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From page 51... ... 51 4.1 Introduction When considering the role of the 550 U.S. highway and transit tunnels in the overall transportation network, and considering the lessons observed from natural disasters and the transportation-related consequences of the September 11th attacks, it is clear that loss of a critical tunnel at one of numerous "choke points" could result in hundreds or thousands of casualties; billions of dollars of direct reconstruction costs; even greater socioeconomic costs; and ancillary costs to other institutions in the nation's complex, interrelated economy. Read the entire page →
From page 52... ... Determination of the appropriate method of construction typically depends on the depth, cross section, and soil/rock/groundwater conditions along the alignment. Other constraints include geographical and environmental factors, presence of existing structures and utilities, and constructability issues. Read the entire page →
From page 53... ... 53 (A) Typical bored tube rail tunnel. Read the entire page →
From page 54... ... The basic elements of the double-steel-shell tube is a steel shell that forms a watertight membrane and, in combination with a reinforced concrete interior lining, provides the necessary structural strength for the completed tunnel. Figure 4 represents a typical double-steel-shell tube, which shows the cross section of a two-lane tunnel on an Interstate highway. Read the entire page →
From page 55... ... with epoxy coatings. Figure 5 represents a typical concrete immersed tube for a fourlane highway tunnel with two 2-lane sections and ventilation ducts on both sides. Read the entire page →
From page 56... ... 56 Figure 4. Steel double-shell immersed tube tunnel. Read the entire page →
From page 57... ... 57 Figure 6. Cut-and-cover tunnel, subway line structure. Read the entire page →
From page 58... ... mined underground tunnel construction is typically the preferred method. Bored tunnels are often excavated using mechanical equipment, such as TBMs, and are usually circular. Read the entire page →
From page 59... ... , local breach, partial or complete collapse, or inundation with water (i.e., global failure) to progressive failure. Read the entire page →
From page 60... ... 60 Type Description Sketch Blind Shield • A closed face (or blind) shield is used in very soft clays and silts • Muck discharge is controlled by adjusting the aperture opening and the advance rate • Used in harbor and river crossing in very soft soils; often results in a wave or mound of soil over the machine • Not used nowadays Open Face, Hand-Dug Shield • Good for short, small tunnels in hard, noncollapsing soils above groundwater tables • Usually equipped with face jacks to hold breasting at the face • If soil conditions require it, this machine may have a movable hood and/or deck • A direct descendent of the Brunel Shield • Seldom used nowadays SemiMechanized • Similar to open face, but with a back hoe and boom cutter; often equipped with "pie plate" breasting and one or more tables • May have trouble in soft, loose, or running ground • Compressed air may be used for face stability in poor ground • Seldom used nowadays Mechanized • A fully mechanized machine • Excavates with a full face cutter wheel and pick or disc cutters • Manufactured with a wide variety of cutting tools • Face openings (doors, guillotine, etc.) Read the entire page →
From page 61... ... 61 Type Description Sketch Rock Reinforcement • Untensioned rock dowels or tensioned rock bolts • To help rock mass self-support capacity and to mobilize the inherent strength of the rock mass • May provide only temporary support until a final lining is placed • To protect against spalling and fallout of rock wedges between reinforcements, a surface skin may be required such as chain link mesh or shotcrete Shotcrete • Early construction support in rock with limited stand-up time to prevent loosening of the rock mass and raveling failure • Used in soft ground tunnels when a sequential excavation method (SEM) is used. Read the entire page →
From page 62... ... 62 Classification Behavior Typical Soil Types Firm Heading may be advanced without initial support, and final lining may be constructed before ground starts to move. Loess above water table; hard clay, marl, cement sand, and gravel when not overstressed. Read the entire page →
From page 63... ... This information allows a rough assessment of the tunnel lining vulnerability to an explosion inside the tunnel. Joint Failure Joints between immersed tube segments or between the end tube and the connecting structures (e.g., ventilation buildings) Read the entire page →
