Intelligence Analysis Behavioral and Social Scientific Foundations (2011) / Chapter Skim
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1 Analysis in the U.S.Intelligence Community: Missions, Masters, and Methods--Thomas Fingar
1 Analysis in the U.S.Intelligence Community: Missions, Masters, and Methods--Thomas Fingar
Pages 3-28
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From page 3... ...
, 2009 National Intelligence: A Consumer's Guide at http://www.dni.gov/IC_Consumers_Guide_2009 .pdf [accessed December 2009] , and An Overview of the United States Intelligence Community for the 111th Congress at http://www.dni.gov/overview.pdf [accessed December 2009]
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officials, and getting it completely right is often less important than providing useful information and insights to the right people at the right time. Even data-rich and methodologically brilliant analytic products may contribute little to the national security enterprise they are supposed 4 Examples of trends affecting the agendas and capabilities of governments include the rapid "graying" of populations in Europe and Japan and youth bulges in African and Central Asian countries already struggling to meet demands for education and jobs (National Intelligence Council, 2008a)
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Oversimplifying greatly, the 16 constituent agencies -- with 19 analytic components counting the National Intelligence Council, National Counterintelligence Executive, and National Counterterrorism Center -- exist because each serves different, and somewhat unique, customers and missions. Each has developed expertise and analytic tools to meet the needs of its primary customers.
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PARAMETERS AND PRESSURES AFFECTINg ANALYTIC PERFORMANCE Implementation of the blueprint summarized above has begun, and the initial results suggest it is both workable and worthwhile. The results also demonstrate, however, that several more challenges must be understood and addressed to minimize unnecessary duplication while providing more accurate, insightful, and useful analytic support to the IC's large, diverse, and demanding customer base.11 The magnitude of the task is complicated and compounded by the explosive growth of requirements and 10 Thecall for formation of subject-specific centers was made, i.a., in The 9/11 Commission Report (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, pp.
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From page 7... ...
of institutions and individuals who desire or demand analytic support from the IC.13 Because intelligence support has long been treated as a "free good," there are few constraints on what customers can request or what members of Congress expect to be provided.14 The proliferation of customers and topics on which the IC was expected to acquire information, develop expertise, and deliver analytic insights raised questions about how to do so. The default setting was for new customers to go to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
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These challenges are further compounded by shorter deadlines -- to be useful now, analytic insights often must be provided in days or hours rather than weeks or months -- and the demand for more "actionable intelligence" (i.e., information that can be used to disrupt a terrorist plot, prevent the delivery of chemical precursors, or freeze bank accounts being used for illicit purposes) .15 More numerous and more complex issues require use of more and different types of information.
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From page 9... ...
This is a long-standing lament, but most proposals to alleviate competing demands do not go beyond calling for more long-term strategic analysis and less attention to current issues (e.g., Russell, 2007; Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, 2005)
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Until noted by the intelligence analyst, no one had considered that the reason there had been no attacks on the pipeline was probably because it had already been put out of commission. 18 When I was Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, I received a message from the staff of a senior director at the National Security Council requesting an update on political reconciliation, economic reconstruction, and public safety in Iraq.
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From page 11... ...
. Monitor and Assess Current Developments and New Information The ability to provide warning of what lies over the horizon, around the bend, or behind a tree requires continuous and close monitoring of developments that might affect places, problems, people, or policy maker requirements in every analyst's portfolio.
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The six or seven senior participants from the Department of State, Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, the National Security Council, the National Intelligence Council, and the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) come together as peers who check their bureaucratic roles at the door so they can speak freely about issues, options, and objectives without worrying about turf or other bureaucratic issues.
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. Rather than focusing on structural solutions such as creating strategic analysis units, or on changing the behavior and expectations of decision makers, the most useful proposals to improve analytic support begin from the premise that providing useful insights and context when addressing "current" issues requires both deep expertise and understanding of strategic 24 One senior official with whom I worked earlier in my career described the problem some what more colorfully when he said, "I'd love to spend more time thinking about the future but right now I'm up to my ass in alligators."
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From page 14... ...
They involve a high degree of contingency because analysts must adapt and respond to changing requirements, the serendipity of events, and the fruits of collection efforts. The degree to which analysts focus on or are consumed by these job elements is a function of where they work, what accounts they follow, whom they support, and a number of other situational factors.25 For some analysts, these tasks are all consuming, but a subset must also devote time 25 I Ccomponents generally employ one of two broad approaches to assigning responsibilities and developing their analytic workforces.
