Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives (2012) / Chapter Skim
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5 Recommended Path Forward
5 Recommended Path Forward
Pages 130-174
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homeland defense capability in response primarily to a 130
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2. Discriminating between actual warheads and lightweight countermeasures has been a contentious issue for midcourse defense for more than 40 years (see classified Appendix J for greater detail)
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Before providing additional information on the recommended GMD-E, it is important to consider the key CONOPS for providing an effective defense of the United States and Canada. KEY CONOPS FOR EFFECTIVE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA Defending high-value assets against attack from ballistic missiles requires minimizing the possibility of leakage through the defense for any reason while also minimizing the wasting of interceptors.
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INTERCEPTOR X-BAND RADAR 2 • Load and update Threat • Cued search w/ Search Cue object state vectors Complex coherent pulse and Tasking BATTLE MGR • Fly-out toward integration. 3 assigned threat • Early acquisition • Attack assess Prelaunch and track of the • Select threat complex 6 and Update threat complex complex to 5 via Radar KILL VEHICLE IR engage and plan SENSOR/COMPUTER • Object track files intercept • Acquire and track state vectors and • Intercept complex and objects initial TOM assignments in assigned view area • Doppler imaging • Assess results • Create object files Threat of threat objects and follow-up Compare • TOM correlated Objects 4 shots 11 Radar and 9 with radar metrics • Dynamics, size, and • Override option Optical Metrics • Send IR scene (t)
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It would be difficult for an adversary to have confidence in countermeasures without extensive testing, which the United States might be able to observe and gather data on that would permit defeating the countermeasures. The art of midcourse discrimination, developed over many decades, does not provide perfect selection of RVs, but the committee believes that by designing a ballistic missile defense (BMD)
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2010. Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C., February, pp.
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Classified Appendix J discusses issues of radar discrimination, with the conclusion that an adequate solution of the problem is possible. A generalized summary of those considerations is as follows.
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Over extended track periods, the relative positions can be refined by a further order of magnitude. Along with measurement of relative range to within fractions of a meter, using wideband waveforms, these position data provide a three-dimensional target object map that can be converted to the angular coordinates of a homing seeker, ensuring proper registration of each object in the target cluster.
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Classified Appendix J provides additional discussion and analysis related to classical optical discrimination.
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Functional Delegation Table 5-1 displays the functions that must be performed in defending against a ballistic missile attack independent of where it is launched from or where it is going. It indicates what sensors are needed and what they do and do not provide in the way of information that the defense can use.
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140 MAKING SENSE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TABLE 5-1 Recommended Missile Defense CONOPS and Function Delegation Phase of Command Threat Function Level Intelligence Surveillance Sensors Peacetime Surveillance Approve Monitor Broad area surveillance doctrine developments and and ROE assess capabilities, for lower order of battle, levels and intentions Heightened Alert Increase Estimate Respond to DEFCON tensions DEFCON intentions status with focus on level and tactics of adversary AOR adversary Threat TWAA Delegate Determine Determine raid size, launch and defense adversary's throw weight, impact powered authority to remaining assets, prediction, missile typing. flight appropriate locations, and Cue defense acquisition COCOM capabilities and tracking sensors Threat Defense acquisition, Monitor Support NCA/ Maintain surveillance for midcourse tracking, and COCOM response follow-on attacks from flight engagement planning and contingency same or other sources planning Engage and plan 2nd Monitor shot Target designation Implement contingency plan Postdesignation Response assessment plan Intercept Monitor Reentry Follow-on Monitor engagements Terminal engagement within atmosphere NOTE: AOR, area of responsibility; ROE, rules of engagement; NCA, National Command Authority; COCOM, combatant commander; TWAA, tactical warning and attack assessment; DEFCON, Defense Readiness Condition.
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to search, track, and engage when forward-based characterization of radars verify threat threat objects After forward defense Establish track files radar acquires threat, and state vectors for commit interceptor(s) all objects Prepare backup Rank objects and interceptors transmit handover of TOM to interceptor Commit additional interceptors(s)
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• In the Middle East or northeast Asia, the defense of allies and/or U.S. forces would face shorter range threats, with total flight times of 15 min or less and typical maximum range apogees of 600 km or less.
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In summary, MDA's comprehensive, overarching Master Integrated Test Plan for all of its deployed assets and supporting activities was distributed in July 2010, but the actual results and benefits of the plan remain to be seen. Testing aside, the most important contributor to an effective missile defense is the robustness of the architecture and the CONOPS that define its capabilities, even given uncertainties in the threat and reliability of the system elements.