From page 64... ... Therefore, cross passages are more vulnerable to damage. In general, however, from an operational standpoint, cross passageway tunnels are not considered to be more critical than the main running tunnels because (1) Read the entire page →
From page 65... ... Progressive Failure Failure of the tunnel liner and surrounding ground may cause instability of adjacent underground utilities and damage to surface structures by piping and differential settlements. Flooding of the entire transportation system may also be considered a progressive failure. Read the entire page →
From page 66... ... Test results are available from Bechtel/Parsons Brinckerhoff [Ref. Read the entire page →
From page 67... ... ; and (3) where a regular tunnel section in soft ground is connected to rigid station end walls or a rigid, massive structure such as a ventilation building or shaft. Read the entire page →
From page 68... ... earthquake motions [Ref. Read the entire page →
From page 69... ... • Introduction of medium IEDs, which are delivered either by vehicle (car) or by multiple persons acting in concert to transport the payload and consolidating at a critical location inside the tunnel. Read the entire page →
From page 70... ... The hazards and threats presented on the left side of the tables include very large, large, medium, and small IEDs and large fires. All of the hazards and threats were developed further to identify hazard and threat scenarios that include hazard and threat, path to target, tactical delivery device, and ultimate target. Read the entire page →
From page 71... ... 71 Explosion Tunnel Type Ground Support System Soil or Rock Overburden Thickness Small1 Medium2 Large3 Fire (>34 MBTU per hour, or 1 00 MW) < 1 x diameter E D C D Strong Rock All Types > 1 x diameter E D C D < 1 x diameter D B B B Rock Bolts with Wire Mesh/Lattice Girder/ Shotcrete > 1 x diameter D B B B < 1 x diameter F B B B Steel Ribs with or without Liner Plate >1 x diameter F B B B < 1 x diameter F B B C/B Cast-in-Place Concrete Liner > 1 x diameter F C/B B C/B < 1 x diameter D B A B Soft Rock/ Firm Ground Segmental Concrete > 1 x diameter D B B/A B < 1 x diameter D B A B Steel Ribs or Lattice Girder with Shotcrete >1 x diameter D B A B < 1 x diameter F B A C/B Cast-in-Place Concrete > 1 x diameter F C/B B/A C/B < 1 x diameter D B A B Bo re d or M in ed Loose/Soft Ground Segmental Concrete > 1 x diameter D B A B < 1 5' D B A C Unreinforced Concrete/Masonry Lining > 1 5' D B A C < 1 5' D B A C Firm Ground Reinforced Concrete Lining > 1 5' D B A C < 1 5' D B A C Unreinforced Concrete/Masonry Lining > 1 5' D B A C < 1 5' D B A C Cu t-a nd -C ov er Loose/Soft Ground Reinforced Concrete Lining > 1 5' D B A C Steel Tube D B A D Immersed Tube Concrete Tube D B A D Air-Rights Structure D C B D Notes: 1. Read the entire page →
From page 72... ... Systems serving transportation tunnels handle the following key safety functions: • Emergency ventilation, • Fire protection, • Drainage, • Power supply, • Lighting, • Signals, • Train control, • Traffic control, • System control, and • Communications. 4.5.2 Categorization of Systems The systems serving the above key safety functions have been categorized into five primary categories to simplify the designation of critical elements: • Ventilation – Emergency ventilation • Life safety – Fire protection – Drainage • Electrical – Primary – Ancillary – Traction – Emergency • Command and Control – Traffic control – Train control – Signals – System control • Communications Ventilation includes all of the systems, equipment, and facilities required to provide ventilation of a tunnel during an emergency. Read the entire page →
From page 73... ... Hazard or Threat Tactical Delivery Device PV/OV/DP Air-Rights Structure PV insufficient protection of column, wall, or roof slab; relative proximity of threat to column, wall, or roof slab OV no inspections at entrances to limit vehicle type, size, or cargo 5H Large IED Truck DP B PV insufficient protection of column/wall/roof slab; relative proximity of threat to column/wall/roof slab OV no inspections at entrances to limit vehicle type, size, or cargo 6H Medium IED Car/Van DP C PV insufficient protection of column/wall/roof slab; relative proximity of threat to column/wall/roof slab OV public access to roadway; inadequate surveillance 7H Small IED Backpack DP D PV insufficient fire protection of column/wall/roof slab OV no vehicle inspections at entrances to limit size, type, or cargo 8H Large Fire1 Tanker DP C Abbreviations: PV = Physical Vulnerability OV = Operational Vulnerability DP = Damage Potential Note: 1 . More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) Read the entire page →
