Improving the Decision Making Abilities of Small Unit Leaders (2012) / Chapter Skim
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2 Challenges of the Operational Environment for the Small Unit Leader: Observations and Findings
2 Challenges of the Operational Environment for the Small Unit Leader: Observations and Findings
Pages 29-49
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From page 29... ...
. During this visit, the committee members had an opportunity to observe a training demonstration and to gather information about novel approaches to developing and implementing theater-realistic, scenario-based, predeployment training in the Marine Corps.
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To address this gap, a subgroup of committee members developed an interview protocol to elicit field experiences from Marine small unit leaders with recent deployment experience in Iraq and/or Afghanistan.1 In December 2010, National Research Council staff made arrangements for 6 committee members to conduct interviews with small unit leaders at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) in Quantico, Virginia.
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From page 31... ...
In addition, the committee wanted to call attention to the resourcefulness of small unit leaders in developing strategies to mitigate the effects of resource gaps so as to encourage the Marine Corps to draw on these small unit leaders' experiences as it assesses strategies for supporting and sustaining distributed units. In discussing the challenges of distributed operations, mission diversity, adaptive adversaries, and rules of engagement, the committee examines how these challenges complicate decision making.
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Goulding, Jr., Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, "Enhanced Company Operations (ECO) Limited Objective Experiment 4 (LOE4)
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8 in order to make adjustments for conditions on the ground. For example, one small unit leader described revising his platoon's table of organization to reflect the structure and functions of a battalion, with members of the platoon assuming responsibility for intelligence and operations roles.9 Another small unit leader identified specific administrative, logistics, intelligence, and communications functions that were needed, and then created a team of eight Marines to assume roles that would normally be present at the battalion level.10 However, as several of the Marines interviewed by the committee at Quantico pointed out, these ad hoc in-theater augmentations would not be necessary if smaller units were provided with trained 5 USMC interviews with committee subgroup members, Quantico, Va., December 7, 2010.
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Goulding, Jr., Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, 2008, "Enhanced Company Operations: A Logical Progression to Capability Development," Marine Corps Gazette 92(8)
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Goulding, Jr., Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, "Enhanced Company Operations (ECO) Limited Objective Experiment 4 (LOE4)
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21, 22 Coupled with geographic dispersion, the diversity and volatility of the hybrid environment add even more complexity to small unit decision making and further underscore the importance of training and equipping small units for success. Marine small units and their leaders often interact with and coordinate 18 USMC interviews with committee subgroup members, Quantico, Va., December 7, 2010.
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From page 37... ...
can have strategically significant results depending on their effectiveness in identifying enemies and establishing productive relation ships with local populations.24 Given the youth of the force, the complexity of hybrid environments, and the diversity of missions, both the selection and the training of small unit leaders and their Marines deserve sustained attention and investment. The Marine Corps currently has no formal policy for directing Marine commands, from the battalion on down, on how to select small unit leaders at the company, platoon, or squad levels.25 However, the leadership aptitude, style, and qualities of individual small unit leaders become more important as small units shoulder increasingly signifi cant responsibilities in field.
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To ensure that training curricula and structures are preparing Marine small units for the diverse demands of hybrid warfare, TECOM is working to identify and define the competencies needed by both enlisted Marines and officers at all grades. In addition to the traditional warfighting skills, emerging training approaches are focused on developing cognitive, psychomotor, and affective skills in small unit leaders, with an emphasis on cultivating intuitive decision making in 26 USMC interviews with committee subgroup members, Quantico, Va., December 7, 2010.
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Marine Corps Training and Education Command, "USMC Systems Approach to Training," presentation to the committee, Washington, D.C., September 27, 2010. 33 USMC interviews with committee subgroup members, Quantico, Va., December 7, 2010.
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ONR's George Solhan observed to the committee that "irregular threats are exceptionally difficult to template."39 Indeed, the fact that adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan are observant, adaptive, and easily embedded in local populations presents tremendous challenges for "sensemaking" among small units and their leaders. As discussed in Chapter 3, "sensemaking" is a term used by organiza 35 Ivy Estabrooke, Office of Naval Research, "Social Cultural Knowledge for Decision Making," presentation to the committee, Washington, D.C., August 5, 2010.
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43 USMC interviews with committee subgroup members, Quantico, Va., December 7, 2010.
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To counter adversary operations successfully, small unit leaders must remain a step ahead of the adversaries' learning curve. This entails recognizing when adversary tactics have changed and developing appropriate countermeasures, and/ or devising ways to keep the adversary from being able to predict the actions that a unit will take.47 For example, one small unit leader emphasized the importance 44 USMC interviews with committee subgroup members, Quantico, Va., December 7, 2010.
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50 USMC interviews with committee subgroup members, Quantico, Va., December 7, 2010. 51 Gen Charles C
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Goulding, Jr., Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, "Enhanced Company Operations (ECO) Limited Objective Experiment 4 (LOE4)
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However, this topic came up several times in committee interactions 55 USMC interviews with committee subgroup members, Quantico, Va., December 7, 2010. 56 MariMaeda, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, "TIGR: Tactical Ground Reporting System," presentation to the committee, Washington, D.C., November 15, 2010.
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Later, the unit leader said, he was asked why he had decided to escalate force and was told that the locals were now afraid to enter the marketplace.61 58 USMC interviews with committee subgroup members, Quantico, Va., December 7, 2010. 59 USMC interviews with committee subgroup members, Quantico, Va., December 7, 2010.
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From page 47... ...
Furthermore, despite the fact that small unit leaders are assuming significant responsibilities, the Marine Corps has not established an institutional selection process for the positions of company commander and squad leader.63 62 Gen Charles C Krulak, USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps.
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Given the rapid evolu tion of the combat environment, the penetration of knowledge from the battlefield into predeployment training is much too slow. In addition, the traditional mecha nisms of the Marine Corps for capturing and transferring experiential knowledge, such as lessons learned, cannot keep pace with the evolution of operations.
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From page 49... ...
As they return to garrison, small units and their leaders bring with them a wealth of knowledge about these environments, as well as key insights into what tools, technologies, training, and other support elements are most important for the successful conduct of operations. Without mechanisms to capture and build on the unique experiential knowledge of small unit leaders, the Marine Corps could easily lose this tremendous resource.
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