Biosecurity Challenges of the Global Expansion of High-Containment Biological Laboratories Summary of a Workshop (2012) / Chapter Skim
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E9: United States
E9: United States
Pages 193-204
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From page 193... ...
Laboratory Location NIAID Integrated Research Facility Fort Detrick, MD National Biodefense Analysis & Countermeasures Center Fort Detrick, MD USAMRIID Recapitalizationa Fort Detrick, MD Boston University National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL) b Boston, MA Virginia Division of Consolidated Laboratoriesc Richmond, VA National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility Manhattan, KS SOURCE: Kaiser, 2011.
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Collins, CO George Mason University RBL Manassas, VA Global Health Research Building Durham, NC Howard T Ricketts Laboratory RBL Chicago, Il Pacific RBL (under construction) Honolulu, HI Southeast Biosafety Laboratory Birmingham, AL Tulane National Primate Research Center Covington, LA University of Missouri- Columbia RBL Columbia, MO University of Tennessee RBL Memphis, TN New Jersey Medical School Center for Infectious Disease Research RBL Newark, NJ SOURCE: Kaiser, 2011 and http://www.niaid.nih.gov/LabsAndResources/resources/dmid/NBL_RBL/Pages/site.aspx.
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More information on the history of the Select Agent Program may be found in the National Research Council report on Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and Toxins (NRC, 2009)
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13546, "Optimizing the Security of Biological Select Agents and Toxins in the United States," created the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel (FESAP) , which was tasked to make recommendations to improve the Select Agents Program (Obama, 2010)
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. For example, the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 increased laboratory construction to support research efforts in several areas, including antimicrobial resistance and countermeasures research.
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What standards exist for high biological containment laboratories in the United States for engineering and construction, licensing, safety, security, regular oversight, and certification? General Standards The CDC-NIH publication Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL)
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. Many organizations provide resources and guidelines for biosafety and biosecurity training: • The Sandia National Laboratories' International Biological Threat Reduction Program aims to reduce biological threats worldwide by, among other things, promoting the responsible use of biological agents, equipment, and expertise and improving the understanding of accidental and deliberate biological risks.22 • The CDC has online course modules and exercises for training in biosafety and biosecurity.23 • University of Texas Medical Branch maintains the National Biocontainment Training Center that provides training in biosafety and biosecurity to United States and international students, as well as on-site fellowships offering mentored training for individuals preparing for work at BSL-4 and for containment laboratory managers and engineers.24 • Yale Center for Public Health has online course resources for biosafety training based on a course taught at the school, designed in part for those interested in implementing biosafety and biosecurity courses at their own facilities.25 • Biosafety and animal safety training tools are available on the American Biological Safety Association (ABSA)
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From page 200... ...
Location Agent Description Date Source Human Error New Hampshire Vaccinia Accidental exposure from needlestick 9/2007 CDC, 2008 unknown Potential exposure when employee stuck self 8/2007 Field, 2007 Yersinia pestis with broken scalpel blade Maryland Vaccinia Accidental exposure from needlestick 8/2007 CDC, 2008 University of South Worker drops plate and splashes self 7/2007 Field, 2007 Ricketssia Alabama prowazekii U.C. Davis Potential exposure due to needlestick 7/2007 Field, 2007 Brucella University of Iowa Tularemia Potential exposure due to needlestick 5/2007 Field, 2007 Iowa Vaccinia Accidental exposure from needlestick 5/2007 CDC, 2008 UT San Antonio Tularemia Workers entered lab wihout PPE, unlikely 4/2007 Field, 2007 exposure unknown Researcher ill because of improper 4/2007 Field, 2007 Brucella decontamination procedures Pennsylvania Vaccinia Accidental exposure from needlestick 10/2006 CDC, 2008 Saint Louis monkeypox Worker exposed from needlestick 8/2006 CDC, 2008 University University of Anthrax