From page 74... ... Hazard or Threat Tactical Delivery Device PV/OV/DP Immersed Tube Tunnel Soft to Firm Ground Strong Rock PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover OV uncontrolled ship traffic movement through channel over tunnel with uninspected cargo 11H Very Large IED Depth Charge from Ship DP A A C Path to Target: Surface Roadway over Tunnel Target: Roof Slab Scenario No. Hazard or Threat Tactical Delivery Device PV/OV/DP Cut-and-Cover Tunnel Air-Rights Structure PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover OV if parking structure, no vehicle inspections to limit size, type, or cargo 12H Large IED Truck DP A A PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover OV if parking structure, no vehicle inspections to limit size, type, or cargo 13H Medium IED Truck or Multiple Backpacks DP B B Abbreviations: PV = Physical Vulnerability OV = Operational Vulnerability DP = Damage Potential Note: 1. Read the entire page →
From page 75... ... 2T Medium IED Transit Car/ Engine or Multiple Backpacks DP B B B-C D PV insufficient liner thickness; relative proximity of threat to liner OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops; uncontrolled access through ancillary facilities (i.e., stations, exits/stairs) ; inadequate surveillance 3T Small IED Backpack DP D D D-F E PV insufficient liner thickness; relative proximity of threat to liner OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops 4T Large Fire1 IED on Transit Vehicle DP D C B-C D Path to Target: Trackway Target: Column/Wall/Roof Slab Scenario No. Read the entire page →
From page 76... ... Hazard or Threat Tactical Delivery Device PV/OV/DP Cut-and-Cover Tunnel Air-Rights Structure PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover OV no vehicle inspections to limit size, type, or cargo 12T Truck DP A A PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover OV no vehicle inspections to limit size, type, or cargo 13T Medium IED Truck or Multiple Backpacks DP B B Abbreviations: PV = Physical Vulnerability OV = Operational Vulnerability DP = Damage Potential Very Large IED Large IED Note: 1. More than 341MBTU per hour (100 MW) Read the entire page →
From page 77... ... Hazard or Threat Tactical Delivery Device PV/OV/DP Air-Rights Structure PV insufficient protection of column/wall/roof slab; relative proximity of threat to column/wall/roof slab OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops 5R Rail Car/ Engine DP B PV insufficient protection of column/wall/roof slab; relative proximity of threat to column/wall/roof slab OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops; uncontrolled access through ancillary facilities (i.e., stations, tunnel exits/stairs) 6R Rail Car/ Engine DP C PV insufficient protection of column/wall/roof slab; relative proximity of threat to column/wall/roof slab OV insufficient inspection in rail yards and shops; uncontrolled access through ancillary facilities (i.e., stations, tunnel exits/stairs) Read the entire page →
From page 78... ... Hazard or Threat Tactical Delivery Device PV/OV/DP Cut-and-Cover Tunnel Air-Rights Structure PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover OV no vehicle inspections to limit size, type, or cargo 12R Truck DP A PV insufficient roof slab thickness; inadequate tunnel cover OV no vehicle inspections to limit size, type, or cargo 13R Truck or Multiple Backpacks DP B A A A B Abbreviations: PV = Physical Vulnerability OV = Operational Vulnerability DP = Damage Potential Large Fire1 Very Large IED Very Large IED Large IED Medium IED Note: 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) Read the entire page →
From page 79... ... and a set of damage potentials. This should provide the owner or operator with a clear guide to the types of hazard and threat scenarios possible for tunnels. Read the entire page →
From page 80... ... • • Emissions Control • •Ventilation System Function Smoke Management • • • • Plumbing Drainage • • • • Fire/Smoke Detection • Note Note 1 1 Fire Standpipe/Hydrants • • • • Fire Apparatus • Portable Fire Extinguishers • • • • Fixed Fire Suppression2 Notes 3 & 4 Notes 5 & 6 Note 6 Emergency Exits • • • • Cross Passages • • • • Life Safety Systems CCTV8 • Auxiliary Power • • • • Traction Power7 • •Electrical Power Emergency Power • • • • Normal Lighting •Lighting Systems Emergency Lighting • • • • Train Signals • • •Signal Traffic Signals • Emergency Phones • • • • SCADA8/Data • • • •Communications Control Center • • • • Automatic • • • • On-Site • • • • Remote • • • • Control Systems Emissions Monitoring • Notes: 1. Fire/smoke detection are only in stations and ancillary facilities. Read the entire page →