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Other analysts, probably the majority, are able and expected to devote most of their time to production intended to close intelligence gaps, illuminate new issues, or satisfy internally or externally mandated requirements to update information on leadership biographies, military orders of battle, developments in foreign science and technology, foreign direct investment in particular countries or industries, and other such issues. Some of this work is crucial and contributes directly to the work of other analysts; some of it requires more effort than may be warranted to produce information and insights of interest to only a small number of people who may or may not have any reason or ability to act on that information.26 Contribute to Community and Collaborative Products Contributing to the President's Daily Brief and participating in the production of National Intelligence Estimates and other formally "coordinated" assessments impose heavy demands on analysts, but for all but a tiny number, the duration is short and the frequency is very occasional.
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The goal is to have analysts think of themselves as members of a single intelligence enterprise rather than as employees of a specific component agency. This is one of many interdependent measures to address cultural impediments to integration and collaboration without sacrificing the advantages of having specialized components keyed to the missions and requirements of different bureaucratic customers.
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It is not uncommon to hear complaints from both analysts and managers that analysts "must" spend too much time collaborating with colleagues or using new analytic tools.30 Provide guidance to Collectors The existence and utility of the National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) notwithstanding, analysts play the primary role in translating 29 The term "living documents" is intended to capture a process that produces authoritative and regularly updated analytic products, but is more formal than a blog or Wiki.
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A second mechanism, also managed by the Analytic Mission Management team, involves the convening, usually by a National Intelligence Officer, of senior analysts working on a particular place or problem. The purpose of these meetings is to clarify what policy makers want and need to understand and determine collectively what kinds of information might provide greatest insight into the problem.
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MAKINg NECESSITY A VIRTUE LEADS TO A BETTER WAY OF DOINg BUSINESS In the past -- and here the past is as recent as the immediate post-9/11 period during which there was tremendous growth in the IC budget and the number of analysts -- the standard response to increased demands was to add people and/or create new analytic components.33 To improve information sharing, reduce "cultural" barriers to collaboration, and consolidate work on important issues, the 9/11 Commission recommended and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) endorsed the creation of specialized "centers." The IRTPA also gave statutory authority to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)
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. This inventory revealed less redundancy than many assumed, especially when one examined specific areas of focus subsumed under broad rubrics such as "China" or "missiles." Yet it also indicated that many agencies had developed small elements to address subjects tangential to their core missions because they did not know where relevant expertise could be found elsewhere in the IC, could not "task" analysts elsewhere to provide necessary input, or could not have confidence in the quality of the work done by people they did not know and could not evaluate on their own.36 This mapping exercise also revealed that most components judged that they lacked a "critical mass" of expertise on all but 35 Vestigial capabilities exist for many reasons, ranging from the magnitude of the IC effort against the former Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies to expertise on Libya's weapons of mass destruction programs that became less relevant when Muammar Gaddhafi decided to dismantle those programs and surrender key components to the United States.
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His efforts were thwarted by officials who used counterintelligence concerns and other arguments to stifle this early effort to integrate the analytic community. A few years later, Mark Lowenthal, who succeeded Gannon as ADCI/AP, revived the ARC with somewhat more success, but he gave it a rationale that caused both individual analysts and managers to avoid entering pertinent information out of concern that the ARC would provide the basis for recruiting analysts for task forces, undesirable assignments, or other activities they might not wish to do.
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This discovery lent new urgency to efforts to recruit at higher levels of experience and to use the experienced veterans to mentor more junior analysts without regard to home agency affiliation. 39 The impetus for formation of virtual teams was the desire to create "critical masses" of expertise sufficient to address the complex analytic problems assigned to the IC without sacrificing the advantages of proximity to key customers that would result from the creation of "centers" (as called for by the 9/11 Commission)
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. See also Intelligence Community Directive (ICD)
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Persuading them to adopt new techniques and to work differently than the generations they are succeeding is easy. What is less easy -- but essential -- is developing modernday means to vet information, exercise quality control on products developed using Wikis and blogs, and maintain the requisite security safeguards when dealing with persons outside of the IC.44 In doing so, IC leaders must diligently adapt policies and procedures developed for a different time, different types of problems, and different generations to suit the capabilities and expectations of the youthful workforce.
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2008. Intelligence community directive (ICD)
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2007. Intelligence community unites for "Analysis 101." National Public Radio, May 7.
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2009. Afghan election poses policy dilemmas for U.S.
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