Nuclear Power Technical and Institutional Options for the Future (1992) / Chapter Skim
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2 The Institutional Framework
2 The Institutional Framework
Pages 19-90
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From page 19... ...
proportions or worse during the ensliing 1214 years at one or more of the 200 nuclear power plants operating in the world? How could that affect public opinion, political referenda, and, thus, the prospects for the utili~'s new nuclear plant?
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From page 20... ...
At about the come time, a study by researchers at the M~chusetts Institute of Technology reached the foBow~ng conclusion. Despite the best efforts at institutional reform and Ovation n, LWR Bight water reactors technology, the difficulties presently condoning the U.S.
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From page 21... ...
The Council estimates that there Is an 80 percent probability that the actual average annual Crowds over the period wB1 not exceed! ~7 percent per year or fall below 1~ percent per year.[North American Electric ReLiability Council 19gD3 ~ There were, of course, other studies not mentioned here.
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From page 22... ...
Future Supply In 1989, the United States had an installed stemmer generating capacity of about 673,000 MWe. Dunug the 1990 to 1999 period, the North American Electric Reliability Council estimates U.S.
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From page 23... ...
Stardng from the larger estimated meter value of T79,000 MWe at the end of 1999, such growth rates would Men produce supply growths of about 12~000 MWe per year to 2O,000 MWe per year. If retirements of, for example, 1,000 MWe per year were assumed, new additions would need to be about 13,000 MWe per year to 21,000 MWe per year for the first several years of the next century.3 3 Dunng the 199Os, the North American Electric Reliability Council estimated that the largest number of U.S.
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From page 24... ...
. This prospect Is ~ contrast to that of the peak years of nuclear plant orders when, from 1970 to 1974, new orders for nuclear units averaged about 31,000 MWe per year IDOL, 1989aJ, although many of these were later cancelled.5 Growth in Competition Due to high facility development and construction costs and state regulatory practices, utilities today are more often contracting with Gird park power producers throw competitive bidding procedures designed to acquire new generating capacity.6 According to a recent national survey, since 1984, 4 Accompanying a warning of electricity shortages ~ this decade, the report of a recent conference stated HA full mm of options and enough lead time to make sound choices on both demand and supply sides Is far safer than short-term decisions and catch-up policies.
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From page 25... ...
According to the elec~iaty supply estimates for 1990 through 1999 made by the North American Electric Reliability Council, about 18,000 MWe of nonntility generator additions are planked compared to about 68,000 MWe of utility generating unit additions.lNorth Amended Electric Reliability ColmciL L990] In 1990, 6,000 MWe of non-utility generation went into service, brig the total to 32,700 MWe.lNational Independent Energy Producers, 1991]
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From page 26... ...
Many utilities have mstaIled or are mstaDing new p~nn;ng systems to assure that ad options to supply electricity are considered and the least-cost options are chosem[National Association of Regulatory Utility Comma oners, 1988; EPRI, 19~] Untapped electricity savings from end-use efficiency ~mprovemeets are treated e~liatly as a resource option, functionally comparable to energy Evened to consumers from power plants.
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From page 27... ...
Construction times for nuclear plants are discussed as well because of their significance to capital carrying charges. Some cost comparisons with coal are also presented International data are provided where appropriate.
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From page 28... ...
. On the average, the data show that nuclear plant capital carrying charges are about three times that of coal plants, accounting for the major net difference between their total generation e~enses.lDOE, l990c]
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From page 29... ...
they have taken longer to build, thus accum~adng more interest dunug construction (which is, ~ many cases, capitalized) , and (33 In most cases, nuclear plant decomm~ssio~g costs are taken into accost in the capital carrying charges.
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From page 30... ...
Furthermore, the data show continued escalation in overnight costs for plants beginning commercial operation during the 19~70s and 198Os, with a sharp increase Mom the years before 1981 to 1981 and beyond (e.g., the highest cost plant Mom 1981 to 1984 was trance as expensive as the highest cost plant from 1977 to 1980~. The cost increases do not appear to be affected strongly by the introduction of larger plants.42 The lower standards of quality and quality assurance required for nuclear plants were not initially sufficiently appreciated by the nuclear industry nor its regulators.