From page 81... ... Ventilation Function Smoke Management Life Safety Drainage Drainage Fire/Smoke Detection Note 1 Note 1 Fire Standpipe/Hydrants Fire Apparatus Portable Fire Extinguishers Fixed Fire Suppression2 Notes 3 & 4 Notes 5 & 6 Note 6 Emergency Exits Cross Passages Fire Protection CCTV8 Electrical Ancillary Power Traction Power7Power Emergency Power Lighting Emergency Lighting Command and Control Train Control Traffic Control System Control Signals SCADA8/Data Control Command and Control Center Communications Communications Emergency Telephones Notes: 1. Fire/smoke detection are only in stations and ancillary facilities. Read the entire page →
From page 82... ... Impact Rating Life Safety Tunnel Operations Operation Restoration Severely Catastrophic Incident impacts life safety sufficiently to require tunnel closure Incident impacts tunnel operations sufficiently to require complete shutdown Incident impacts operation restoration, taking several months to 1 year Catastrophic Incident impacts life safety sufficiently to require tunnel closure Incident impacts tunnel operations sufficiently to require complete shutdown Incident impacts operation restoration, taking several weeks to months Critical Incident impacts life safety Incident impacts tunnel operations sufficiently to require a disruption of operations Incident impacts operation restoration, taking a few days to weeks Serious Incident impacts life safety Incident impacts tunnel operations sufficiently to require a disruption of operations Incident impacts operation restoration, taking 24 hours to a few days Marginal Incident impacts life safety Incident impacts tunnel operations sufficiently to require a modest disruption of operations Incident impacts operation restoration, taking less than 1 hour Negligible Incident does not impact life safety Incident does not impact tunnel operations Incident does not impact operation restoration Table 19. Degree of impact on safety and operations. Read the entire page →
From page 83... ... Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic System Function Smoke Management Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Life Safety Fire/Smoke Detection Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic CCTV Critical Critical Catastrophic Fire Standpipe/Hydrants Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Fire Apparatus Critical Serious Critical Portable Fire Extinguishers Critical Marginal Critical Fixed Fire Suppression Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Systems Drainage Critical Critical Catastrophic Emergency Exits Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Facilities Cross Passages Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Electrical Auxiliary Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Traction Power - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Power Emergency Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Lighting Emergency Lighting Critical Critical Critical Command and Control Train Control - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Traffic Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic System Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Signals Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic SCADA/Data Critical Critical Critical Command and Control Command and Control Center Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Communications Communications Emergency Phones Catastrophic Critical Critical CCTV = closed-circuit television; SCADA = supervisory control and data acquisition; dashes = data not available. Table 20. Read the entire page →