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The combination of observations for more than 100 sec by an interceptor-mounted optical sensor that is closing on the threat complex, together with concurrent X-band radar observations and a firing doctrine that exploits the battle space available for SLS engagements, offers the greatest probability of being able to separate real threatening objects from decoys and other objects and should be central to any defense of the U.S. homeland, allies and friends, and U.S.
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In short, the recommended evolutionary GMD-E would provide much longer and more effective concurrent threat observation during engagements by both X-band radars and the onboard sensors of the KV while closing on the threat complex. This combination, coupled with SLS battle space and firing doctrine supported by robust two-way communication, is a powerful tool for discriminating real warheads from countermeasures and for reducing leakage.
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, provide the important battle space for SLS capability for homeland defense. These changes also provide the best opportunity for discrimination against offensive countermeasures utilizing the combination of properly located X-band radar capabilities and optical sensors on the interceptors themselves as they close on the threat complex.
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FIGURE 5-4 Recommended notional GMD-E interceptor fly-out contours with 6 km/sec interceptor fly-out contours and two-stage 70-sec total burn.
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This provides as much as 200 sec of observation by the onboard sensor in most first-shot engagements, thus maximizing opportunity for concurrent viewing of the spatial and temporal dynamics of target objects by both the onboard optical sensor and radars in view while the interceptor is closing on the target complex. The analysis used to size the sensor is provided in classified Appendix J
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RECOMMENDED GMD EVOLUTION -- THE SENSORS Layered defense systems are desirable to increase engagement effectiveness, but individual layers should be implemented only if the value added is better and more cost effective than competing options. Layered defense is commonly
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150 MAKING SENSE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TABLE 5-2 Recommended Notional GMD-E KV Mass Properties Statement Liquid Midcourse KV with 30 cm 45-kg Mass Sensor Segment or Subassembly (kg) Notes DACS Adjusted for 4 g Pressure regulator 0.50 Assumes 4 divert thrusters Divert thrusters 4.60 ACS required assumed = 0.1 × divert ACS thrusters 0.46 Closing velocity = 8-10 km/sec Value drivers Included Maximum total time of KV operational = 1,100 sec Manifold Included Sized for 4 g in last 10 sec Seeker less IMU including cooling 45.00 Contingency for FPA shielding 1.00 IMU 1.00 Avionicsa 10.00 Separation system 0.50 Ordnance initiate lines 0.25 Kill enhancement device 5.00 Rough estimate KV primary battery 5.00 Estimate based on other programs KV basic structure and install 8.00 Tanks used as load-carrying structure but Kevlar epoxy composite structure for high axial and lateral acceleration Total KV dry weight less tank 81.31 Total ∆V in m/sec + 10% ACS Useful fuel and oxidizer ACS and press fraction of useful, 10% 19.30 Added ACS fuel at 10% of divert ACS and pressurization fuel, 10% 1.93 Propellant trapped in system 20% of fuel load Unusable propellant fraction, 3% Unusable propellant 0.58 Conventional pressure tanks Tankage 3.98 Account for ACS/pressure fuel used but not effective for thrust Subtotal of KV wet 106.52 Isp of propellant (sec)
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2004. Report of the American Physical Society Study Group on Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense: Scientific and Technical Issues, American Physical Society, College Park, Md., October 5, p.
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Many of these multiple layers of sensors may be in the same configuration, but they may be based in different geographical areas to provide coverage and engagement flexibility to engage ICBM threats over a wide range of approach azimuths. The threat detection, tracking, and imaging sensor suite is a key element of any missile defense system, as described earlier in the recommended concept of operations.
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It is recommended that these stacked GBX radars be located at the current UEWR (ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS)
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Assuming that the transmitter and receiver could be modified to pass the required information, this function is estimated to require 0.65 percent of the radar resources per interceptor for an in-flight target update (IFTU) every 10 sec, until the final 10 sec before intercept, where 65 percent might be required for IFTUs every 0.1 sec (classified Appendix J provides greater detail)
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provide the precision tracking capability and kill assessment to enable SLS with the concurrent viewing that the committee described earlier. These radars, coupled with the recommended GMD-E interceptors, provide SLS engagement battle space over virtually all populated portions of North America for the midcourse phase of the ICBM threat trajectory -- i.e., they provide homeland defense.