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From page 31... ...
a 1982 Dollars m source material were converted to 1988 DoBa" by using factor of 1.213 [DOE, 1989c] b Nuclear Regulatory Comm~on data were used for dates of commercial Operation and for individual plant capacities pNRC, L990a,b3 NOTE: The data base that was provided contused 79 plants.
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From page 32... ...
and Jades but they were not so pronounced. id,, - -—rat The high costs of recently completed nuclear plants have been subjected to intense review by state public utility commissions, and in some cases '3 See An Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Construction Costs [DOE, l986b3 for a more complete discussion of the relative importance of overnight costs versus time-related costs.
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From page 33... ...
Construction Times in Yearsa for Punts Begging Commercial Operation In Given T'me Penods _ 1975 Trough 1979 19~ dough 1984 Prior to 1975 1985 through 19~39 Minimum T'me 2.7 3.7 6.1 6.6 Maximum Time 7.6 10.1 13.4 193b Average Time 5.4 72 10.1 ] ' ~ Number of Punts 40 23 17 30 l a Construction Time Is defined here as time elapsed from actual ground breaking until the first generation of electrical energy.
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From page 34... ...
addend SOURCE: RAEA, 19901 . Major deterrents to new orders for nuclear plants include their high capital ~ Barges, which are driven by 0th construction costs and emended construction times, and the risk that their construction costs wiD not be recovered Battle of these issues (de" reduced capital carrying charges and predictability of cost recovery must be addressed before new nuclear plant orders are likely.
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From page 35... ...
lDOE, 1990c] Prev~oustr, after completing a detailed analysis of the trend of O&M costs for nuclear power plants, ELA stated Continued escalation in operating costs could erode any cost advantage that operating nuclear power plants now have .
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From page 36... ...
o I lo c)
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From page 37... ...
The analysis could find no evidence that increases ~ replacement power prices ~nBuenced real capital additions costs. Plant aging As received a great deal of attention, and some analysts have cited aging as a major determinant of nuclear power plant operating costs However, this analysis found that plant aging explained only about 17 percent of the escalation in capital additions costs.
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From page 38... ...
, nuclear plants were projected to require twice the investment of coal plants. The eiectria~ generation costs of projected coal plants versus nuclear power plants were also compared on a relative basis.
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From page 39... ...
Under some assumptions of parameter values, nuclear power Us a crumble cost advantage over coal; for other parameter Dues the reverse is the case.~Iones and Waite, 1990] 39 With respect to bonging the benefits achieved in the most successful countries to others, the authors tabulated ways of reducing the capital costs of nuclear power plants (e.g., feedback eminence through standardization, extend planning quality and quantity by completing detailed designs and resolving political and regulatory issues before starting construction, and improve project m~nagement)
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From page 40... ...
Prudence - capital costs said to have been imprudently incurred. Typically, imprudence findings have centered on decisions which affected the schedule for completion of the plant, or which involved the management of engmeenng and construction tasks.
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From page 41... ...
This is an authority of utility commit ons that has seldom been used before. It has been primarily applied to nuclear, rather than fossil, power plants.2, Knowing that costs might be considered Prudent or '~mpn~dent,~ the ministry must develop better methods for managing the design and construction of nuclear plants.
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From page 44... |
From page 45... ...
542 610 704 747 801 909 87~7 946 871 1,052 Lo64 ~1 t1~ ~7 860 Ratio (Op'n/Constr'n) 02 02 0a 02 0.4 05 05 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 O.6 0.6 0.7 nuclear punts would have a ~ degree of standardization The Electric Power Research Institute's Advanced Light Water Reactor Utility Reqliirements Document specifies Rat designs be 90 percent complete prior to begging construction (see Chapter 3, Table ~23.