From page 84... ... Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic System Function Smoke Management Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Life Safety Fire/Smoke Detection Catastrophic Critical Critical CCTV Critical Critical Critical Fire Standpipe/Hydrants Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Fire Apparatus Critical Serious Serious Portable Fire Extinguishers Marginal Negligible Negligible Fixed Fire Suppression Critical Serious Serious Systems Drainage Marginal Marginal Critical Fixed Fire Suppression Critical Serious Serious Emergency Exits Catastrophic Critical Catastrophic Facilities Cross Passages Catastrophic Critical Catastrophic Electrical Primary Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Auxiliary Power Critical Critical Critical Traction Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Power Emergency Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Lighting Emergency Lighting Critical Serious Serious Command and Control Train Control Catastrophic Critical Critical Traffic Control - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - System Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Signals Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic SCADA/Data Critical Serious Serious Command and Control Command and Control Center Catastrophic Critical Critical Communications Communications Emergency Phones Catastrophic Serious Serious CCTV = closed-circuit television; SCADA = supervisory control and data acquisition; dashes = data not available. Table 21. Read the entire page →
From page 85... ... Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic System Function Smoke Management Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Life Safety Fire/Smoke Detection Serious Serious Critical CCTV Serious Serious Critical Fire Standpipe/Hydrants Critical Critical Critical Fire Apparatus Critical Serious Critical Portable Fire Extinguishers Negligible Negligible Negligible Fixed Fire Suppression Negligible Negligible Negligible Systems Drainage Marginal Critical Critical Emergency Exits Serious Serious Serious Facilities Cross Passages Serious Serious Serious Electrical Primary Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Auxiliary Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Traction Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Power Emergency Power Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Lighting Emergency Lighting Marginal Marginal Marginal Command and Control Train Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Critical Traffic Control - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - System Control Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Signals Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic SCADA/Data Critical Serious Serious Command and Control Command and Control Center Catastrophic Catastrophic Catastrophic Communications Communications Emergency Phones Critical Marginal Marginal CCTV = closed-circuit television; SCADA = supervisory control and data acquisition; dashes = data not available. Table 22. Read the entire page →
From page 86... ... Ventilation Ducts Low Low Low Control Center Medium Medium Medium Fire Protection Utilities High High High Tunnel High Medium Medium Portals Medium Low Low Ventilation Structures Low Medium Medium Ventilation Shafts Low Low Low Ventilation Ducts Medium Low Low Stations -- -- -- - Low Low* Control Center Low Low Low Drainage Utilities High High High Tunnel High High High Portals Medium Medium Medium Ventilation Structures High High High Ventilation Shafts Low Low Low Ventilation Ducts Low Low Low Stations -- -- -- - High High* Read the entire page →
From page 87... ... 87 Primary Hazard or Threat Critical Location Critical System or Element DEI egraL DEI m uide M DEI lla mS eriF egraL s u odraza H slaireta M R/ B/C kcattA rebyC Ventilation F F F F D F F Life Safety F F F E D F D Electrical C C C D D F D Command and Control C C C F D F D Tunnel Shell Communications C C C D D F D Ventilation F F F F D F F Life Safety F F F E D F D Electrical C C C D D F D Command and Control C C C F D F D Portals Communications C C C D D F D Ventilation B B C B D C D Life Safety B B C B D C D Electrical B B C C D C D Command and Control B B C C D C B Ventilation Structures Communications B B C C D C D Ventilation B B C B D B B Life Safety C C D B D C D Electrical C C D C D C D Command and Control C C D B D C D Ventilation Shafts Communications C C D B D C D Ventilation C C B B D B B Life Safety D D C C D C D Electrical D D C C D C D Command and Control D D C B D C D Ventilation Ducts Communications D D C B D C D Ventilation B B C C D B B Life Safety B B C B D C C Electrical B B C E D C C Command and Control B B C C D C C Stations Communications B B C B D C D Ventilation B B C C D C B Life Safety B B C C D C C Electrical B B C C D C C Command and Control B B C B D C B Control Centers Communications B B C B D C B Ventilation C C C D D C F Life Safety C C C D D C F Electrical B B B D D C F Command and Control B B B D D C F Substation Communications B B B D D C F A = Severely Catastrophic D = Serious B = Catastrophic E = Marginal C = Critical F = Negligible Table 24. Vulnerabilities of critical locations. Read the entire page →
