Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives (2012) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
1 Introduction
1 Introduction
Pages 19-29
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 19... ...
In addition to being susceptible to certain countermeasures, the Safeguard program was meant to detonate defensive nuclear warheads overhead to prevent enemy nuclear detonations in the United States, which did not engender support for it. 1 For additional reading, see Ashton B
|
From page 20... ...
began to exploit the emerging long-wave infrared sensor technology that allowed detecting and tracking objects against the cold space background. Studies conducted in the mid- to late 1960s defined midcourse defense options based on interceptors with long-wave infrared sensors capable of detecting potential intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
|
From page 21... ...
2010. Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C.: February, pp.
|
From page 22... ...
A more immediate threat is a new 3,200 km IRBM North Korea is developing that can threaten Japan, Guam, and Okinawa -- all staging areas for a U.S. response to aggressive behavior by North Korea.4 4 Ibid., p.
|
From page 23... ...
Generic but representative examples of potential ballistic missiles, available in the open literature, and actual threat assessments from the intelligence community are provided in classified Appendix F, which accompanies this unclassified report.5 The principal hurdles in developing a true ICBM for Iran and North Korea to overcome are achieving reliability and a sufficient range, developing a workable RV, and producing a nuclear (or conceivably chemical or biological) weapon that can be used in an ICBM RV.
|
From page 24... ...
Accordingly, and consistent with its congressional tasking, this study does not consider the ability to defend against Russian or Chinese strategic forces as an evaluation criterion for proposed missile defense systems. In addition to developing its strategic deterrent, however, China is also very active in developing conventionally armed tactical and theater missile capabilities for "anti-access, area-denial" missions.
|
From page 25... ...
While the committee had access to classified information provided by the Missile Defense Agency on its programs of record, the committee chose to 8 For brevity, missions (2)
|
From page 26... ...
The duration of the PBDI phase depends on PBV design and mission. However, it can be very or vanishingly short as noted in a recent Defense Science Board report entitled Science and Technology Issues of Early Intercept Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility (September 2011)
|
From page 27... ...
0-1,000 km 1,000-3,500 km (IRBM) 5,500-10,000 km 3,500-5,500 km FIGURE 1-2 Notional ballistic missile defense (BMD)
|
From page 28... ...
As such, the analysis included in this unclassified report (as distinct from the classified annex) is based on illustrative calculations that, in the committee's view, reasonably capture various missile defense architecture trade-offs.
|
From page 29... ...
policy of extended deterrence, the last of the three reports calls for cooperation with allies to provide a defense umbrella against belligerent states, particularly North Korea and Iran, that are hostile to the collective interests of the United States and its friends and allies on which it depends. The title of this report, Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense, underscores the four primary objectives in meeting the congressional tasking.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.