Climate and Social Stress Implications for Security Analysis (2013) / Chapter Skim
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1 Climate Change as a National Security Concern
1 Climate Change as a National Security Concern
Pages 15-34
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From page 15... ...
The goal was for the committee to be able to integrate knowledge from across the physical and social sciences and also to be able to offer advice to the intelligence community on how to think about the security risks that might arise when climate change leads to situations for which countries, regions, or human life-supporting systems are not adequately prepared. Biographies of the committee members may be found in Appendix A
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From page 16... ...
The intelligence community is also responsible for assessing the likelihood of violent subnational conflicts in countries and regions with extremist groups, dangerous weapons, critical resources, or other conditions of security concern. It must also anticipate and assess various other risks to the stability of states and regions and risks of major humanitarian disasters in key regions of the world, both because of the indirect threats such risks may pose to the United States or its allies and because of national commitment to the principles of U.N.
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From page 17... ...
security policy community, both within and outside government, have given increasing attention to the potential risks that climate change could pose for national as well as international security. In 2008, for example, the intelligence community produced The National Intelligence Assessment on the National Security Implications of Global Climate Change to 2030 (Fingar, 2008)
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From page 18... ...
The most frequently cited potential climate events include sea-level rise, the shrinking of glaciers and the Arctic icecap, an increase in extreme weather events, and increasingly intense droughts, floods, and heat waves. The scenarios and examples presented in the above reports address broad consequences for fundamental societal needs such as food, health, and water and also the likely implications for specific regions and countries.
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From page 19... ...
"Since climate change affects the distribution and availability of critical natu ral resources, it can act as a ‘threat multiplier' by causing mass migrations and exacerbating conditions that can lead to social unrest and armed conflict." (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2009:1) "While climate change alone does not cause conflict, it may act as an ac celerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian institutions and militaries around the world.
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From page 20... ...
. Several scenarios see such declines in food or water security or disease outbreaks as likely drivers of population migrations, both within and across borders, that result in political or social stress, usually in the countries that receive the immigrant populations (e.g., Busby, 2007; Center for Naval Analysis, 2007; Lennon et al., 2007; Fingar, 2008; Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2009; Treverton et al., 2012)
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From page 21... ...
Perhaps the most frequently cited security risk from climate change is the possibility of melting Arctic sea ice leading to increased international tensions over newly accessible sea routes and natural resources in the Arctic (Busby, 2007; Center for Naval Analysis, 2007; Carmen et al., 2010)
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From page 22... ...
These trends indicate that high-temperature extremes are becoming more common even more rapidly than the average temperature is increasing and that the rate of change is increasing. Such trends in extreme events and the current understanding of climate change provide ample reason to expect these weather and climate trends to continue, along with the considerable spatial and interannual variability that has been experienced in the recent past.
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From page 23... ...
The rate of carbon dioxide buildup in the atmosphere is now a factor of 10,000 greater than it was during any period on geological record prior to human civilization, and sea levels during prior interglacial periods with comparable average surface temperatures were substantially higher than they currently are (Hansen et al., 2010)
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From page 24... ...
But from the standpoint of anyone concerned with the global profile of security risks, it is important to recognize that such events are expected to become more common because of anthropogenic climate change. Whether any specific event can be attributed to anthropogenic climate change is less relevant than the likelihood of serious climate-related disruptions occurring in places where they might raise security risks for the United States and the change in that likelihood over time.
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From page 25... ...
This is particularly the case with extreme climate events, which have been quite infrequent but can also be highly consequential. Although extreme events have the greatest potential to disrupt political and social systems and raise security concerns and are thus the most important events for security analysts to understand, their low frequency of occurrence makes it especially difficult to validate scientific predictions about them.
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From page 26... ...
During the Cold War, for example, most people thought that deterrence was robust, and few thought the likelihood that the Soviet Union would actually initiate a nuclear attack against the United States was anything but minuscule. But because the consequences would have been so dire, tremendous efforts were made by the intelligence and national security communities to monitor events that might provide early warning of the possibility of such a strike.
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From page 27... ...
Moreover, the spatial resolution of climate change models is often coarser than is required to resolve the spatial structure of many extreme events to the degree needed for security analysis. Another factor limiting confidence in the projections of extreme climate events is that the fundamental attributes of Earth's climate system have moved or very soon will move beyond the bounds of experience on which models are based.
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From page 28... ...
This does not mean that climate science has nothing to say about the future of extreme events that can be useful to the intelligence community. What it means is that there are multiple scenarios of the future of climate events that are each likely enough that they deserve consideration by the intelligence community.
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From page 29... ...
To better evaluate the import for U.S. national security of scenarios like this, which have some scientific plausibility but which extend beyond the current scientific consensus, the intelligence community might benefit from several types of knowledge that could be developed in the coming decade to help analysts anticipate security issues that might arise if such a scenario is realized.
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From page 30... ...
intelligence community and other interested actors to foresee security risks that may arise from climate change and its interactions with other social, economic, and political processes. Thus, we are concerned with climate risks to the extent that they may affect security risks.
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From page 31... ...
. Another important class of security risks that are excluded from this study is those that may arise from policy responses to the anticipation or experience of disruptive climate events.
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From page 32... ...
These kinds of climate-security connections could prove highly significant and deserve serious attention in security analysis, both by monitoring the development of such policies and by analyzing their implications for stresses in other places both when they are put in place and when a stressful climate event subsequently occurs. Focus on Disruptions Outside the United States Our study focuses largely on developments and vulnerabilities external to the United States, while recognizing that climate change is a global phenomenon and that events occurring within the United States can be disruptive in other countries, and vice versa.
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From page 33... ...
We consider policy and intelligencegathering actions related to events that might occur in the coming decade as well as activities that must begin within a decade in order to have adequate intelligence capacity for anticipating climate–security interactions at later times. An adequate intelligence capacity in this area must include an improved ability to anticipate changes in climate-related security risks beyond the decadal time horizon, for at least two reasons: The processes of climate change already in motion will most likely have their more serious security impacts beyond the next decade, and actions taken within the decade can reduce those longer-term risks.
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From page 34... ...
It addresses a continuing discussion in the academic literature about direct versus more complex and contingent relationships. These chapters provide the evidence to support the work in Chapter 6, which takes up a core task of the project: recommending what the intelligence community should be monitoring in order to assess climate– security connections in ways that are useful for policy.
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