From page 88... ... PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient access surveillance 14H Large IED Truck DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss PV Insufficient perimeter protection OV Insufficient surveillance 15H Medium IED Car/Van DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss PV Insufficient perimeter protection OV Insufficient surveillance 16H Small IED Backpack2 DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Stand-Alone Substation Scenario No. Hazard or Threat Tactical Delivery Device PV/OV/DP Vent.System Life Safety Systems Power Dist. Read the entire page →
From page 89... ... C&C Comms. PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient access surveillance 20H Large IED Truck DP total loss total loss total loss total loss total loss PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient surveillance 21H Medium IED Car/Van DP partial loss total loss partial loss partial loss partial loss PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient access surveillance 22H Small IED Backpack2 DP partial loss total loss partial loss 8 8 8 partial loss partial loss Path to Target: Tunnel Roadway Target: C&C Center Above or Adjacent to the Tunnel Scenario No. Read the entire page →
From page 90... ... PV public access into roadway OV inadequate surveillance 27H Small IED Backpack Exposed Ductbank DP N/A N/A partial loss7,8 partial loss7 partial loss7 PV uncontrolled vehicle access OV no cargo restrictions 28H Large Fire1 Tanker Portal4 DP loss6 loss loss 8 8 8 loss loss PV uncontrolled vehicle access OV no cargo restrictions 29H Large Fire1 Tanker Any Tunnel Location Adjacent to Critical Facility5 DP partial loss6 partial loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss PV uncontrolled vehicle access OV no cargo restrictions 30H HazMat Truck Any Tunnel Location DP function loss9 function loss9 function loss9 function loss9 function loss9 PV uncontrolled vehicle access OV no vehicle inspections at portals 31H C/B/R Vial/ Aerosol/ Package in Vehicle Tunnel Occupants DP function loss9 N/A N/A N/A N/A Abbreviations: Notes: PV = Physical Vulnerability 1. More than 341 MBTU per hour (100 MW) Read the entire page →
From page 91... ... PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient access surveillance 32H C/B/R Vial/ Aerosol/ Package on Foot DP functions as weapon delivery device9 N/A N/A N/A N/A PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient access surveillance 33H C/B/R Vial/ Aerosol/ Package in Motor Vehicle DP functions as weapon delivery device9 N/A N/A N/A N/A Path to Target: Virtual Target: C&C Center Scenario No. Hazard or Threat Tactical Delivery Device PV/OV/DP Vent.System Life Safety Systems Power Dist. Read the entire page →
From page 92... ... PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient access surveillance 14T Large IED Truck DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient surveillance 15T Medium IED Car/Van DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient surveillance 16T Small IED Backpack DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Stand-Alone Substation Scenario No. Hazard or Threat Tactical Delivery Device PV/OV/DP Vent.System Life Safety Systems Power Dist. Read the entire page →
From page 93... ... C&C Comms. PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient access surveillance 20T Large IED Truck DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient surveillance 21T Medium IED Car/Van DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient access surveillance 22T Small IED Backpack2 DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Station Scenario No. Read the entire page →
From page 94... ... C&C Comms. PV public access into trackway OV inadequate access surveillance 25T Small IED Backpack Exposed Ductbank or MEC Equipment DP N/A partial loss7 partial loss7, 8 partial loss7 partial loss7 PV open access to station OV no personal inspections 26T Small IED Backpack on Foot in Train Station DP partial loss10 partial loss10 partial loss10 partial loss10 partial loss10 PV uncontrolled access to trains OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections 27T Large Fire1 IED on Train Any Tunnel Location Adjacent to Critical Facility5 DP partial loss6 partial loss partial loss partial loss partial loss PV uncontrolled access to trains OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections 28T Large Fire1 IED on Train Portal4 DP partial loss6 partial loss partial loss partial loss partial loss PV uncontrolled access to trains OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections 29T HazMat Device on Train Any Tunnel Location DP function loss9 function loss9 function loss9 function loss9 function loss9 PV uncontrolled access to trains OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections 30T C/B/R Vial/ Aerosol/ Package on Foot in Train Tunnel/ Station Occupants DP function loss9 function loss9 function loss9 function loss9 function loss9 Abbreviations: PV = Physical Vulnerability OV = Operational Vulnerability DP = Damage Potential Vent. Read the entire page →
