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Evolution of the Concept of 'Victory' in Soviet Military-Political Thought After the Second World War (1989)
Pages 42-46

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From page 42...
... The semantic structure of the concept can be illustrated as two intersecting axes: one axis reflects a conception of a final point, at which it is necessary to finish the war in a manner considered "victorious"; the second axis symbolizes the notion of what must be done in order to achieve superiority over the enemy. The choice running the length of the first axis is marked as one of opposites: "the unconditional surrender of the enemy" versus "the readiness of the enemy to make concessions." The choice symbolized by the second axis is also a unification of opposites: "the maximum application of one's own forces and capabilities in battles" versus `'the maximum exploitation of the enemy's vulnerabilities." The first axis describes the goal-oriented aspect of the concept of victory; the second is concerned with the technical aspect.
From page 43...
... The successive phases of this evolution in meaning are examined below. The first stage primarily encompasses 1945-1955, when the phraseology of victory in the USSR was formulated on the basis of Stalin's so-called "permanently operating factors of war." In the first decade -of confrontation with the United States, which possessed superiority in nuclear weapons, foremost among these factors were the stability of the rear and the spirit of morale as determined by the Soviet regime, the patriotism of Soviet citizens, and the organizational work of the Party; other factors, such as the quality of the divisions, the value of the full use of weapons, and the art of organization within the armed forces, also held positions of importance.
From page 44...
... superiority as such." At the beginning of this stage, Minister Andrey ~ Grechko returned to a discussion of the qualities inherent in socialism that served as a constant source of strength for the Soviet Army. However, the phrasing this time was different: instead of predicting inevitable victory, it took a moralistic tone, introducing a striving for victory, placing victory as the duty of military servicemen, both commander and soldier.
From page 45...
... It is precisely because of this disunity that the military doctrine of the members of the Warsaw Pact proclaims the unusual military goal of "the banning or the nonassumption of war." This goal does not preclude carrying out an act of retribution in the event of military action; retribution lies on a completely different, "goal-less" plane. More than anything else, the reign of technical definitions in military phraseology, of "the acceptance of particular concessions" versus "unconditional surrender," has made military thought receptive to the idea of localized military success of the type based on a "nonaggressive defense." So this is how the phraseology of victory has evolved from the direct derivation of superiority from the notion of right to the proclaimed inappropriateness of this conception, ultimately undermining the semantic structure of the concept of victory itself, and placing in doubt all of its aspects that reflect the idea of superiority over the opposition.
From page 46...
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