Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

7 Intuitive Theories of Behavior--Hal R. Arkes and James Kajdasz
Pages 143-168

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 143...
... After several months, the stock prices of the two sets of stocks were compared. The intuitive theory was that the expertise of the stockbrokers would easily swamp the darts' total ignorance.
From page 144...
... His congressional and national campaigns were characterized by severe condemnations of those whom he accused of being "soft." Yet President Nixon visited China in 1972, a trip that began to thaw the long-frozen relations between the two countries. Anwar Sadat authorized the Yom Kippur War against Israel in 1973.
From page 145...
... This is the crux of the fallacy of essentialism: attributing cause to stable internal factors and disregarding the powerful influence of situational external factors. The second highly relevant psychological research program contemporaneous with Fischer's book pertains to "the fundamental attribution error" (Ross, 1977, p.
From page 146...
... . Of course, intelligence analysts are in the role of observers who may or may not be aware of the external factors that may be influencing an actor's behavior, so it is understandable why the fundamental attribution error might be a temptation.
From page 147...
... . Research highly relevant to the everyday tasks confronting the intelligence analyst is that of Philip Tetlock (2005)
From page 148...
... Mandel (2009) reported a research study done with Canadian intelligence analysts making predictions about upcoming political events.
From page 149...
... The forecaster depicted by the filled circles has excellent calibration. Fig 7-1b.eps specific events in the Middle East or Africa that would or would not occur within the subsequent year.
From page 150...
... First, the group providing the supporting reason had the same elevated confidence as the control group, suggesting that people left to their own devices generate reasons supporting their choice. Second, being forced to generate a contrary reason markedly improved the confidence–judgment relation.
From page 151...
... The answer is simply to report the consistent results of the last such referendums. Tetlock's 284 professionals who participated in his research exhibited substantially inferior calibration and discrimination compared to the algorithms (Tetlock, 2005)
From page 152...
... However, the prediction fails because the algorithm cannot consider the fact that the professor cannot leave the house because he has a broken leg, a condition that negates the normally accurate forecast made by the algorithm. Experts are able to find broken leg cues in a rich data source.
From page 153...
... a run is scored, then it may be inferred that the batter was safe at first. Baseball experts and nonexperts read exactly this scenario and were later asked to state whether various sentences had appeared in the story.
From page 154...
... to anticipate the Yom Kippur attack in 1973, BarJoseph and Kruglanski (2003) point out that the lack of information was not the cause of intelligence failures.
From page 155...
... . AMAN knew that the Egyptian military exercises seemed "unusually realistic" in the days preceding the Yom Kippur War, but that datum was interpreted to be consistent with the prevailing schema that this was the usual time for Egypt's annual exercises.
From page 156...
... 282) : "Information inconsistent with the favorite irritable bowel syndrome diagnosis was overlooked." Once an incorrect schema is substantiated, consistent evidence is noted, and inconsistent evidence is not.
From page 157...
... Fifty-nine graduate students in social work were asked to read information about 12 clients and provide ratings indicating how likely it was that each client was a child abuser. In the personality profiles of most interest to this discussion, some clients' descriptions had either one or two pieces of information that pretest subjects had indicated were highly diagnostic of being a child abuser, such as "He was sexually assaulted by his stepfather." The researchers inserted into various profiles zero, two, four, or eight pieces of information that pretest subjects had indicated were nondiagnostic, such as "He was born in Muskegon." The most important finding was that adding completely nondiagnostic information had a pronounced effect of diminishing the impact of the diagnostic information.
From page 158...
... How can this be? Because analysts do not think in a way that mimics a multiple-regression equation, and because most problems that confront analysts cannot be analyzed using such an equation, our consideration of this question should be directed at the high performance of TTB rather than its relative accuracy compared to that of multiple regression.
From page 159...
... The point is that once a decision maker appropriately employs a small number of diagnostic cues, the time, effort, and possibly the danger of obtaining the additional cues may not be worth the extra cost. More information is not necessarily better.
From page 160...
... Second, more cues might mean less valid cues, which may in turn inappropriately dilute the impact of the valid ones. Third, more cues may lead one to attend to bogus broken leg cues, which can tempt one to disregard the conclusions of a very good strategy.
From page 161...
... Regulation play is relatively slow paced, with approximately 2.25 minutes per move. In regulation play the average move quality of master players was nearly identical to the average move quality of class B players.
From page 162...
... Only the chess master and intelligence analyst are predominantly predicting human behavior. However, the behavior that can be exhibited on a chess board is highly restricted by a codified set of rules.
From page 163...
... The experienced nurse or firefighter is likely to have encountered such a situation before, allowing them to draw on experience. The experienced intelligence analyst, some might argue, is more likely to deal with a turn of world events that has no precedent.
From page 164...
... These authors believe that such factors contributed to the Israeli surprise during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Two of the most influential intelligence analysts for Israel leading up to the war were Major General Eli Zeira (Director of Military Intelligence)
From page 165...
... This request bears some similarity to structured analytic techniques currently advocated by some intelligence agencies. For example, ACH requires that analysts provide evidence supporting hypotheses contrary to the one currently being favored.
From page 166...
... This will allow testing of structured analytic techniques to determine if they do indeed improve intelligence performance and reduce reliance on tempting, but inaccurate, intuitive theories. REFERENCES Agranat (Investigation committee, Yom Kippur War)
From page 167...
... European Journal of Social Psychology 23:77–87. Mandel, D
From page 168...
... European Journal of Social Psychology 31:707–720. Neustadt, R


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.