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7 Identifying Areas for Action (Breakout Sessions)
Pages 65-80

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From page 65...
... BREAKOUT SESSION 1: DETERMINING NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE PRECAUTIONS Chair: Michael Callahan Rapporteur: J Craig Reed In view of the increasing range of available biosafety options, from expensive engineered solutions to lower-cost microbiological techniques, breakout session 1 examined how to select combinations of precautions that best meet individual needs.
From page 66...
... Starting in the early 1980s, regulations began requiring a number of expensive technologies to reduce aerosol exposure including HEPA filters, directional air flow, multiple air exchanges per hour (ACH) , and biological safety cabinets (BSC)
From page 67...
... As eliminating all risk is not achievable, a key component of the approach is defining an acceptable risk level. His institution (Institute for Animal Health)
From page 68...
... Management controls include alarm response protocols, HEPA filter validation, and protective clothing. Threat control measures for biosecurity threats include physical security, security procedures, inventories, security staff, and security services.
From page 69...
... Difficulties in Implementing Good Practices Several participants indicated that it is frequently difficult to convince lab and healthcare workers to use good practices, even in cases where the techniques, such as glove use and hand hygiene, are both inexpensive and known to be effective. To address this issue, one
From page 70...
... The individual also suggested that evaluations might discover that many components of containment labs are overengineered and that changes could potentially lead to decreased costs. Routine use of second HEPA filters was suggested as a possible example of engineering that may no longer be necessary given that when this practice started in the 1980s filters were much easier to damage.
From page 71...
... He suggested that scientists strive to increase transparency in science and communicate and demonstrate a culture of scientific responsibility to the public. Scientists should work with lawmakers and concerned citizens to regulate real risks, evaluate the value of proposed safety and security solutions, and examine the full costs of proposed regulatory solutions.
From page 72...
... described OIE, its laboratory network, and the twinning program OIE is using to expand and strengthen that network. OIE, which is an intergovernmental organization with 178 member countries, produces manuals and international standards for animal health, disease surveillance, laboratory diagnostics, trade, vaccine production, veterinary laboratories, and animal facilities.
From page 73...
... As part of the new system, the Internal Security Department of the Ministry of Home Affairs began vetting personnel with access to containment labs that were determined to be protected facilities, and the Singapore Civil Defense Force assumed responsibility for laboratory emergency response. The Ministry of Health approved laboratory certifiers and trainers and required annual certification of BSL-3 labs.
From page 74...
... The third speaker offered suggestions for improving practices and argued that practices are much easier to change than equipment or lab designs, and the final speaker provided another perspective on the design decision process. Following the presentations, Willy Tonui (Kenya Medical Research Institute, Kenya)
From page 75...
... Make sure HEPA filters are accessible for future service. As single pass air is very expensive and wasteful, he recommended considering recirculating ~85 percent of the air with additional HEPA filtration on the recirculated component.
From page 76...
... Nonetheless, he finds it reassuring that the lab will be available when needed and indicated that in the future, the Institut Pasteur plans to install a BSL-3 lab at each of their locations. A Rational and Attainable Approach to Successfully Implementing Biosafety in Laboratory Settings Worldwide Barbara Johnson (Biosafety Biosecurity International, United States)
From page 77...
... For example, ‘turnkey' labs are often designed like clean rooms instead of containment labs and contain numerous HEPA filters that are expensive to maintain, impossible to test, and do not increase safety. A key attribute for BSL-2 labs is cleanability and in many cases vinyl flooring and painted gypsum wallboard suffices.
From page 78...
... BREAKOUT GROUP 3 DISCUSSIONS In addition to discussing the presentations, the breakout session participants were asked to consider several questions: 7 Regulations include: Decree of the Minister of Trade and Industry of the Republic of Indonesia regarding the export and import of certain dangerous materials, including chemical and biological agents (2000) ; Decree of the Minister of Health of the Republic of Indonesia regarding safety and security guidelines for microbiology and biomedical laboratories (2009)
From page 79...
... Several people indicated that even with modular labs, there is no one size fits all solution and customers should shop around and make decisions based on their needs using the advice of their own technical advisors. Others cautioned that some modular labs are deceptively simple and include features such as an excessive number of HEPA filters with high maintenance requirements.


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