Responding to Capability Surprise A Strategy for U.S. Naval Forces (2013) / Chapter Skim
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naval forces -- the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard.1 Capability surprise is both inevitable and inherently complex. It has multiple dimensions, including time, mission, and cross-mission domains; anticipation of enabling technologies; physical phenomena; and new tactics that may enable surprise.2 Anticipating and mitigating capability surprise may seem daunting for U.S.
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4 Nassim Taleb defines a black swan as "a highly improbable event with three principal characteristics: It is unpredictable; it carries a massive impact; and, after the fact, we concoct an explanation that makes it appear less random, and more predictable, than it was." For additional reading on black swan events, see Nassim Nicholas Taleb, 2010, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd edition, Random House Trade Paperbacks, New York, N.Y. 5 Operation Burnt Frost was the mission to shoot down a nonfunctioning National Reconnaissance Office Satellite in 2008.
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4. Training for warfighters and mission operators that incorporates surprise elements not only to develop resourcefulness in surprise mitigation but also to instill the confidence that surprises usually have work-arounds.
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naval forces in addressing a potential capability surprise, the committee adapted a functional framework consisting of six phases that can be aligned with the development functions, accountabilities, and principles required for effective surprise mitigation. The framework, shown in Figure S-1 and described in greater detail throughout this report, comprises six phases: (1)
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naval forces are proactive in developing and anticipating surprise capabilities it is recom 7 Some exemplars identified by the committee include the Navy's SSBN Security program, the Air Vehicle Survivability Evaluation Program (Air Force Red Team) , and the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense program (in response to Operation Burnt Frost)
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TABLE S-1 Office Options Considered for Surprise Mitigation for U.S. Naval Forces Option No.
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While there are usually early indicators of potential capability surprises, there does not appear to be a co ordinated means for U.S. naval forces to explicitly scan the horizon for such indicators; to capture, retain, and vet such indicators with relevant organiza 8 Defense Science Board.
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direct the Chief of Naval Research to establish a "virtual" scan ning and awareness structure led by the Office of Naval Research-Global, engaging the technical, intelligence, and operational communities in order to systematically scan the horizon, maintain awareness, and conduct technology readiness assessments for both the CNO and the surprise mitigation office, as called for in Recommendation 1. Improve Methodologies for Assessing Surprise Finding 3: Organizations that anticipate and respond effectively to potential capability surprises -- such as the Navy's SSBN10 Security program, the Air Vehicle Survivability Evaluation program (Air Force red team)
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, there appears to be an opportunity for a surprise mitigation office to provide naval force component solutions to surprises facing the entire Joint Force. Furthermore, there is an opportunity for both offices to draw on each other by sharing expertise, methodologies (modeling, simulation, analysis, red teaming)
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naval forces appear to be inadequate and to lack reserve capacity. In particular, there appears to be limited flexibility in the way of design margins for plat forms and payloads to respond to a range of potential capability surprises, and it further appears that the Department of the Navy's investment in sci ence and technology is insufficient to provide a robust array of technology building blocks that allow a rapid response to a broad range of potential surprises.
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U.S. naval forces do not have an advocate and resource sponsor to rapidly field new capabilities to counter pop-up surprises, nor are they taking advantage of any existing capabilities, as identified in the Navy Readiness Reporting Enterprise (NRRE)
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The final two phases of the framework would be ably led by the identified existing organizations once the surprise mitigation office has prioritized, defined, and planned appropriate measures for its participation in these final phases to
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SYSCOM, Systems Command; IC, intelligence community; NWDC, Navy Warfare Development Command. See Appendix D for the definitions of acronyms that have not yet been spelled out.
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3 & 5a Novel red teaming & 1 5b Program Framework 4 Plaƞorm margins Other USG planning CollaboraƟon Tailored acquisiƟon CNO OSD with OSD ASN RDA Agencies surprise office CMC DARPA 2 CTO CUSCG 3 AƩenƟon to OPNAV PEOs DASN "gapped" SYSCOMs SOCOM PMs RDT& E surprises & M&S FFC N1 Warfare ONR Centers 6 a, b, & c N2/N6 Training for CPF ONR -G surprise N3/N5 2 2 ONR-G Surprise CLF Virtual Lead offices N4 for scanning & awareness CNE N8 ONI 1& 5c Surprise MiƟgaƟon N9 Office FIGURE S-3 Mapping of recommendations to organizations within and outside the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
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