Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

3 Scientific Investigation in a Law Enforcement Case and Description and Timeline of the FBI Scientific Investigation
Pages 47-74

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 47...
... This chapter describes in brief the early stages of the investigation, specifically the gathering of evidence, formation of investigative teams, and decisions regarding scientific analyses that led to the FBI findings and conclusions that are summarized and evaluated more fully in Chapters 4 through 6.1 It also introduces the concepts of science, scientific investigation in law enforcement, and the different views of uncertainty -- and the manner in which it is described -- in science versus law. 3.2 SCIENCE AND SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION AS PART OF A LAW ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATION In a scientific study, explanations for observable phenomena are sought through the gathering of reliable data and the formulation of testable hypoth eses.
From page 48...
... 10/12/01 11/14/01 FBI and local law Collection of biological N/A enforcement evidence: 4 envelopes, 17 clinical samples, 106 environmental samples along mail paths (FL, DC, NJ, NY, CT) 10/17/01 10/19/01 Battelle Memorial Microbiological analyses of B2M1D1 Institute (BMI)
From page 49...
... among colonies derived from letter spores 12/01 12/06 Dugway Proving Reverse engineering of spore B1M13 Ground (DPG) "powders" B1M14 continued
From page 50...
... 2/02 10/06 SNL Silicon analyses B1M6 2/01/02 8/13/05 University of Agar analysis B1M10 Maryland (UMD) 3/07/02 2/01/06 DPG Analytical chemistry analysis of B1M13 spore powders 3/22/02 4/14/02 FBI Volatile organic compound B1M7D2 analysis in evidentiary material Early 7/6/05 FBI ICP-OES: elemental B1M6 2002 composition of letter material, B1M7 culture media, envelope types 12/02 6/1/04 TIGR Whole genome sequencing of B1M5 Morphs A, B, C, D 8/02 2/22/04 UMD Heme analysis B1M10 8/02 8/05 Agar and heme analysis B1M10 Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (Army)
From page 51...
... Brokaw letter B subtilis contaminants 7/31/03 8/11/03 Novozymes B
From page 52...
... 8/29/07 8/29/08 FBI Analysis of meglumine and B1M12 diatrizoate in RMR-1029, letter material, other samples 10/05/07 10/08/08 TIGR Finalization of B subtilis B2M2D2 genome sequence 1/09/08 6/08/08 TIGR Screening of unidentified B
From page 53...
... In addition, the approach used to gather, process, and analyze evidence can differ between a purely scientific investigation and a law enforcement investigation. Both types of approaches are necessary in a bioterrorism investigation, which also requires attention to public health risks and safety needs (see Box 3-1)
From page 54...
... Scientific criminal investigations require an amalgamation of capabilities including scene expe rience, attention to detail, a skeptical perspective, powers of observation, and the application of logic (Gardner, 2005)
From page 55...
... The Bureau imme diately formed an internal group that had members from the scientific team, investigative team, and terrorism team. Recognizing the importance of parallel criminal and scientific investigations, the FBI embedded high-level DOJ staff from the internal team, who then advised them throughout the investigation.
From page 56...
... . The committee was told that the team working on the scientific investi gation met weekly with the law enforcement team for information sharing, strategy, and coordination.
From page 57...
... As the scientific investigation proceeded, several laboratories conducted sequential and parallel scientific analyses on the evidentiary material gathered from the letters, environmental samples, and clinical samples (see Table 3-2)
From page 58...
... sequenced subtilis subtilis subtilis Phenotypic X X X X screens of variants (B1M2D14) (morphotypes)
From page 59...
... analysis; PCR = polymerase chain reaction; SEM = scanning electron micros copy; SEM-EDX = scanning electron microscope with energy-dispersive X-ray analysis; VOC = volatile organic compounds
From page 60...
... anthracis spores were recovered from media outlets in New York and from government offices in Washington, D.C., or the containment facility created to store potentially contaminated mail. All four envelopes were postmarked by the United States Postal Service (USPS)
From page 61...
... noted that "The possibility of B anthracis exposure from envelopes secondarily contaminated from implicated postal facilities greatly extended the group of potentially exposed persons in our investigation." The epidemiological investigations found two distinct case clusters sepa rated in time.
From page 62...
... B anthracis was isolated from environmental samples at six postal facilities along the path followed by the mail to AMI as well as at the AMI building itself.
From page 63...
... FIGURE 3-3 Leahy letter powder.
From page 64...
... The B anthracis isolates cultivated from the clinical specimens of patients, the four recovered powder-containing envelopes, and over 100 environmental samples collected along the suspected path traveled by the contaminated mail were subtyped by the CDC using multiple-locus variable-number tandem repeat analysis and sequencing of the protective antigen gene (pagA)
From page 65...
... -based device was used by the CDC at the Brentwood postal facility in 2001 for preliminary assessment or adjunct analysis of B anthracis DNA in environmental samples, but this approach had not been validated by them at that time for these types of samples.
From page 66...
... that laboratories in the CDC Laboratory Response Network that were equipped for PCR analysis were overwhelmed with samples early in the investigation, and that the FBI obtained more timely results on the presence of B anthracis in environmental samples by relying instead on RODAC plate isolation techniques.
From page 67...
... Several scientific and technical issues should be explored in more detail, such as the performance characteristics of the assays, whether or not the assays were validated for use with these sample types, the degree to which samples or sample locations gave repeatedly positive results, interpretation of inconsistent positive results, whether or not the Ames genetic mutations in the anthrax letters were detected in any of these overseas samples, and the natural distribution of B anthracis strain types in this overseas geographic region.
From page 68...
... On October 15, when staff in Senator Daschle's office opened an envelope containing a white powder, police quarantined the office and surrounding rooms, shut down the Capitol's mail system, and suspended public tours. Law enforcement officials in protective biohazard suits took over Senator Daschle's office.
From page 69...
... Although suggestive of a mechanism and scenario by which Ottilie Lundgren, a resident of Oxford, Connecticut, might have devel oped inhalational anthrax (cross contamination of mail en route to her home) , the committee lacked sufficient information (e.g., other possible exposures, unusual susceptibility to low numbers of anthrax spores)
From page 70...
... The science and technology that formed the basis for these analyses evolved rapidly and had a major impact on the field of microbial forensics. Although the public health crisis largely subsided after the last victim died in November 2001, the scientific investigation continued until 2008 and the criminal investigation continued until the case was closed in February 2010 (see Table 3-1)
From page 71...
... Yet during subsequent years, the investigators did not fully exploit molecular methods to identify and characterize B anthracis directly in crime scene environmental samples (without cultivation)
From page 72...
... At the end of this study, the NRC committee was provided limited information for the first time about the analysis of environmental samples for B anthracis Ames from an undisclosed overseas site at which a terrorist group's anthrax program was allegedly located.
From page 73...
... When a new investigation is launched, this core set of external experts could assist in recruiting others with more specific expertise relevant to the investigation under way. For example, the FBI included some expert scientists early in the anthrax letters investigation, but it does not seem to have sought formal expertise in statistics until the investigation was nearly com pleted.
From page 74...
... In the anthrax letters investigation, there were repeated claims that all of the attack letters contained all of the genotypic variants (see Chapter 6 and Finding 6.7) that implicated flask RMR-1029 as the source of the anthrax spores, when in fact not all of the letters were checked for these variants.


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.