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From page 46... ...
plants beeline customized, unique desks. There is genera belief that standardization of nuclear plants wid result In accelerated Ecens~ mproved construction schedules, tourer capital costs, and increased safely.
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From page 47... ...
economy. Plant Management Many nuclear plants ~ e United States have operated very wed over emended periods of time.
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From page 48... ...
Such management failures increase skepticism about and opposition to nuclear power generally. Today, the whole utility industry therefore Han a stake in helping to improve tile management practices of its weakest members, or as a last resort, to insist that the weakest members not operate nuclear power plants.26 Because of the high visibility of nuclear power and the responsibility for public safety, a consistently higher level of demonstrated utility management practices is essential before the U.S.
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From page 49... ...
As load factors increase, plants produce more electrical energy ~ a Even time period. The International Atomic Energy Agency collects load factor data for the world's nuclear power plants.
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· Load factor calculated from the month following the date of commercial operation. SOURCE: [OECD, 1989 and IAEA PRIS, Report NBLG020G 89 02 02]
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From page 51... ...
The Committee did not quanta differences between outage durations In the United States and those ~ other countries attributable to regulatory requirements. Other nuclear power plant performance indicators of interest are the number of unpinned automatic reactor scrams (i.e." trips or shutdowns)
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From page 52... ...
. Unplanned automatic scrams The graph shows Me average number of unplanned automate scrams while the reactor is critics mat occurred at nuclear plants operating offs an annual capacity factor of 25 percent or greater.
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From page 53... ...
126 1 o 66 0.71 o" ili o.oo ~ ~ Oi 025 022 o ,9 1~80 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 198e Togo 1990 Goa 53 FIGURE 2-1 U.S. industry performance indicator trends through 1990 (p.
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From page 54... ...
._ Q C) 800 600 200 1,113 1 937 ~ Be 863 ill 797 11555151111 ~ '980 1981 1982 1~83 1984 1~ 1986 1~87 1988 1989 1990 1990 Goa BWR Plants 48, ; _ _ ~6 575 1 1 1 1 1 1 2' 194 ~69 ~6' 273 1980 1~1 1982 1983 19841985 1~86 t~87 1988 198e 1990 Logo PWR Plants Gross heat rate Low gross heat rate, or btu per kilowatt hour, reflects emphasis on thermal ehiaency and attention to detail in the maintenance of balance~f-plant systems.
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From page 55... ...
industry performance indicator trends through 1990 (p.
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Except for capacity factors, the performance indicators of U.S. nuclear plants have improved significantly over the past several years.
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From page 57... ...
Several factors seem to influence public attitudes: · For the past decade or more, electrical supplies have been ample, and the public feels no sense of urgency about supporting the addition of new generating capacity of any kind. · The public reds that there are alternatives to nuclear power plants to produce electric power and believes that nuclear power is more costly than many of these alternatives · Well publicized problems with U.S.
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From page 58... ...
or Somewhat important, although when asked, fIf a new power plant is needed In your area, would you favor, oppose, or reserve judgment for a nuclear plant? 59 percent said that they would reserve judgment and 23 percent that they would oppose a nuclear plant.[DOE, fib]
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From page 59... ...
- A recognized need for a greater electricity supply that can best be met by new large-scale baseload generating stations;33 · A national environmental policy leading to sanctions to reduce emissions resulting from the use of coal, oft and natural gas in generating electricity (Of course, such a policy would also make alternative sources of electricity more attractive, including energy-eBSciency improvements and renewable energy technolog~es.~; · Mamtain~g the safe operation of e~nsdug nuclear power plants, and communicating this fact In a coherent manner to the public; · Providing the opportunity for meaningful public participation in nuclear power issues, including generation planning, siting, and oversig}lt;34 · Communicating to the public In a coherent and comprehensive way the whole issue of natural and man-made low level radiation as well as that of perceived and estimated risks; · A resolution of the high-level radioactive waste disposal stalemate; and · Assurances that a revival of nuclear power would not matenady affect the likelihood of nuclear weapons proliferation. 33 Nuclear plants are presently considered not to be appropriate for service as peaking units for operation as well as economic reason although they can be used for load-follow~g.