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In addition, in the area between the single-shot footprint and the SLS footprint, there is battle space for second shots to replace failures or to engage additional credible objects identified by the first interceptor at the time it designates its intended target object. This feature is sometimes called shoot-evaluate-shoot or shoot-designate-shoot.
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The main message of the figures and the associated assessment is as follows: If the recommended CONUS-based GMD-E interceptor is adopted, there is no need for early intercepts from Europe to help defend North America, because the CONUS-based interceptors provide excellent coverage with at least one SLS engagement and often a third shot as well. Early Intercept: Useful or Not?
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However, as shown in some of the engagements analyzed in this chapter, early intercept even in the best of cases does not occur early enough to avoid the need for midcourse discrimination. While intercept from Europe would be quite important if nothing is done about the limitations of the current GMD system architecture, the committee believes it is better to solve that problem, and others, with the recommended CONUS-based GMD-E.
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While a 6-km/sec interceptor in Europe would provide additional shot opportunities for CONUS defense, the committee does not advocate introducing an interceptor with fly-out velocity greater than about 4.5 km/sec into Europe. Coverage of GMD Evolution Against Threats from North Korea In a format similar to that of the figures showing the threat from Iran, Figures 5-13, 5-14, and 5-15 compare nominal single-shot and SLS coverage for minimum energy, lofted, and depressed trajectories from North Korea for the committee's recommended architecture.
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160 MAKING SENSE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE FIGURE 5-13 Notional defended footprint of North Korean minimum-energy trajectories. FIGURE 5-14 Notional defended footprint of North Korean lofted trajectories.
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Figure 5-15 shows the coverage against North Korean depressed trajectories. Here, most of northwest Canada is protected, but the coverage of Alaska is reduced by the short time of flight and the shallow trajectories, making defense of the FGA site less robust than might be desired.
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East Coast four-shot SLS engagement (ground track view)
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This hypothetical ICBM engagement assessment illustrates a firing doctrine using SLS engagements. Additionally, the trajectories in the figures that follow and in classified Appendix J are color-coded to reflect the portions of the trajectories that are being tracked by the various radars.
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180 Threat booster burnout 190 First shot interceptor launched from Poland site (commit on track from Azerbaijan XBR) 260 Interceptor burnout 339 KV sensor acquires threat complex (R2Tgt = 1,994 km; T2Go = 177 sec; R2Int = 1,061 km)
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track and hit/kill assessment data along with data from the earlier interceptor sensor TOM are fused by the BMC2 and provided to each interceptor in the SLS succession until a kill is assessed as complete or until the battle space is exhausted. The last two shots, if needed, come from a CONUS East Coast interceptor site, in this example at Caribou, Maine.
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It can be seen from an examination of the event timeline that a significant battle space is left after the fourth shot in the SLS engagement sequence. This provides a lot of flexibility in the timing of the actual shots and allows more time for certain functions that might be impacted by natural backgrounds and unexpected events during the course of the engagement.
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(deg) First shot 190 516 11.3 35.7 Second shot 666 931 4.8 127.0 Third shot 1,081 1,525 11.5 10.3 Fourth shot 1,675 1,811 12.2 34.2 Figure 5-18 displays the ground track view of the baseline engagement (same as Figure 5-16)
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(at 1,811 sec) FIGURE 5-18 Example of Middle East to CONUS East Coast four-shot SLS engamement scenario (ground track view)
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(deg) First shot Poland 474 690 9.5 67.4 Second shot Poland Not enough battle space for second shot Poland site Second shot Maine 720 1,357 11.1 8.3 Third shot Maine 1,387 1,671 11.9 15.3 Fourth shot Maine 1,701 1,825 12.1 39 • Case 2, Figure 5-20 (two possibilities)
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170 FIGURE 5-20 Case 2: Fylingdales radar out.
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This second shot is not a true SLS engagement, but it is given significant new data by the BMC2 from the first shot KV sensor combined with the new Thule and/or Cape Cod GBX track data and can be considered an SLS shot. The third shot, if necessary, is a true SLS engagement.
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The recommended path forward, GMD-E, involves a smaller, shorter burn interceptor configuration building on development work already done by MDA under the KEI program but with a different front end. The heavier, more capable KV with a larger onboard sensor provides the capabilities absent in the current GMD system but responsive
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As discussed throughout this report, missile defense is at a critical point. The title of this report, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense: An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S.
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4. GMD-E's predicted capability for SLS over most of North America relieves the requirement, necessitated by current GMD limitations, for early intercepts from Europe against threats from the Middle East toward North America.
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