Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives (2012) / Chapter Skim
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4 Comparison of Utility, Maturity, and Cost-Effectiveness
4 Comparison of Utility, Maturity, and Cost-Effectiveness
Pages 107-129
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From page 107... ...
As stated in Chapter 1, the title of this report, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense, underscores three primary objectives in addressing the congressional tasking: (1) to provide a sound basis for resolving once and for all some of the claims for BMD systems, including sensors, which the committee found are possible in principle but are based on an unrealistically constrained view of the threat, or that given the kinematics and time constraints of the engagement problem, are not realistically achievable; (2)
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From page 108... ...
These costs do not include the cost of supporting sensors, which is provided in a later section of this chapter. Sunk investment costs from the start of these programs (or previous heritage programs)
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From page 109... ...
sunk investments based on kinetic energy interceptor heritage; (3) sunk investment based on Aegis block development Figure S-2 upgrade, design, and production heritage of SM-2 Block IV; (4)
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From page 110... ...
2008. "Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Status, Integration, and Interoperability," May 6.
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From page 111... ...
The color ratings are as follows: blue is highly effective; light green is effective at relatively low costs with some weaknesses or lack of ability to handle all expected threats; yellow provides some capability at relatively low costs but unclear how much can be achieved; orange is a marginal capability at relatively low to moderately high costs with serious questions about feasibility or affordability; and red denotes not viable for one reason or another along with relatively high costs. The 20-yr LCCs for each system are shown in the fifth row across, and the breakdown of those costs for development, procurement, MILCON, and O&S are provided in Appendix E
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From page 112... ...
; NE, northeast. Color key: blue, system is highly effective; light green, system is effective for most but not all expected threats; yellow, system provides some capability but unclear how much can be achieved; and orange, system provides marginal capability with serious questions about feasibility.
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From page 113... ...
eBased on the SM-3 Block IIA codevelopment and Aegis ashore RDT&E budget from FY 2010 thru FY 2016 and buy quantity of 29 and the estimated procurement budget cost of additional buy of 15 SM-3 Block IIAs. fSM-3 Block IIA estimated procurement cost is based on a force quantity buy of 48 operational missiles plus additional test missiles based on a mix of either two dedicated Aegis ships or two Aegis ashore land sites each with a 20-yr O&S cost estimate based on sustaining a level of 24 operationally available missiles.
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From page 114... ...
Similarly, an Aegis-based boost phase interceptor would have difficulty reaching liquid- or solid-propellant ICBMs launched from North Korea (which must head in a north or northeasterly direction if targeting the United States) because of the lack of suitable waters from which to launch such interceptors.
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From page 115... ...
The second is that having spent or committed the money for acquiring and sustaining a constellation of SBIRS satellites for the next 20 years, we can buy and support all the recommended additional supporting sensors for all missions for less than the total LCC of the proposed Precision Tracking and Surveillance System (PTSS) , which, as will be discussed later, adds little if any value to support the real needs of missile defense.
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From page 116... ...
While its tracking precision requirement is based on strategic warning and assessment impact prediction, it is sufficient to cue other threat acquisition radars that are organic to defense systems. In fact the data are good enough to commit boostphase interceptors where time is critical as well as robust midcourse interceptors, although, as will be shown, the committee recommends a second independent confirmation before the midcourse interceptors are committed.
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From page 117... ...
A third Pave Paws radar, at Beal Air Force Base, California, is still active and represents a large investment by MDA; however, it has very limited operational utility against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) due to its location.
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From page 118... ...
It does not, however, take advantage of any next-generation technological advances, which invariably raises the price of these devices. S-Band Radar The Aegis shipboard SPY-1 B/D S-band radar was designed as an air defense radar but also performs well against shorter range or large-cross-section ballistic missile threats provided it is cued from some forward sensor.
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From page 119... ...
. As previously noted, one of the key messages in Figure 4-2 is the high cost of PTSS compared to the costs of the other supporting sensors for BMD -- that is, having invested in acquiring and sustaining a constellation of SBIRS satellites for the next 20 years, or having committed such an investment, the United States can buy and support all the recommended additional sensors for less than the total LCC of PTSS.
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From page 120... ...
This analysis is provided in classified Appendix K, and the results confirmed the committee's view that even in this long-timeline case with minimal radar coverage, the forward-based FBX or THAAD radars together with the recommended version of GBX are adequate for any handover and provide significant support for midcourse discrimination, which PTSS cannot provide. PTSS appears to have a more limited set of objectives: namely, it focuses on increasing the coverage of Aegis SM-3 interceptors by providing accurate and more continuous tracking of the threat objects during their midcourse flight.
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From page 121... ...
. For example, island areas, such as Hawaii, Okinawa, and Guam are best defended against missile attack by Aegis in late midcourse with a THAAD battery providing improved radar coverage and discrimination support and a second shot capability if warranted.
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as the satellite passes over 0 degrees East.
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From page 123... ...
RECOMMENDATIONS Boost-Phase Systems Given the foregoing assessments of the feasibility of boost-phase defense and of system alternatives in light of the objectives of the U.S. administration with respect to providing ballistic missile defense capabilities both abroad and at home, it is evident that ballistic missile defense is at a critical turning point.
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From page 124... ...
The first path, starting at the left column -- defense of U.S. deployed forces and host nations -- is also applicable to defense of friends 5 For example, while a North Korean ICBM aimed at Hawaii and some other Pacific locations could be intercepted in boost phase by a properly located Aegis ship, the United States cannot realistically or prudently expect that BPIs intended for defense against North Korean or Iranian attacks can be stationed in Russian or Chinese airspace or over other nonallied territory (or where overflights of such territory would be necessary to reach on-station locations)
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From page 125... ...
. 6 The source data for these defense alternatives are provided in the classified Appendixes I and J
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From page 126... ...
At the top of the current GMD buildout path, the dashed black arrow represents an alternative third site for existing GMD interceptors in the northeast United States. This alternative provides single-shot coverage of the eastern United States against threats from the Middle East, with some added benefit against North orean K threats, indicated by the horizontal dashed black arrow toward the "North America Defense Against North Korea" column.
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From page 127... ...
For this reason, the committee recommends an evolved GMD system that provides full shoot-look-shoot (SLS) capability and is substantially more effective than the other potential homeland defense additions to the current GMD buildout.
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From page 128... ...
Major Recommendation 4: As a means to defend deployed U.S. forces and allies from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats, the Missile Defense Agency and the Services should continue investing in non-boost systems such as Aegis, THAAD, and PAC-3, with continued attention to architecture integration of sensors with shooters (sometimes referred to as an integrated battle command system, or IBCS)
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From page 129... ...
The importance of the synergy between these concurrent observations and the SLS battle space in maximizing midcourse discrimination effectiveness cannot be overemphasized. • An additional interceptor site with the new evolved GBI in CONUS together with the recommended radar additions provide SLS coverage of virtually the entire United States and Canada against the sort of threat that can prudently be expected to emerge from North Korea or Iran over the coming decade or so.
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