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From page 60... ...
Measures Jested to mitigate the effects of an accident, once it occurs, are intended primarily to protect the public's health and safety. The preceding section on public attitudes indicated that the potential hazards of nuclear power are important to the public Although having enormously different health consequences, the aca cents at TMI and Chernobyl reinforced the public's concern about the safety of nuclear power plants.
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From page 61... ...
However, the Commission has recently stated A core damage probability of less than 1 in 10,000 per year of redactor operation appears to be a very useful subsidiary benchmark in making judgments about that portion of our regulations which are Erected toward ardent prevention.[Chilk, 1990a] With respect to this benchmark, the NRC staff has stated If each of the current population of approximately 100 plants had a calculated core damage freqllengy approximating this overall mean value [ice 1 x 104 per reactor year]
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From page 62... ...
commercial reactor operation [NRC, 1990b] , there have been one core melt accident Am, one serious fire that threatened core damage (Brown's Ferry and several serious system or component failures in commercial LWRs.
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From page 63... ...
commercial nuclear power plants was reviewed to identify and categorize precursors to potential severe core damage acadents.rNRC, 1989b] According to ~RC's report: The operational events selected In the ASP Program form a unique database of historical system failures, multiple losses of redundancy, and infrequent accident initiators.
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From page 64... ...
In 1988, four of the seven precursors tenth the highest conditional core damage probability (he., 1988 precursors baring an estimated conditional core damage probability greater than 1E4) involved common mode failures; anodes event involved potential common mode failures.
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From page 65... ...
There are two issues regarding this procedure, however, the question of just who Is an expert on a given issue, and the data upon which the experts base their opinion In NUREG-1150, these issues are important when considenag how the methodology and results will be used, and in understanding the Bmitations of this methodolo~.39 In 1989, the NRC staff stated: Available PRA ewdence to date suggests that current plants, on the whole, probably are configured such that the overall mean core damage frequent is probably near but still somewhat above 104 per year.[Stello, 1989] However, NUREG-11~, ~ 1990, indicated that this estimate may be pet Although WUREG-1150 is not an estimate of the risics of aB 38 Specifically, NRC stated: Asking due account of the reservations expressed in the Review Group Report and in its presentation to the Commission, the Commission supports the emended use of probabilistic risk assessment ~ regulatory decisionmaking.]
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From page 66... ...
The mean core melt frequencies reported ~ NUREG-1150 for these five commercial nuclear power plants are reproduced ~ Table 2-13. TABLE 2-13 Mean Core Melt Frequency (Reactor Year i)
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From page 67... ...
rirnlally every probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) performed has led to some modifications in plant design or operational practices that would reduce the estimated severe core damage frequengy.~[Carr, 1990]
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From page 68... ...
to gam a more quantitative understanding of the overall probabilities of core damage and f~on product releases, and (4) if necessary, to reduce the overall probabilities of core Manage and fission product releases by modifying, where appropriate, hardware and procedures that would help prevent or mitigate severe accidents.
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From page 69... ...
radioactive waste repository. The work is bed funded by ratepayers through a special surcharge on electricity generated at nuclear power plants.
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From page 70... ...
, which limit the release of radionuc:lides to specific levels for 10,000 years after disposal [EPA, 40 CFR 191] NRC's staff has strongly questioned the workability of these quantitative requirements, as have the Nation Research CouDcil's Radioactive Waste Management Board and others.42 For example The .
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From page 71... ...