From page 95... ... C&C Comms. PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient access surveillance 31T C/B/R Vial/ Aerosol/ Package on Foot DP functions as weapon delivery device9 N/A N/A N/A N/A PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient access surveillance 32T C/B/R Vial/ Aerosol/ Package in Motor Vehicle DP functions as weapon delivery device9 N/A N/A N/A N/A Path to Target: Virtual Target: C&C Center Scenario No. Read the entire page →
From page 96... ... PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient access surveillance 14R Large IED Truck DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient surveillance 15R Medium IED Car/Van DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient surveillance 16R Small IED Backpack2 DP N/A N/A N/A total loss total loss Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Stand-Alone Substation Scenario No. Hazard or Threat Tactical Delivery Device PV/OV/DP Vent.System Life Safety Systems Power Dist. Read the entire page →
From page 97... ... C&C Comms. PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient access surveillance 20R Large IED Truck DP total loss total loss total loss8 total loss total loss PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient surveillance 21R Medium IED Car/Van DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient access surveillance 22R Small IED Backpack2 DP partial loss total loss partial loss8 partial loss partial loss Path to Target: Surface Access Roadway Target: Station Scenario No. Read the entire page →
From page 98... ... C&C Comms. PV public access into trackway OV inadequate access surveillance 25R Small IED Backpack Exposed Ductbank or MEC Equipment DP N/A partial loss7 partial loss7, 8 partial loss7 partial loss7 PV open access to station OV no personal inspections 26R Small IED Backpack on Foot in Train Station DP partial loss10 partial loss10 partial loss10 partial loss10 partial loss10 PV uncontrolled access to trains OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections 27R Large Fire1 IED on Train Any Tunnel Location Adjacent to Critical Facility5 DP partial loss6 partial loss partial loss partial loss partial loss PV uncontrolled access to trains OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections 28R Large Fire1 IED on Train Portal4 DP partial loss6 partial loss partial loss partial loss partial loss PV uncontrolled access to trains OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections 29R HazMat Device on Train Any Tunnel Location DP function loss9 function loss9 function loss9 function loss9 function loss9 PV uncontrolled access to trains OV no cargo restrictions; no personal inspections 30R C/B/R Vial/ Aerosol/ Package on Foot in Train Tunnel/ Station Occupants DP function loss9 function loss9 function loss9 function loss9 function loss9 Abbreviations: PV = Physical Vulnerability OV = Operational Vulnerability DP = Damage Potential Vent. Read the entire page →
From page 99... ... PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient access surveillance 31R C/B/R Vial/ Aerosol/ Package on Foot DP functions as weapon delivery device9 N/A N/A N/A N/A PV insufficient perimeter protection OV insufficient access surveillance 32R C/B/R Vial/ Aerosol/ Package in Motor Vehicle DP functions as weapon delivery device9 N/A N/A N/A N/A Path to Target: Virtual Target: C&C Center Scenario No. Hazard or Threat Tactical Delivery Device PV/OV/DP Vent.System Life Safety Systems Power Dist. Read the entire page →

From page 51...

... 51 4.1 Introduction When considering the role of the 550 U.S. highway and transit tunnels in the overall transportation network, and considering the lessons observed from natural disasters and the transportation-related consequences of the September 11th attacks, it is clear that loss of a critical tunnel at one of numerous "choke points" could result in hundreds or thousands of casualties; billions of dollars of direct reconstruction costs; even greater socioeconomic costs; and ancillary costs to other institutions in the nation's complex, interrelated economy.