Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives (2012) / Chapter Skim
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3 Alternatives to U.S. Boost-Phase Defense
3 Alternatives to U.S. Boost-Phase Defense
Pages 73-106
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is provided vis-à-vis their potential mission applicability. PRESENT AND PROPOSED SYSTEMS Ground-Based Midcourse Defense System The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report states that "the United States is currently protected against limited ICBM attacks.
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2010. Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C., February.
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; and the GMD Communication Network. The GMD system interfaces with the BMD C2BMC system that provides target typing and tracks to the GMD fire control system.
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. With respect to BMD, the Aegis system has an existing capability deployed for sea-based midcourse defense and terminal defense and is in Phase A (concept development)
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3.6.1 is currently deployed for defense against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and has a limited capability against intermediaterange ballistic missiles (IRBMs)
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Table 3-3 lists the total investment cost of approximately $17 billion and the average annual investment costs for the previous and current BMD Aegis programs from FY 1964 through FY 2009. The table includes all the predecessor program investments beginning with the initial Navy-funded investments in the Aegis program, which consisted of both the development of the SM-2 (RIM-66C)
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Phase 4 of PAA, which is not yet well defined but is specifically aimed at improving protection of the eastern United States against the potential of eventual introduction of Iranian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
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In combination with Aegis, it may also provide defense of high-value, small-area targets against longer-range missiles. The system, which is designed to be deployable on C-17 aircraft, consists of six mobile launchers with eight interceptor missiles per launcher, AN/TPY-2 X-band radar, and the THAAD fire control and communications (TFCC)
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Final target discrimination is achieved through TOM alignment and onboard IR discrimination. The THAAD system investment began with the Ballistic Missile Defense Office funding a demonstration and evaluation (DEM/VAL)
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A radar provides surveillance and missile guidance from launch through midcourse maneuver, terminal engagement, and intercept. Following target acquisition by the radar, the target trajectory and intercept point are supplied by the fire control system.
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3 See Department of Defense, 2010, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C., February.
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boost-phase missile defense and non-boost alternatives in the context of their potential mission applicability. The following section provides an unclassified analysis that is based on a notional set of threat missiles, interceptor designs and sensors where fly-out velocity has been varied parametrically to explore the basic physical limitations of missile defense system performance.
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7 the 2011 Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Science and Technology Issues of Early In Intercept Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility, it was noted, among other things, that "If, as an alternative to simply firing salvos of defense missile at each incoming missile, time is available to fire one missile, observe what happens from that engagement, and then fire the remaining missile(s) only if the assessment is made that the first shot was not successful, then the potential exists to save significant defense resources." 2011 Defense Science Board.
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Even then, to provide an early shot ahead of the FGA-based interceptors protecting the western United States, the field of fire of Poland-based interceptors would be constrained to a tail chase engagement geometry to avoid dropping interceptor stages on populated areas of the Russian Federation, another likely bone of contention. Here, a notional interceptor based in Poland such as that described in Figure 3-1 would not threaten any portions of the Russian Federation's strategic deterrent force, would provide good coverage of Europe, and might be of value to homeland defense under circumstances discussed later in Chapter 5.
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The basing of ICBMs or MRBMs in silos near Qom raises a question about the value of an Aegis ship in the Black Sea. The committee set aside the obvious operations issues of maintaining an Aegis ship in the southeastern Black Sea in examining engagement effectiveness (see classified Appendix J for greater detail)
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Despite the recent cancellation of U.S. participation, it should be noted that the MEADS UHF surveillance radar has 360-degree coverage against ballistic missile targets from every direction.
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2010. Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C.: February, pp.
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European Defense Analysis Figures 3-2 to 3-9 illustrate the notional capability expected in the European PAA, where fly-out velocity is varied parametrically. Figure 3-2 displays the ear 5,600 km IR B M IR B M Max R ange 2,000 km MR B M 3,500 km 4,000 km 4,500 km 5,000 km 5,300 km 4.0 km/s ec Min E nergy F ootprint FIGURE 3-2 Notional engagement opportunities of a 4-km/sec fly-out velocity interceptor against minimum energy threats from central Iran flying directly over the planned Deveselu site.
