Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

3 Assessing Surprise
Pages 43-60

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 43...
... To evaluate responsiveness to threats and develop new tactics to respond to surprise, one must practice in an environment that closely mirrors reality. Accordingly, naval forces often exercise red teams and rely on anticipatory modeling and analysis to predict surprise, identify vulnerabilities, and develop countermeasures, either by rapidly fielding existing response technologies or, in extreme cases, engaging the acquisition process to build new naval capabilities.
From page 44...
... In the SSBN Security program, for example, the diverse SME team is preplanned, extensible through outreach, and explicitly identified as the "Friends of SSBN" network; it is a standing team, ready to be called on to respond to surprise issues. It is also noted that in order to identify threats and anticipate surprise, red teams perform modeling, simulation, and analysis at three levels of fidelity: (1)
From page 45...
... Nevertheless, the approaches used by them can serve as a model for successfully addressing capability surprise in other complex mission areas. Assessments Capability Known vulnerabiliƟes that may become issues based on Problems idenƟfied by: IniƟal Assessment: Define threat capability, will, or PotenƟal Vulnerability SSBN OPS • Physics Projects (Based on ParƟal or Full • Intel ValidaƟon, Tracked via • Red Team Assessments, Included in Annual Preliminary Vulnerability Force Security Assessment)
From page 46...
... Implementation • Concepts Impact analysis and response/ • TTPs decisions/recommendations • Directions • Programs • Funding "Sensors" for Detecting and Naval Intel Defense Defense Universities Commercial Assessing Forces Agency Industry Labs Industry Defense Surprise Domain for Finding Surprise Navel OPS Naval Exercise Intel Collection Lab Experiments M&S DOD RDTE DOD Acquisition Other Govt R&D Commercial R&D Commercial Market "Sensor" Effectiveness: High Moderate Poor FIGURE 3-2 Domains of surprise "sensor" effectiveness.
From page 47...
... The overall undertaking is vast, and the models employed cover many different disciplines: basic physics, engineering design for development of platforms and weapon systems, mission planning, training, intelligence gathering and interpretation, conduct of actual military operations, and the subsequent evaluation of their outcomes. Clearly, a complete discussion of M&S in support of the naval forces would not be practical.
From page 48...
... system could significantly impact naval operations; however, little evidence was found that the element of surprise has consistently been incorporated into fleet exercises and training. Similarly, while known potential threats to U.S.
From page 49...
... History has numerous examples -- for example, kamikazes, the Maginot Line, and suicide bombers -- of not anticipating a surprise because of flawed cultural perspectives. Throughout this study, red teams were heard from that were assembled to evaluate weapon systems performance, analyze specific technology vulnerabilities, and run naval exercises given various adversarial scenarios.
From page 50...
... As our understanding of potential surprise matures, it is important that independent red teams are assembled with the appropriate balance of skills and HSCB consideration to ensure an understanding from military and cultural perspectives that may not exist within the core organizations. Fortunately, DOD recognizes the need for diverse perspectives and cultural understanding and has invested in HSCB research in order to introduce the human dimension into defense planning.
From page 51...
... Given the growing need to understand human terrain and cultural differences in future military operations, the committee suggests that future red team participants could benefit from these 2  Stacy C Marsella, David V
From page 52...
... Both modeling environments should be part of military assessment activities going forward. As military forces are increasingly used as an integral component of overall political operations, red teams will need to bridge this gap, learning from HSCB models and using this perspective to inform military operations.
From page 53...
... modeling and red teaming opportunities in the committee defined scenarios Modeling and Simulation in the Context of Space Systems Over the years the U.S. Navy has developed ever greater use of and dependence on space-based assets.
From page 54...
... is covered under the rubric "space weather." Because of its broad military and commercial impact, there exists a National Space Weather Program, the details of which can be found at the National Space Weather Program Portal.6 The DOD component is discussed in the National Space Weather Program: The Implementation Plan (2nd Edition) .7 This program encompasses monitoring, modeling, and predicting the space environment and its impact on SATCOM, GPS positioning and timing, and spacecraft.
From page 55...
... Perhaps an interesting M&S undertaking might be to compile the full penetration of GPS dependence into areas that the naval forces depend on and to assess the broad impact on naval operations that the penetration implies. The results might be surprising.
From page 56...
... that the GPS signal can undergo significant phase fluctuations when it propagates through such plasmas. This can lead to deep fading of the signal at the GPS receiver causing obvious problems (such as loss of lock-on)
From page 57...
... Since kinetic systems M&S traditional red teaming has long been utilized throughout the Navy's system-of-systems enterprise, the committee next briefly explores how HSCB and social media modeling could enhance current M&S environments and better prepare naval forces for a scenario such as the one faced in fictitious Provencia. Social Network Modeling and Influence Operations Imagine a modeling environment and open simulation framework that allows naval forces to rapidly assemble a reasonable representation of the Provencia situation, including (1)
From page 58...
... For the situation in Provencia, a red team should be prepped for the situation using the human behavior modeling framework and then employed in a wargaming experience that has been carefully orchestrated to include social media–based upsets and nonkinetic response. Red teams should be varied in culture and international makeup and have multiservice, multigenerational, and multidisciplinary personnel, including those well versed in the social sciences.
From page 59...
... -- appear to possess the following characteristics: senior leadership support; team independence; access to a strong base of cross-disciplinary technical and operational expertise; an ability to identify threats through campaign-level modeling, system-of-systems simulation, and high-fidelity physics-based models; precise vulnerability modeling and analysis capabili ties validated by test and experiment data; mechanisms to recommend and/or deploy solutions as necessary; adequate, steady funding; and focus on a par ticular mission such as Navy SSBN Security. In addition, these organizations appear to leverage modeling, simulation, and analysis tools in conjunction with a network of experts to expose bias, offer critical review, model and test against potential vulnerabilities, and demonstrate alternative solutions to respond to surprise.
From page 60...
... In particular, efforts should be made to expand and periodically refresh the composition of red teams to achieve a greater diver sity in thinking and better represent the adversary.


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.