Evaluation of the Updated Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas (2012) / Chapter Skim
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6 Evaluation of Epidemic Modeling
6 Evaluation of Epidemic Modeling
Pages 53-62
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From page 53... ...
Gaps in scientific knowledge, limitations on data-collection resources, and the complexity of the transmission processes themselves all make it impossible to precisely predict the consequences of an infectious disease outbreak. The very process of model construction requires simplifying assumptions that introduce more uncertainty.
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The uSSRA underestimated contact risks and used overly optimistic parameter values for diagnostic capabilities, surveillance, contact rates, vaccination, and response. Consequently, the uSSRA spread model results incorrectly indicate foreshortened spread and low impact estimates.
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METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS Limitations of the Scope of Model The committee noted two major shortcomings related to the geographical and outcome scopes. First, the spread model incorporated only seven states.
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This is one of the strengths of NAADSM and also its major weakness, as it relies on expert opinion to define components. Model outcomes are very sensitive to parameter assumptions, and even when expert opinions are used they can vary and lead to wide probability distributions (Bates et al., 2003)
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From page 57... ...
The uSSRA did not reference any state or federal documents that would describe a mechanism for accurately identifying and updating active premises. In the face of an FMD outbreak, it will be critical to already have in place well-validated state animal health databases, active surveillance, and premises identification.
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From page 58... ...
. The uSSRA should have provided a more accurate and transparent analysis of the cited literature and provided further details to compare results of an exponential analysis with those of a probit analysis.
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Assumptions About Available Response Resources and Capacities The uSSRA makes various assumptions about foreign animal and zoonotic disease response capabilities presumed to be in place at the time of the anticipated NBAF opening in 2020. It will be important to have these tested capabilities in place from day 1 to mitigate the effects of an accidental release of an infectious agent.
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Furthermore, the lack of real-time FMD surveillance, as acknowledged in the uSSRA, diminishes the likelihood of early detection and control. The uSSRA states that "economic estimates based on the outputs of the economic model for the Updated SSRA will, again, underestimate the absolute impact of the outbreak of FMD originating from the NBAF because the outbreak is artificially limited to the region modeled instead of the whole of North America" (p.
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2008. Use of heterogeneous operation-specific contact parameters changes predictions for foot-and-mouth disease outbreaks in complex simulation models.
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From page 62... ...
2008. Foot-and mouth disease in North American bison (Bison bison)
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