Managing for High-Quality Science and Engineering at the NNSA National Security Laboratories (2013) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
C--Review of Relevant Studies and Reports 1995-2010
C--Review of Relevant Studies and Reports 1995-2010
Pages 39-49
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 39... ...
An unstable workforce and lack of adequate plan to maintain core competencies; 3. Unclear roles and responsibilities assigned to DOE/NNSA headquarters and to the offices and programs included within the laboratory governance structure, ill-defined and duplicated lines of authority and oversight, including the failure of NNSA to achieve its intended independence; and 4.
|
From page 40... ...
2005 Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force also observed a lack of integrated and coordinated set of missions, citing DOE's lack of policy guidance and the lack of uniformity among design laboratories about requirements and regulations for the weapons development. For example, the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force noted several occasions where a laboratory would justify the building of a new facility based on requirements that they themselves created, in order to appear superior to another laboratory.
|
From page 41... ...
The recommendation to "provide laboratory contractors with increased flexibility in employment practices, partnership formation, technology transfer, and other area" was also made, which included action to: Provide increased flexibility for engaging collaborators and other federal agency and private sector sponsors. Decreased transactional oversight or review and increased flexibility in contract terms in Work for Others and CRADAs will enable the laboratories to better meet DOE mission goals, and to engage with private industry on more commercial time scales and terms.
|
From page 42... ...
. MAINTAINING CORE COMPETENCIES Many reports, including the SEAB's 2005 Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force Report, the Defense Science Board's 2008 Report on Nuclear Deterrence Skills, the 2009 Stimson Center's Task Force Report on Leveraging Science for Security: A Strategy for the Nuclear Weapons Laboratories in the 21st Century, and American's Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States expressed concerns that the NNSA lacks an adequate plan for the future recruiting of scientists who possess the core capabilities needed to maintain the nuclear weapons program, and that scientists are not given the ability to exercise and strengthen these essential skills, threatening the safety and reliability of the stockpile (Townsend et al., 2009; Defense Science Board, 2008; Perry and Schlesinger, 2009)
|
From page 43... ...
The lack of defined roles and responsibilities within the management structure of the complex has resulted in multiple layers of oversight and compliance requirements, excessive overhead costs, and productivity losses: all of which avert attention from S&E research. The 1995 Galvin Task Force observed many instances of the inappropriate role that DOE played in the day-to-day operations and management of the laboratories.
|
From page 44... ...
These chains of command are ill-defined, creating confusing lines of authority and accountability within the management structure, and fostering an environment where poorly established boundaries and redundant regulations are the norm. The 1999 Chiles Commission and the 2000 Foster Panel observed similar confusing chains of command, emphasizing that parallel chains created "day-to-day frustration among those in the field 44
|
From page 45... ...
The Stimson Task Force noted that due to NNSA not achieving the independence it was meant to have, "the laboratories now function under a complicated set of DOE and NNSA regulations, guidelines, and oversight." The laboratories need better 2 The National Nuclear Security Administration Act was created as a provision under the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000. For additional information about the NNSA Act, see http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-106s1059enr/pdf/BILLS-106s1059enr.pdf.
|
From page 46... ...
. The 2009 Strategic Posture Commission gave notable examples in their report: During the first term of the Bush Administration, the DOE General Counsel effectively prevented any NNSA actions exempting the NNSA from any DOE regulations, arguing any such action required DOE staff concurrence." In 2005, a Defense Science Board Task Force examined production at the Pantex plant and concluded that excessive regulation originating outside the NNSA in a risk-averse DOE was raising costs and hampering production.
|
From page 47... ...
. The 1995 Galvin Task Force described the effect of the excessive amount of audits on the laboratories: Everyone wants in on the act -- headquarters, the DOE area office, the DOE field office, program offices of the DOE, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB)
|
From page 48... ...
In 2009, the Strategic Posture Commission continued to highlight the excessive oversight of external agencies on the Complex, stating that "the regulatory burden on NNSA facilities is increased significantly by the on-going audits and reviews by the DOE Inspector General, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, and the Government Accountability Office. These burdens are not under the control of either the Secretary of Energy or the NNSA administrator" (Perry and Schlesinger, 2009)
|
From page 49... ...
2005. Report of the Nuclear Weapons Complex Infrastructure Task Force.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.