Responding to Capability Surprise A Strategy for U.S. Naval Forces (2013) / Chapter Skim
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6 Implementation and Fielding
6 Implementation and Fielding
Pages 79-111
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From page 79... ...
Needs Surprise is difficult to predict, as discussed previously in this report. When it does materialize, the ability of naval forces to react effectively is dependent on three important principles: flexibility, timeliness, and affordability.
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From page 80... ...
Timeliness Addressing the capability surprise challenge is very similar to addressing the needs that have created the Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) process.
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From page 81... ...
workforce by 25% by the end of 600 FY2000 80 500 60 400 300 40 200 20 100 0 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 DoD Procurement Dollars Acquisition Organization Workforce FIGURE 6-1 DOD acquisition workforce: SOURCE: Jacques S Gansler, University of Maryland, "Fulfilling Urgent Operational Needs," presentation to the committee, Irvine, Calif., June 27, 2012.
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From page 82... ...
For example, see National Research Council, 2010, Information Assurance for NetworkCentric Naval Forces, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.; National Research Council, 2004, The Role of Experimentation in Building Future Naval Forces, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C.; and http://acquisition.navy.mil/home/policy_and_guidance.
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From page 84... ...
From her original role as an anti-Soviet fighter plane platform, over the past half century she has deployed to provide strike support in the Vietnam and Southeast Asian conflicts, humanitarian aid, blockades, show-of-force in critical areas throughout the world, air support in Iraq and Afghanistan, and numerous other missions. To fulfill these roles, the platform has been adapted, reequipped, lengthened, and otherwise modified to meet the needs of new missions with new technology, aircraft, weapons, etc.
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IMPLEMENTATION AND FIELDING 85 FIGURE 6-4 USS Enterprise.
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Ohio-Class Submarines Eighteen nuclear-powered, ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) of the Ohio class were built starting in 1976 (Figure 6-6)
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From page 87... ...
have all greatly benefited from these advances. Naval forces too have greatly benefited from taking assets with existing capabilities and quickly upgrading them with new capabilities to respond to "surprises" in the operational environments.
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Using these key critical components as an investment or hedge for future capabilities, they can be leveraged as the building blocks to enable a quick turn to respond to future capability surprises. This represents a change in the existing engineering design philosophies.
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The committee recognized an even more foundational issue: that naval surprise normally occurs at the operational and mission level, while naval acquisition organizations and processes are centered on platform delivery. Several promising suggestions were raised during the committee's investigations.
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From page 90... ...
is key to both repurposability and the spiraling-in of new capabilities. Naval forces' platforms can be operational for many decades.
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IMPLEMENTATION AND FIELDING 91 FIGURE 6-8 LCS 1: USS Freedom.
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From page 92... ...
Second, the platforms should have built-in, sufficient electrical capacity, cooling water, ventilation, and other auxiliary services to support future missions. Main and auxiliary machinery must also be as modular as possible to permit adaptation to technical improvements or future capacity requirements.
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From page 93... ...
Again, the rapid manner in which an Aegis DDG was converted from BMD capability into a temporary antisatellite capability for 5 an earlier NRC report, it was recommended that "in long-term planning for future amphibious In shipping, the Navy should consider the feasibility of a common ship design for assault, prepositioning, and sea-basing missions." See National Research Council, 1999, Naval Expeditionary Logistics: Enabling Operational Maneuver from the Sea, The National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., p.
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From page 94... ...
The commercial cell phone industry develops new products on major and minor upgrade cycles, where only one-third of the internal subsystems are new and it takes three minor upgrades before a "totally new" phone is developed, thus saving time and reducing cost and risk. The ability to repurpose a system is driven by the few key critical components that are its building blocks and will drive the degree of modularity (and therefore spiral capability)
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From page 95... ...
The DOD customer must participate in the allocation of resources for future contingencies as part of these architecture decisions. The concept of the payload value chain is one that should be considered in the architecture designs for all types of capabilities development.
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From page 96... ...
Rapid Acquisition During the recent Iraq and Afghanistan wars, dozens of rapid acquisition organizations were created throughout the Services, including the following: • Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) , • Rapid equipping force, • Quick reaction capabilities, 7 Carl von Clausewitz.
