Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety (2012) / Chapter Skim
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5 Industry Management of Offshore Drilling
5 Industry Management of Offshore Drilling
Pages 90-110
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From page 90... ...
Many operating companies adhere to a rigorous safety checklist and in many cases perform safety audits of their contractors, service companies, and others. However, over the course of time, offshore accidents occur that are attributable to the lack of one or several elements of an integrated safety management system or to a lack of diligence in executing those elements that are part of the contractor's systems.
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From page 91... ...
Industry's response to the Ocean Ranger disaster resulted in a major shift in ballast control training and the introduction of simulators to train ballast control operators. The disaster also led the offshore industry to improve the training of rig personnel in survival skills and the procedures for abandonment of a drilling vessel.
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From page 92... ...
The U.K. Health and Safety Executive defines safety culture as "the product of individual group values, attitudes and perceptions, competencies and patterns of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization's health and safety management." Creating safety culture means instilling attitudes and procedures in individuals and organizations ensuring that safety issues are treated as high priority, too.
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From page 93... ...
A subordinate does not hesitate to question a supervisor, and a contractor employee does not hesitate to question an employee of an operating company. Investigations of several large-scale accidents in recent years provide clear illustrations of the consequences of a deficient safety culture.
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From page 94... ...
come in conflict with minimizing risk, a disciplined approach is needed to weigh process effectiveness against the level of risk for an upcoming action or series of actions. A sound safety culture ensures that the organization can address conflicting objectives without compromising system safety and can keep the likelihood of a system failure as low as practicable (see Chapter 6)
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From page 95... ...
The drilling contractor -- focused on running the MODU, the subsea operation, and drilling equipment -- relies on the operating company to provide 3 Firmware is fixed software used to control electronic devices.
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From page 96... ...
Despite the complexity of deepwater offshore drilling, the committee has observed from presentations made by industry representatives (as mentioned above) that the parties involved tend not to exhibit an overall systems approach for addressing the multiple interacting safety issues involved in the subsea, MODU, and drilling activities.
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From page 97... ...
In essence, the offshore industry is fragmented into a large number of service providers and independent agents with specific roles for drilling offshore wells. This arrangement tends not to allow for recognition of the system-level challenges of handling a multitude of service providers, often with different goals, safety practices, experience levels, and training.
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From page 98... ...
Transocean supervisory personnel included the offshore installation manager (OIM) , who coordinated rig operations with BP's well site leaders and managed the Transocean crew; the master, who was responsible for all marine operations when the rig traveled from one location to another; and a senior tool pusher, who supervised the tool pushers, who in turn coordinated drilling operations carried out by the drillers and assistant drillers.
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From page 99... ...
Involved in those decisions were the operator, drilling contractor, and service companies.6 The complex interaction of the corporations and government agencies was not managed at a systemic level to anticipate the possible safety shortfalls that ultimately led to the well blowout. This was evidenced by a substantial number of decisions and actions that are inconsistent with the characteristics of a robust safety culture and HRO discussed earlier in the chapter: While the geologic conditions encountered in the Macondo well posed challenges to the drilling team, alternative completion techniques and operational processes were available that could have been utilized to prepare the well for temporary abandonment safely (see Chapter 2)
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From page 100... ...
Management processes failed to adequately identify and mitigate risks created by operational decisions before the blowout, communicate critical information, train key engineering and rig personnel, and ensure that measures taken to save time and reduce costs did not adversely affect overall risk. A substantial compilation and discussion of witness testimony, written communications, and other information concerning management performance are presented in those reports.
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From page 101... ...
The lack of a strong safety culture resulting from a deficient overall systems ap proach to safety is evident in the multiple flawed decisions that led to the blowout. Industrial management involved with the Macondo well– Deepwater Horizon disaster failed to appreciate or plan for the safety challenges presented by the Macondo well.
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From page 102... ...
As the E&P industry moved toward greater reliance on contractors, consultants, and service company support, a major challenge arose for operators: assessing the experience levels, training, and ability of the personnel to execute an integrated safety program for an offshore drilling operation. Training requirements, including those for well control, vary among companies.
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From page 103... ...
ASRS, which is based on voluntary reporting and is administered by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, analyzes the information and makes it available to the public and across the aviation industry for educational purposes to lessen the likelihood of aviation incidents and accidents. For years, companies and contractors in the oil and gas industry have collected drilling data on all offshore wells.
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From page 104... ...
RECOMMENDATIONS Responsibility and Accountability Summary Recommendation 5.1: Operating companies should have ul timate responsibility and accountability for well integrity, because only they are in a position to have visibility into all its aspects. Operat ing companies should be held responsible and accountable for well de sign, well construction, and the suitability of the rig and associated 9 Report of the Society of Petroleum Engineers Gulf of Mexico Deepwater Drilling and Completions Advisory Summit to NAE/NRC Committee, March 2011, http://www.
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From page 105... ...
Because offshore operations require a high level of technical competencies, any organization that would assume the role of operator needs to have the readily available and internal capacity to be able to access the technical and operational competencies of the contractors and service providers. However, drilling contractors (being the operators of the MODU and the drilling equipment)
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From page 106... ...
As research efforts focused on the safety of offshore drilling operations have been relegated to manufacturers, contractors, and service providers, much less of that research is done by the operators. Furthermore, there is little coordination of system safety research associated with offshore drilling operations.
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From page 107... ...
Specific education for drilling operations, especially offshore drilling, is lacking. There are a variety of related engineering disciplines such as petroleum, mechanical, chemical, and industrial engineering, but only a few programs offer introductory courses in drilling.
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From page 108... ...
Approaches using simulators should include team training for coordination of activities in crisis situations. Each operating company, service provider, and drilling contractor has been viewed by the oil and gas industry as responsible for its own training.
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From page 109... ...
Overall, in the drilling industry there is little uniformity in the type, amount, and frequency of training. Furthermore, there is a noticeable lack of team training and training of management personnel who make critical decisions for offshore drilling operations.
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From page 110... ...
110 Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout Also, the Marine Well Containment Company is an organization set up for the purpose of containing an underwater well control incident in U.S. Gulf of Mexico.
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