Worker exposed to Anthrax after needlestick 7/2006 CDC, 2008 Chicago Connecticut Vaccinia Accidental exposure from needlestick 3/2005 CDC, 2008 Children's Hospital Anthrax Scientists exposed after live anthrax samples 6/2004 CDC, 2008 and Research accidentally get shipped to the lab Center Oakland, CA USAMRIID Ebola Accidental exposure from needlestick 2/2004 Kaiser, 2007 unknown West Nile Virus Lab worker contacts virus after accidentally 12/2002 CDC, 2008 cutting finger with scalpel unknown West Nile Virus Lab worker contracts virus after needlestick 8/2002 CDC, 2008 University of Texas Cutaneous anthrax of lab worker 4/2002 Field, 2007 Anthrax USAMRIID Junin virus Bone fragment from monkey punctured finger 12/1982 Johnson, during autopsy 2004 USAMRIID Lassa virus Accidental needle stick in finger 11/1979 Johnson, 2004 Equipment/Engineering Error University of GA none Flooding occurred twice of high-containment 2008 Schneider laboratory after sterilizer failed to shut off and Hart, 2008 CDC CDC used duct tape to secure facility after air 2007 Young, Coxiella filtration system failed during maintenance 2008 burnetii
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201 Appendix E: Country and Region Overviews University of Anthrax Potential exposure from broken flask spill 8/2007 Field, 2007 Mississippi Medical Center University of Texas Anthrax Potential exposure after fluid discovered in 5/2007 Field, 2007 Health Science bottom of centrifuge Center unknown Potential exposure after cap came off tube 8/2006 Field, 2007 Brucella University of Virginia Tularemia Potential exposure from cracked tube 8/2006 Field, 2007 University of Worker exposed after autoclave bag leaked 5/2006 Field, 2007 Yersinia Pestis Kentucky Tufts University Botulinum Potential exposure after broken vial found in 4/2006 Field, 2007 neurotoxin centrifuge unknown Potential exposure after broken vial 9/2005 Field, 2007 Coccidioides containing agent found in centrifuge immitis Plum Island 3 hour power failure 12/2003 Santora, 2002 Rocky Mountain Open container fell off shaker 2001 Johnson, Yersinia pestis Laboratory 2004 Unknown/Miscellaneous Error unknown Blood tests show potential exposures of 10 2007 Field, 2007 Coxiella people to agents burnetii unknown Tularemia Potential exposure after bitten by infected 7/2007 Field, 2007 animal unknown Lab worker potentially scratched by infected 4/2007 Field, 2007 Yersinia pestis animal Lovelace Lab worker bit by infected animal 9/2006 Field, 2007 Yersinia pestis Respiratory Research Institute Texas A&M Lab workers infected while cleaning aerosol 2/2006 United Brucella chamber; failure to report to CDC States GAO, 2007 Public Health Infected mice missing 8/2005 Field, 2007 Yersinia pestis Research Institute at UMDNJ UNC-Chapel Hill Venezuelan Blood test show possible exposure 9/2004 Field, 2007 equine encephalitis Medical College of Lab worker contracts coccidioidomycosis, 8/2004 Field, 2007 Coccidioides Ohio unknown route of exposure immitis Boston University Tularemia 3 scientists infected with Tularemia over 5 2004 Field, 2007 Medical Center months Rocky Mountain Skin test converted; cause was likely 2000 Johnson, Mycobacterium Laboratory improperly inactivated samples 2004 tuberculosis Rocky Mountain Worker hospitalized and successfully treated 1998 Johnson, Chlamydia Laboratory with antibiotics; no specific cause determined 2004 trachomatis Yerkes Primate Simian Exposed research assistant dies 6/1998 Wrobel, Center Herpesvirus 1998 Rocky Mountain Skin test converted; no specific cause 1996 Johnson, Mycobacterium Laboratory determined 2004 tuberculosis Yale University Sabia Researcher contracts virus and exposes 75 8/1994 Glass, 1994 other co-workers Plum Island Foot and Accidental release of virus into holding pens 1978 Margasak, mouth disease 2008 SOURCE: NRC Staff.
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tularensis, which is a select agent. OSHA proposed fines of $8,100 for each of Boston University and Boston Medical Center Corporation for their failure to ensure proper use of personal protective equipment.34 The lack of transparency at Boston University has greatly increased public concern about the new National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, for which the United States government is preparing additional risk assessments with advice from the National Research Council.35 6.
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2007. Technical Input on the National Institutes of Health's Draft Supplementary Risk Assessments and Site Suitability Analyses for the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratory, Boston University: A Letter Report.
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2010. Optimizing the Security of Biological Select Agents and Toxins in the United States.
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