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From page 97... ...
to support their successful deployment, including maintainability requirements. The dozens of rapid acquisition organizations that have sprouted up over the last decade to serve our needs in the Middle East are not a permanent solution to the acquisition challenge.
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Christiansen's Innovator's Dilemma11 and the recommendations in the Defense Science Board (DSB) report on fulfillment of urgent operational needs, 12 a separate acquisition organization should be established to address the barrier to rapid solution fielding.
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From page 99... ...
Prototyping Rapid prototyping, while a key component of accelerating technology and capability maturity, does not by itself go far enough to address the acquisition challenge associated with capability surprises. There is a need to take this a step further and deploy some limited numbers of new capabilities in order to allow system developers to engage in real-world experiments with the warfighters, to understand limitations, and create innovations in CONOPS to complement the new technology and to mature them consistent with the needs of the operational warfighters.
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From page 100... ...
Current naval ship and weapon acquisition methods are not compatible with unanticipated surprises. Until the Second World War, given the robust industrial base and a sense of urgency as well as the benefit of the insulation provided by two oceans and the lower pace of attack, the United States was able to mobilize its industry in its own defense and also act as the arsenal for the world.
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From page 101... ...
Our naval forces are no longer the sole possessor of technology, but to ensure that our systems behave as intended and without surprises, we must be able to trust their manufacturers in a world where the maker of a chip can tamper with its functionality and reliability, putting it beyond the reach of our system integrators and military operators. The United States needs to be exploiting the science from everywhere, leveraging technology development from our allies, and fielding systems from our own industrial base.
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From page 102... ...
2009. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, D.C., July, p.
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The naval forces should deploy not with "deficiencies" but with "known capabilities" and spiral capabilities. The concept of establishing a baseline design and spiraling in upgraded capabilities has been around for decades for large platform systems such as aircraft.
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Examples of Rapid Acquisition Programs The committee has identified several novel initiatives that have attempted to address the challenges of expediency with respect to the acquisition process. These initiatives include the USMC Combat Hunter program and the Navy's Acoustic Rapid COTS Insertion (ARCI)
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From page 105... ...
Further, the program identified and transitioned immediately available commercial solutions to personal protective gear by adopting best practices for knee, arm, and other body parts, thereby minimizing the impact of cuts, scrapes, and the like on mission execution. The Navy's ARCI Program The ARCI program for the Navy's submarine force is an excellent example of how to deploy new capabilities in a short time.
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From page 106... ...
Operating within the existing federal acquisition regulations (FARs) , contracting officers understand and execute their authorities in support of the acquisition, testing, and deployment of commercial hardware on a time-critical time line that (1)
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From page 107... ...
These modifications still drove the need for full-scale static and fatigue test assets; however, the available commercial data in other common and mature systems, such as the landing gear and other areas, helped to minimize platform development costs. Areas that experienced a significant leverage of the commercial 737 design included the engines and flight avionics hardware (software was a new development effort)
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From page 108... ...
In the Navy Structures Group, where data must be created for each new platform, the available commercial data were leveraged to help the group make informed decisions about what to submit to M&S and what to actually test. Most of this leverage is skewed toward the development/requirements part of a program.
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From page 109... ...
The hypothesis stands that for incremental or spiral improvements to systems, as well as with new capabilities to address threats presented by surprise, the increased use of commercial data and practices can accelerate the fielding of these new requirements along a shorter time line. There is no longer a requirement or need to test full system articles until they fail or break completely.
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From page 110... ...
The latter technique helps organizations validate that students are not simply drilling and repeating by rote but instead understand underlying principles and are prepared to apply what they have learned to unexpected challenges. In moving beyond initial training, naval forces could apply these same lowcost adaptive techniques to existing military distance-learning courses, adding capability surprise to the curriculum and, more important, to the distance-learning qualification tests.
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From page 111... ...
should ensure that acquisition and contracting personnel are trained in the development of threshold versus objective requirements, the unique requirements associated with the use of commercial products, and the appropriate use of the waiver process in tailoring responses to potential capability surprise. Recommendation 5c: The surprise mitigation office (see Recommendation 1)
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