The rule provided for (1) certification of reactor designs, (23 early NRC approval of nuclear power plant sites, and (33 a combined construction and operating license for applicai~ons for certified reactors on pre-approved s~tes.[GSA, 1990]
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From page 72... ...
requires the Commission to make a post-coustruction, pre-operation finding that a nuclear plant will operate in conformity tenth the Act and that flee plain language of Section 189(a) requires the Commis_ sion to provide an opportunity for a hearing to consider .~ifi~nt new information that comes to light after Titian licensing and that implicates the Com~ion's finding obligations under Section 185.
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From page 73... ...
The Term success of stan~diz~tion will depend on a determination by new owners to indict on standards designs, and their willingness to maintain a bigly degree Of standardization dunug construction and throughout the life of the plant. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission Impact of Advanced Reactors Earlier In this chapter the Committee stated that NRC's regulations should be critically reviewed and modified (or replaced with a more coherent body of regulations)
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From page 74... ...
. Although all utilities supported recent changes to the operator requalification examination process, they were concerned that operators are not permitted to function In the s~m~ator examination process as they normally do on shift, that examiner standards change continually, and that too many organizations are involved In requalifications.
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From page 75... ...
Changes to the regulatory program are berg considered by NRC as a response to the above findings.[NRC, l99Od] The Committee concludes that ARC should improve the quality of its regulation of emsung Ed future nuclear power plants, mclu~g tighter management controls over all of its interactions with licensees and consistency of regional activities.
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From page 76... ...
~ both of these matters, the regulatory agency, whichever it is, Is not above suspicion (Indeed, the prototype for such boards, the National Transportation Safety Board, was once part of the regulatory agency, but experience demonstrated the prudence of separation, as it wiD here, In time.) lamed, 19863 NTSB always includes industry exerts on the investigative learns, thereby getting the most lmowledgeable people.
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From page 77... ...
However, any agreements made In advance are unlikely to incorporate guarantees of recovery of costs that substantially exceed costs for alternative ways to pronde the same service to ratepayers. Thus, Mess the problems that have led to the current high construction costs and cost overruns of nuclear plants are solved, limited assurances are not likely to be of much Rue.
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From page 78... ...
In early 1990, a total of 73 nuclear plants ~ 18 states were operating under performance incentive systems that use such indicators as equivalent availability factor, fuel costs (or replacement power costs) , and construction costs.[Inside NRC, 19903 In M~c~chusetts, the Boston Edison Companyis Pilgnm plant operates under incentives primarily based on capacity factor, but also on NRC's SALP process.
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From page 79... ...
awns ~1 ~e ~ prowls go_ ~ ~ In. PI bowed ~ = ~~ ~ Spry ~e e_~lc ~~ of ~^~ H_r,~dob~~ ~~ lo ~ ~ ~= to _ ~e Committee Ids _~mk~^s~d~^~ ~^
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From page 80... ...
Pronded to the National Research Council's Committee on Future Nuclear Power Development in February. Blair, P
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From page 81... ...
1979. Nuclear Regulatory Comm~ssion Po}ipy Statement, NRC Statement on Rislc Assessment and the Reactor Safety Study Report (WASH-1400)
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From page 82... ...
DOE, Energy Information Adminstration. 1988c An Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Operating Costs.
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1982. Projected Costs of Elecuic:~q from Nuclear and Coal-F~red Power Plants.
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From page 84... ...
An exclusive report on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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From page 85... ...
Program on Nuclear Power Plant Innovatiom PI-PA Mark (NSF Grant No.
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From page 86... ...
NRC. 1991a Nuclear Regulatory Commission Information Digest, 1991 Editiom NUREG-1350.
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From page 87... ...
Nuclear Regulatory Comm~on on Nuclear Power Plant Activities.
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From page 88... ...
SteBo, Jr., V., Executive Director for Operations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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From page 89... ...
10 CF~ Part 50, Safety Goals for He Operations of Nuclear Power Plants. Policy Statement.
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From page 90... ...
The risk to the population in the area near a nuclear power plant of Lacer fatalities that might result from nuclear power plant operation should not exceed one-tenth of one percent (0.1 percent) of tile sum of cancer fatality risks resulting from Al other causes.
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