Making Sense of Ballistic Missile Defense An Assessment of Concepts and Systems for U.S. Boost-Phase Missile Defense in Comparison to Other Alternatives (2012) / Chapter Skim
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non-boost missile defense when (1) countering short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats from rogue states to deployed forces of the United States and its allies and (2)
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The duration of the PBDI phase depends on PBV design and mission. However, it can be very or vanishingly short as noted in a recent Defense Science Board report entitled Science and Technology Issues of Early Intercept Ballistic Missile Defense Feasibility (September 2011)
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0 1,000 3,500 5,500 10,000 Short-Range Medium-Range Intermediate-Range Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Ballistic Missile Ballistic Missile Ballistic Missile (SRBM)
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BMD systems to defend against large-scale deliberate nuclear attacks by Russia or China.4 Furthermore, although not the focus of this study, it is important to recognize that any effective defense of the U.S. homeland or allies against limited ballistic missile attack, whether the attack or the defense uses kinetic or directed energy, inherently has the capability, without significant modification, to also intercept satellites passing within its field of fire.
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sunk investments based on kinetic energy interceptor heritage; (3) sunk investment based on Aegis block develop Figure S-2 ment upgrade, design, and production heritage of SM-2 Block IV; (4)
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boost-phase and non-boost systems, as requested by the congressional tasking, the committee developed scenarios it believed the United States, and in some cases its allies, partners, and host nations, would face in each of the four missile defense missions stated in the second paragraph. These scenarios and missions are congruent with the threats described in the congressional tasking as well as with the DOD Ballistic Missile Defense Review.7 In particular, as part of its analysis, the committee examined U.S.
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simulations used to design and analyze ballistic missiles and interceptors. For example, one model -- BMD TRADES -- used to fly out threats and interceptors over a detailed oblate rotating Earth can graphically display the resulting footprint coverage and battle space.
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This could be particularly important where the issue was defending deployed forces or friendly territory -- as would be the case, for example, in a war on the Korean peninsula and in scenarios where hostile missile launches occur late enough in the war so that an opponent's air defenses have been thoroughly suppressed. Similarly, there are some threat t rajectories -- say, from North Korea toward Japan or Guam -- where it might be feasible to station boost-phase interceptors in locations where they could be effective.9 For almost all other plausible engagements, boost-phase intercept is not practical given the limited burn time and the requirement to be close to the intercept point.
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Shorter powered flights of solid-fueled threat missiles require many more satellites for coverage. Shorter range missiles with their shorter burn times and lower burnout altitudes cannot be engaged by spacebased boost-phase intercepts.
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10 The art of midcourse discrimination, developed over many decades, does not provide perfect selection of reentry vehicles. However, by designing a BMD architecture based on the capabilities described in this report, an adequate level of discrimination performance can -- in the committee's judgment -- be achieved in the near term and provide a reasonable chance of keeping the United States generally ahead in the contest between countermeasures and counter-countermeasures over time, at least against emerging missile states like North Korea and Iran.11 In particular, the committee believes that the best approach for addressing the midcourse discrimination problem is the synergy between X-band radar observations 10 MDA has programs of record associated with sensor development with emphasis on airborne and space-based electro-optics/infrared (EO/IR)
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Major Finding 3: There is no practical missile defense concept or system operating before terminal phase for either the U.S. homeland or allies that does not depend on some level of midcourse discrimination, even in the absence of deliberate decoys or other countermeasures.
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Major Finding 6: To be credible and effective, a ballistic missile defense system must be robust even if any of its elements fail to work as planned, whether that failure is due to a failure of discrimination or to something else. Moreover, a properly configured midcourse defense is the most cost-effective and resilient
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and allied deployed forces and of Asian allies.12 • With two or three Aegis ashore sites in Europe, that same combination can provide a layered late midcourse and high-altitude terminal defense for Europe. • No interceptor with fly-out speeds less than 5.0 km/sec based in Poland or Romania or elsewhere in Europe can engage or interfere with Russia's nuclear deterrent ICBMs or submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
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Major Finding 8: The first three phases of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) are expected to provide defense for Europe against a limited ballistic missile attack for deployed U.S.
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• While there may be special cases of a small country such as North Korea launching relatively slow burning liquid-propellant ICBMs in which some boostphase intercepts are possible, the required basing locations for interceptors are not likely to be politically acceptable.13 This recommendation is not intended to preclude funding of generic research and development such as the ABL test 13 For example, while a North Korean ICBM aimed at Hawaii and some other Pacific locations could be intercepted in boost phase by a properly located Aegis ship, the United States cannot realistically or prudently expect that BPIs intended for defense against North Korean or Iranian attacks can be stationed in Russian or Chinese airspace or over other nonallied territory (or where overflights of such territory would be necessary to reach on-station locations) , at least short of a full resolution of Russian and Chinese concerns about U.S.
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Major Recommendation 4: As a means to defend deployed U.S. forces and allies from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile threats, the Missile Defense Agency and the Services should continue investing in non-boost systems
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The importance of the synergy between these concurrent observations together with SLS battle space in maximizing midcourse discrimination effectiveness cannot be overemphasized. • An additional interceptor site with the new evolved ground-based inter ceptor in CONUS together with the recommended radar additions provides SLS coverage of virtually the entire United States and Canada against the sort of threat that can prudently be expected to emerge from North Korea or Iran over the coming decade or so.
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Hawaii is very small target area for threats from North Korea, Iran, or any other country and can be covered by one Aegis ship located west of the islands. By contrast, modifying the GMD system to provide effective defense of Hawaii against an evolved threat would add substantial complexity and cost.
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