Responding to Capability Surprise A Strategy for U.S. Naval Forces (2013) / Chapter Skim
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2 Scanning and Awareness
2 Scanning and Awareness
Pages 32-42
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From page 32... ...
Taken together, these documents form a reasonable basis for the naval scanning and awareness approach that will lead to preparation or avoidance strategies in succeeding steps. The committee specifically notes that the Report of the Defense Science Board, rather than focusing on avoidance, focuses on preparation (in which surveillance plays a major role)
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From page 33... ...
The committee's main departure from the DSB process is focusing on the naval organization and on the implementation of and training for surprise mitigation. It is also the case that the NRAC report used the "red cell" concept: The NRAC Disruptive Commercial Technologies Study Panel undertook an unusual side excursion and conducted a Commercial Red Cell Demonstration to investigate the potential of creative people with World Wide Web access to pro duce new ideas, anecdotally determining what capacity a Red Cell might have to defeat key USMC capabilities or gaps.
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From page 34... ...
As identified in the submarine security program, a form of scanning known as "enigmas" is an activity that examines which technologies and physical phenomena could be exploited even if they are not yet observed in the horizon scanning. Sometimes deployed forces, from fleet commands to Special Operations Forces (SOF)
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From page 35... ...
Breakthroughs that occur are generally developed into products, not within Intel but as joint ventures outside Intel's product lines. This approach appears to align with the messages in Innovator's Dilemma7 and The Other Side of Innovation.8 Technology explorations beyond present product, or operational, lines must be protected and nurtured in neutral territory to provide sufficient expertise and prevent the natural tendency of a product line from resisting potentially competing innovations.
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From page 36... ...
The proposed role of the White House foresight fusion cell and modifications to other government structures is analogous to the activity and organization of Intel's exploration investments to create the future. A takeaway from these examples is that truly outside the box developments -- that is, those with the most potential for disruptive surprise -- are likely best pursued outside the naval organization, in academia and small business ventures, even if sponsored by interested naval program entities.
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From page 37... ...
12 The Scanning and Awareness approach Recognizing and preparing for the different kinds of capability surprise requires advanced studies and war games conducted with open-minded experts across a wide range of fields. Their results need to be continually brought to the attention of the most senior leadership.13 Specifically, experts on capability surprises need to be leading red teams that challenge "conventional" mission executions.
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From page 38... ...
The fleet forces, as the deployed naval presence abroad, can be a valuable observer of worldwide trade and tactics training. Therefore the Service commands should organize to provide input and operational assessment expertise for this ONR-G-led activity.
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From page 39... ...
Thus, ONR is truly both national and international in its connectedness. A key function of ONR-G is not only to scan global research activities for important emerging science and technology but also to actively foster research by providing funding, and, as the opportunities arise, promoting research collaborations with U.S.
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From page 40... ...
Therefore, the Navy should appoint a CTO to ensure adequate bridging of the gap between technology's emergence and its implementation. The CTO would serve as an advisor to the surprise mitigation office and also would ensure appropriate technology insertion at the appropriate risk level throughout the naval capability development organization, primarily by having a decisional role in major milestone reviews.
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From page 41... ...
By bringing primary and alternative contacts, communications backups, and related systems together in metaorganizational packages, the effects of capability surprises can be mitigated. The committee held two teleconference meetings with the staff and leaders from the Commander, Pacific Fleet (COMPACFLT)
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From page 42... ...
direct the Chief of Naval Research to establish a "virtual" scan ning and awareness structure led by the Office of Naval Research-Global, engaging the technical, intelligence, and operational communities in order to systematically scan the horizon, maintain awareness, and conduct technology readiness assessments for both the CNO and the surprise mitigation office, as called for in Recommendation 1.
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