Assuring a Future U.S.-Based Nuclear and Radiochemistry Expertise (2012) / Chapter Skim
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6 National Security
6 National Security
Pages 89-116
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From page 89... ...
. From the initial development of nuclear weapons, expertise in fields of nuclear and radiochemistry have expanded to address a broader range of security-related challenges, including those in intelligence, nonproliferation, nuclear security and emergency response and, more recently, counterterrorism and homeland security.
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From page 90... ...
Work supporting national security missions is carried out not only in the nuclear weapons complex, but in other national laboratories and in academic institutions. TECHNICAL NEEDS AND WORKFORCE CONSIDERATIONS Rather than presenting an inventory of staffing needs for each agency discussed above, the committee looked at the utilization of nuclear and radiochemistry expertise by major program area (weapons, nonproliferation and arms control, counterterrorism, and homeland security)
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From page 91... ...
These capabilities further enabled nuclear and radiochemists to devise and carry out experiments to obtain more accurate and a wider variety of fundamental nuclear data such as cross sections, decay schemes, and half-lives needed to interpret the post-test radiochemical data. Following the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992, a science-based approach for annual certification of nuclear warheads with aging, replaced, or modified nuclear components was adopted by the DOE's Defense Program.
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From page 92... ...
More recently, in the absence of testing, "radchem" efforts at the nuclear weapons design laboratories that support the SSP have evolved. The emphasis has shifted to the reinterpretation of data from old nuclear tests with the goal of meeting the needs of weapons designers who are working toward increased accuracy and a defensible uncertainty analysis.
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From page 93... ...
For the SSP, radiochemical data are the benchmarks against which the physics models in the large-scale simulations are validated; in addition, the data interpretations by nuclear and radiochemists form the basis for certification of the U.S. nuclear stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing.
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From page 94... ...
Workforce Considerations To accomplish work related to SSP at the weapons design laboratories requires a technical staff with not only the knowledge and expertise to handle, purify, and quantify radioactive materials, but also with knowledge and expertise to analyze and interpret nuclear and radiochemical data and understand its meaning in the appropriate context (broad–based system analysis approach)
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From page 95... ...
• Certification of the stockpile without underground testing requires: Improved physics models in simulation codes that are validated against high quality fundamental nuclear experimental data -- such as neutron fission -- and capture cross sections (probabili ties) , independent and cumulative fission yields (that is, "chain yields")
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From page 96... ...
A better understanding of the chemistry of the actinide elements and key fission products, detectors, and tracers in underground nuclear tests. Sustained capability to characterize nuclear materials through: Analytical chemistry, or ▪ Development of new analytical methods (for example, new ▪ methods that reduce waste volumes)
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From page 97... ...
Scenario 3: Nuclear Weapon States Decide Multi-laterally to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons Entirely Although this scenario could be regarded as one extreme associated with the future of the weapons program, this discussion of the ramifications more naturally falls within the area of nonproliferation and arms control and will be discussed further below. Nonproliferation and Arms Control Programs Technical Needs Scientists involved with the Manhattan Project were among the first to recognize and express concern early in the development of nuclear weapons about the potential for proliferation of nuclear technology and nuclear materials.
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From page 98... ...
Gen erally, these fall into the categories of limitations on nuclear testing (the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996) and arms limitation and reduction agreements (for example, 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I, 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II, 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, and 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II)
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From page 99... ...
, the same type of expertise is required for treaty verification as for the "radchem" work associated with the weapons program. The technical approach for verifying compliance with nonproliferation and arms control agreements also draws upon a comparable base of nuclear and radiochemistry expertise.
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From page 100... ...
. This introduces enhanced requirements for additional environmental sampling and radionuclide measurements associated with verification of the NPT, which in turn leads to in an increased need for nuclear and radiochemistry expertise.
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From page 101... ...
There will be a higher rate of turnover of these work ers, consistent with the need to replace skilled workers retiring, and more effort will be expended to provide on-the-job training for workers, where possible. Work will require: Understanding fission processes and having a trained staff with the expertise to make a spectrum of radionuclide measurements in a variety of matrices.
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From page 102... ...
Scenario 2: Implementation of Additional Verification Regimes Successful negotiation followed by ratification of additional treaties raises the possibility of additional verification technology requirements. This will include increased demands for onsite inspections that will drive new sampling and measurement requirements.
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From page 103... ...
• Opportunities also exist for knowledgeable personnel to look at facilities that are producing fissile material to make sure the material is not being diverted. This scenario represents growth in both treaty monitoring and nuclear safeguards and is an issue for the United States and the international community.
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From page 104... ...
The seizures of illicitly trafficked nuclear materials in Prague and else where created both public and government awareness of a growing prob lem. It was recognized by scientists that the technical analysis of nuclear and other radiological materials could produce information that would aid the investigation of nuclear smuggling incidents.3 Nuclear forensic analysis of seized materials could, in principle, give clues about the origin of the materials (for example, how and when the materials were made and their intended purpose)
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From page 105... ...
The ITWG (since renamed the Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group) provides a forum where scientists, law enforcement personnel, and policy makers can discuss and explore issues surrounding the development, use, and implementation of nuclear forensic capabilities for responding to the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and the threat of nuclear terrorism.
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From page 106... ...
In turn, the basis for performing nuclear forensic analysis drives a more fundamental need for nuclear data (for example, better cross sections and more accurate independent and cumulative fission yields) and the need for an array of reference materials that contain various nuclear and radiological materials.
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From page 107... ...
Bounding Scenarios and Assumptions Scenario 1: Status Quo In this scenario, current technical capabilities that support counterterrorism and homeland security missions are maintained by leveraging existing assets, both human capital and infrastructure such as laboratories and radiochemical counting facilities, that were developed to support the nuclear weapons and nonproliferation and arms control program areas. This scenario represents a gradual decline in the required skill and knowledge base over time since new staff that will replace retiring staff will lack hands-on training and experience.
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From page 108... ...
and conducting research and development activities supporting the nuclear forensics capability FUTURE DIRECTIONS Unlike many of the sectors discussed in this report, technical efforts in national security are by nature more restricted to the national laboratory workforce, due to the requirements for protection of classified information. There is no significant industrial sector outside of the national laboratories, and academic research relevant to national security programs are addressed in Chapter 2 and 3.
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From page 109... ...
However, the nuclear weapons program continues to drive the need for fundamental nuclear data. Over the years, other missions have benefitted significantly from past research and infrastructure investments provided by the nuclear weapons program.
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From page 110... ...
For exam ple, the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center within the Department of Homeland Security's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office has conducted a laboratory survey of the demographics of laboratory workers working in nuclear forensics and related programs. Of the individuals identified as be ing involved in nuclear forensics at eight national laboratories (not all of whom are designated as having expertise in nuclear and radiochemistry)
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From page 111... ...
; in contrast, DOE national laboratories have a larger percentage of Ph.D.-level employees. In the data collected from national laboratories for this study, most reporting laboratories cite 40-60 percent of positions requiring nuclear and radiochemistry expertise are at the Ph.D.
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From page 112... ...
The supply of nuclear and radiochemistry expertise for nuclear security requires training beyond what academia can provide. This has not been
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From page 113... ...
DOE/NNSA (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration)
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From page 114... ...
National Nuclear Forensics Expertise Development Pro gram. In Current Status, Trends, and Needs in Radiochemical Education: The U.S.
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From page 115... ...
U.S. Department of Energy, National Science Foundation, Nuclear Science Advisory Committee.
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