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Responding to Capability Surprise A Strategy for U.S. Naval Forces (2013) / Chapter Skim
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5 Resource and Transition Planning
Pages 70-78

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From page 70...
... THE PPBE System and Surprise The PPBE system is a requirements-based, rational decision-making process to determine cost-effective solutions in force structure that are sufficient to satisfy future defense-related scenarios and degradation of capability. The system's characteristics, however, usually inhibit it from imparting enough resilience, flexibility, and responsiveness to allow the naval forces to respond to disruptive or tactical surprise.
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From page 71...
... Then, guns had to be reinstalled on fighter aircraft to conduct close-in dogfighting during the Vietnam War, when the missile technology proved inadequate and the concept of how air-to-air battles would play out proved faulty. A recent example is removing long-range surface-to-surface missiles from the Navy's surface ship weapon inventories.
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From page 72...
... A dedicated step inside the naval forces PPBE cycle to increase force resiliency by enhancing an individual command's ability to be self-reliant is warranted. Local ability to conduct a full kill chain with organic assets is a good litmus test for enabling command initiative.
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From page 73...
... Building more less-expensive, single-mission ships may increase fleet resilience, to absorb the impact of an unanticipated threat at sea, and provides more options for response through geographic dispersion as well as greater ship availability for quick modifications. The committee does not endorse a complete overhaul of fleet composition, but it encourages a review of the force mix with the added considerations of the surface fleet's capability apart from high-value unit protection and ballistic missile defense (BMD)
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From page 74...
... Here, naval educational assets like the Naval War College and Naval Postgraduate School could be tapped to lead policy change and fleet assessments using wargaming and campaign analysis. The other two scenarios, where threats are known yet organizational response issues exist that require policy attention to avoid intelligence-inferred surprise, are related to maritime security, both globally and in defense of the homeland.
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From page 75...
... This authority should be informed by the scanning, assessment, and mitigation analysis efforts. It should be concerned with force and fleet resilience to meet unanticipated surprise, communicate frequently with commanders, and have direct influence on the budgeting process.
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From page 76...
... Once implemented, I2 should be shared with USMC and USCG leadership for possible integration across the naval force structure. Presence versus Preparation A consistent theme is that the demand on the fleet's time to conduct maintenance, complete basic individual training, and finish workups to meet deployment requirements leaves little time for systems and tactics training, red teaming, true experimentation, or time to think about reaction to unanticipated events.
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From page 77...
... naval deployment strategies may provide alternatives to the current deployment pattern, which has remained basically unchanged since the Second World War.3 With a smaller fleet and fewer sailors, deployment cycles may have to be rebalanced, with more time for true preparation. Resourcing Implications This section of the chapter reviews the current status of resourcing for preparation and response, including the difficulties of explicitly resourcing programs to prepare for, counter, and create surprise.
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From page 78...
... For example, even decades ago computing hardware was specified with a significant reserve, and ship centers of gravity and mast clearances were designed in anticipation of likely additional payloads. Further, as stated in the text, classes of ships such as Spruance and littoral combat ships anticipated modular changes as part of the design philosophy.
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Key Terms

  • naval forces
  • command initiative
  • social media
  • unanticipated surprise
  • missile defense

  • individual command
  • budgeting process
  • technical capability
  • unanticipated events
  • defense science

  • surprise mitigation
  • defense planning
  • tactical surprise
  • decision process
  • planning guidance

  • fleet resilience
  • ppbe cycle
  • maritime security
  • vietnam war
  • rapid response

  • timing source
  • process allows
  • littoral combat
  • coast guard
  • electromagnetic environment

  • degraded electromagnetic
  • excess capacity
  • potential capability
  • flexibility naval
  • naval war


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