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9 Overall Assessment, Findings, and Conclusions
Pages 79-90

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From page 79...
... Data and methods of the previous risk assessment led to a conclusion that for the two scenarios with the greatest risk of FMDv release (fomite and worker without respiratory protection) , there 79
From page 80...
... In contrast with the 2010 SSRA, which cited fomites and lack of respiratory protection as the most likely pathways of accidental FMDv release, the uSSRA concludes that the most likely release mechanisms are those associated with natural hazards, specifically earthquakes and tornadoes. The uSSRA concludes that these are about 20 times more likely than operational pathways.
From page 81...
... Although DHS stated that those con ducting the risk assessment consulted the building designs, the uSSRA does not seem to clearly reflect design changes or to incorporate such design provisions in the risk assessment (i.e., natural hazards assess ments not reflecting 65% design plans that harden the structure against tornadoes)
From page 82...
... Lack of Independence Among Events and Parameter Values Finding 4: The uSSRA ignores probabilistic dependencies in calculating risk scenarios, and this results in potentially serious underestimations of total risk and incorrect ranking of risk contributors. Use of ques tionable or erroneous methods and assumptions about probabilistic dependencies in portions of the uSSRA most likely results in an under estimation of the probability of accidental FMDv release.
From page 83...
... The uSSRA should have explored possible sources of data and operating experience for human error in analogous research laboratory settings as the basis of reference error probabilities. Modeling Parameters and Assumptions Finding 7: The uSSRA appears overly optimistic in its assignment of parameter values to models, yet describes the values as conservative.
From page 84...
... Despite eastern Kansas being a region of relatively low seismicity, the uSSRA designates earthquakes as the hazard most likely to lead to an FMDv release from the Manhattan, Kansas, facility. Tornadoes are a more significant natural hazard, given the proposed location of the NBAF in an area with a disproportionately high frequency of tornadoes known as "Tornado Alley."
From page 85...
... DHS and USDA have experience operating similar facilities such as the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) and Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC)
From page 86...
... Although the training and preparedness requirements of the Federal Select Agent Program estab lished under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 are well documented, the uSSRA fails to include the DHS plans for personnel training in security, laboratory procedures, and emergency response as required by P.L.
From page 87...
... The uSSRA makes key assumptions about the physical design of the facility, maintenance and operation, and implementation of mitigation strategies. Any significant deviation from the assumed characteristics will modify risk factors and reduce the validity of the risk assessment.
From page 88...
... the misapplication of methods used to assess risk, (2) the failure to make clear whether and how the evidence used to support risk assessment assumptions had been thoroughly reviewed and adequately evaluated, (3)
From page 89...
... 2010. Evaluation of a Site-Specific Risk Assessment for the Department of Homeland Security's Planned National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility in Manhattan, Kansas.


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