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Soviet-American Dialogue in the Social Sciences Research Workshops on Interdependence Among Nations (1990) / Chapter Skim
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Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games (1989)
Pages 60-64

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
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From page 60...
... Each national political leader appears at both game boards. Across the international table sit his foreign counterparts, while around the domestic table behind him sit his major political allies and competitors and The complete version of this paper was published in Intemational Organization, Summer 1988, 2:427-460.
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From page 61...
... "Ratification" is used here to refer to any decision process at Level II that is required to implement a Level I agreement. The actors at Level II may represent legislators, bureaucratic agencies, interest groups, social classes, or even "public opinion." For purposes of counting "votes" in the ratification process, different forms of political power must be reducible to some common denominator, but the "voting" need not be formalized or democratic.
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From page 62...
... The strategic problems facing Level I negotiators dealing with a homogeneous conflict are quite different from those facing negotiators dealing with a heterogeneous conflict. In some cases, lines of cleavage within the Level II constituencies will cut across the Level I division, and the Level I negotiator may find silent allies at his opponent's domestic table.
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From page 63...
... If a negotiator wishes to expand his win-set in order to facilitate ratification, he may exploit both domestic and international side payments. An experienced negotiator familiar with the respective domestic tables should be able to maximize the cost-effectiveness of the concessions that he must make to ensure ratification abroad, as well as the cost-effectiveness of his own demands and threats, by targeting his initiatives with an eye to their Level II incidence, both at home and abroad.
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From page 64...
... International negotiations sometimes enable leaders to do what they privately wish to do but are powerless to do domestically. Conversely, if a proposed international deal threatens the cohesion of the negotiator's domestic coalition, he will be reluctant to endorse it, even if Judged abstractly)
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Key Terms

  • domestic table
  • negotiators dealing
  • tentative agreement
  • political science
  • international cooperation

  • international table
  • science review
  • chief negotiator
  • domestic politics
  • domestic pressures

  • american political
  • heterogeneous conflict
  • proposed international
  • policy choices
  • international deal

  • bargaining situation
  • domestic coalition
  • politicians seek
  • facing negotiators
  • sometimes enable

  • negotiator familiar
  • intemational organization
  • relative size
  • metaphor captures
  • trigger realignments

  • reach agreement
  • adverse consequences
  • rational soviet
  • national political
  • ratification abroad


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