.S.
From page 20...
... Even more serious, the term is already used to refer to several other major international issues. For example, to many "biosecurity" refers to the obligations undertaken by states adhering to the Convention on Biodiversity and particularly the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which is intended to protect biological diversity from the potential risks posed by living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology.
From page 21...
... The types of life sciences research potentially affected by the dual use dilemma are much broader than the infectious disease agents that have been the traditional focus of biological weapons research programs (Wheelis, Rózsa, and Dando 2006)
From page 22...
... Even if their own research poses no actual risks of misuse, scientists in many areas of life sciences are potentially affected. Perceptions about a particular field or focus could lead to policy actions with both direct and indirect effects on the research enterprise.11 All life scientists are potentially affected by public perceptions about security and other risks arising from continuing advances in knowledge and capabilities.
From page 23...
... Responsible conduct 12 The Asilomar Conference addressed only the accidental creation of recombinant micro­ organisms with increased virulence and other dangerous properties. It did not address the deliberate creation of such organisms for offensive applications in warfare and terrorism, although security concerns had also been raised (Wade 1980; Budianski 1982)
From page 24...
... THE LIFE SCIENCES AND THE "WEB OF PREVENTION" Dual use issues pose serious policy challenges, in particular the search for a mix of measures at the national, regional, and international level that can mitigate the risks of misuse while enabling continuing sci ­ entific advances -- and ensuring the availability of those advances to all. This is part of broader security challenges posed by several key features of biological weapons.15 For example, the wide availability of biological materials in nature, including the most dangerous pathogens, and the ability of these materials to replicate means that there are no technical "chokepoints" where restricting access to materials poses a formidable barrier to acquisition.16 As already discussed, the broad array of life sci­ 15 A more detailed discussion of the fundamental differences between biological and nuclear materials, the two most frequently compared types, may be found in Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins (NRC 2009e:116­117)
From page 25...
... The fundamental international norm against biological weapons is embodied in the Geneva Protocol, which was signed in 1925 and entered into force in 1928, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) , which was signed in 1972 and entered into force in 1975.19 Ambassador Masood Khan of Pakistan, president of the BWC's sixth review conference, commented that: The BWC has had marked success in defining a clear and unambiguous global norm, completely prohibiting the acquisition and use of biologi­ cal and toxin weapons under any circumstances.
From page 26...
... In addi ­ tion, countries may have an array of laws and regulations that address biological weapons and bioterrorism directly or contribute indirectly by governing various aspects of research and commercial activities. But the concept of a web also includes an important role for measures of self­governance drawing on the culture of responsibility among those doing life sciences research, as well as guidelines and other voluntary practices that could have both government and nongovernment compo ­ nents.
From page 27...
... A longer account of efforts to promote engagement, especially in the last decade, by national and inter­ national scientific organizations, and the growing support for education on the part of international bodies such as the WHO, UNESCO, and the OECD and from the activities associated with the operation and imple­ mentation of international agreements such as the BWC, may be found in Appendix C A few examples, which underscore the importance of connections between formal and informal components of the web, are provided here.
From page 28...
... The meetings in 2005 and 2008 provided a focal point around which efforts to raise awareness and engagement by the life sciences community could organize. For example, with an eye to the 2005 BWC meetings, the IAP Biosecurity Working Group decided to focus its first effort on draft­ ing a statement of principles that could provide the basis for efforts by academies and other science bodies to develop codes of their own rather than attempting to develop a full­blown IAP code of conduct.
From page 29...
... identify standards and practices for research oversight; and (3) provide scientific advice to governments and international organizations and develop the role of the science community in global governance.
From page 30...
... 1994. Fusions of anthrax toxin lethal factor with shiga toxin and diptheria toxin enzymatic domains are toxic to mammalian cells.
From page 31...
... Presentation to the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, Sixth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, October 11, New York. Klotz, L
From page 32...
... 2009. National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats.


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