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SLS battle space is a measure of robustness, important for allowing a delay in the decision to commit, for second-shot opportunities to take advantage of initial discrimination results, and for replacing intercept failures. 5,600 km IR B M IR B M Max R ange 2,000 km MR B M 3,500 km 4,000 km 4,500 km 5,000 km 4.0 km/s ec L ofted F ootprint FIGURE 3-3 Notional engagement opportunities of a 4-km/sec fly-out velocity interceptor against moderately lofted threats from central Iran flying directly over the planned Deveselu site.
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In all these examples, the western boundary, shown by the white arc, is determined by the maximum range assumed for the notional threat, not by notional interceptor performance. Figure 3-7, Figure 3-8, and Figure 3-9 show the SLS footprints against minimum energy lofted and depressed trajectories from Iran for three different interceptor fly-out velocities varied parametrically based at Deveselu, Romania, and in northern Poland, assuming EOR.
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3-5 ALTERNATIVES TO U.S. BOOST-PHASE DEFENSE 93 IRBM Max Range 4.5 km/sec 4.0 km/sec 3.5 km/sec 3.0 km/sec FIGURE 3-5 Notional single-shot coverage for interceptors with fly-out velocity varied parametrically between 3.0 and 4.5 km/sec against lofted trajectories from central Iran.
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Fig. 3-8 4.5 4.0 3.5 4.5 4.0 3.5 FIGURE 3-8 Notional SLS footprints against lofted trajectories from Iran for interceptors with fly-out velocity varied parametrically between 3.0 and 4.5 km/sec based at Deveselu, Romania, and Redzikowo, Poland.
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Figure 3-10 illustrates the single-shot footprints one can expect for interceptors with fly-out velocity varied parametrically between 3.0 and 4.5 km/sec against North Korean MRBMs (range of approximately 1,300 km) , assuming EOR capability and an assumed second forward-based AN/TPY-2 radar located near Hagi, Japan, to provide accurate track data.
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if single-shot LOR firing doctrines obtain. If one considers a more widely dispersed set of potential launch locations in North Korea, two sites will be required for complete EOR coverage of Japan, at least for the slower interceptor speeds considered here, and at least two sites in the case of LOR operation.
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Note Hagi FBX location is notional. FIGURE 3-12 Notional ship-based single-shot EOR coverage of Japan: lofted MRBM trajectories.
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FIGURE 3-14 Notional ship-based SLS EOR coverage of Japan: minimum energy MRBM trajectories. Note Hagi FBX location is notional.
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Note Hagi FBX location is notional. FIGURE 3-16 Notional ship-based SLS EOR coverage of Japan: depressed MRBM trajectories.
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The shorter distance between North Korea and Japan means that threat missile detection can occur shortly after burnout, with accurate track data provided by two TPY-2 radars throughout the battle space. Nor is EOR as essential as in Europe, because the intercept ranges against North Korean MRBM threats directed against Japan are shorter and hence more compatible with the Aegis radar tracking capability.
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phases of the European PAA would provide the flexibility for defense of allies and forward bases against threats from North Korea or any other countries, limited only by the number of assets procured and deployed in the region. FINDINGS Midcourse Discrimination As discussed in Chapter 2, the formidable difficulties in being able to maintain boost-phase interceptors in the necessary locations to enable defense even against long-range attacks means that any operationally feasible defense against such attacks would have to effect intercept after the boost phase is complete.
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Midcourse discrimination is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 as well as in classified Appendix J Major Finding 3: There is no practical missile defense concept or system operating before terminal phase for either the U.S.
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• Initially the nonthreatening objects may be "unintentional" -- for example, spent upper stages, deployment modules or attitude control modules, separation debris, debris from unburned fuel, insulation, and other parts of the booster. However, as threat sophistication increases, the defense is likely to have to deal with purposeful countermeasures -- decoys and other penetration aids and tactics including salvo launches and antisimulation devices -- that adversaries will have deliberately designed to frustrate U.S.
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Major Finding 6: To be credible and effective, any ballistic missile defense system must be robust even if any of its elements fail to work as planned, whether that failure is due to a failure of discrimination or to something else. Moreover, a properly configured midcourse defense is the most cost-effective and resilient method of defending the U.S.
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Allies, Partners, and Host Nations The MDA and the Services appear to be on the right track for developing BMD systems for countering short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats from rogue states to deployed forces and U.S. allies, partners, and host nations.
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are expected to provide defense for Europe against a limited ballistic missile attack for deployed U.S. and allied forces within the region and the Middle East, provided the sensor architecture and the missile defense command and control (C2)
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