Perspectives on Research with H5N1 Avian Influenza Scientific Inquiry, Communication, Controversy: Summary of a Workshop (2013) / Chapter Skim
Currently Skimming:
2 The Quickening Pace of Biological Research and Current Challenges in Biosecurity
2 The Quickening Pace of Biological Research and Current Challenges in Biosecurity
Pages 5-14
The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.
From page 5... ...
(For a timeline of events and related publications, see Appendix A.) The development of recombinant DNA technology in the early 1970s marked the beginning of technical capabilities that would, within the next three decades, enable the scientific community to move genetic material between species, induce bacteria to synthesize new proteins using foreign genes inserted for that purpose, and build new genomes that reveal genes of great interest to those charged with protecting the public health.
|
From page 6... ...
This capability allowed laboratory scientists to investigate evolutionary questions in a manner that had never before been possible. A common experimental design involved creating an environment hospitable only to organisms possessing a specific trait -- for example, virulence or transmissibility.
|
From page 7... ...
to assess the concerns and provide recommendations on how to proceed. The resulting NAS Committee on Recombinant DNA Molecules issued a letter en dorsing a voluntary moratorium on specific types of recombinant DNA research "until the potential hazards of such recombinant DNA molecules have been better evaluated or until adequate methods are developed for preventing their spread." In the letter, the committee acknowledged that it was difficult to estimate risk and recommended that an international conference of involved scientists be held to examine the question more closely.a The resulting Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA took place in Febru ary 1975 in Pacific Grove, California.
|
From page 8... ...
is a federal advisory committee that "issues recommendations to the NIH Director that are conveyed through the NIH Office of Biotechnology Activities (OBA) , which is responsible for the NIH system of oversight of recombinant DNA research." The RAC developed and suggests changes to a set of NIH guidelines (now known as the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules)
|
From page 9... ...
and Joan M Merigan Professor, Departments of Medicine, and of Microbiology and Immunology, Stanford University and Chief, Infectious Disease Section, VA Palo Alto Health Care System, discussed developments in national security and responses to dualuse research, highlighting the tension between the long-established value of openness in science (particularly strong in the life sciences)
|
From page 10... ...
. advice, guidance, and leadership regarding biosecurity oversight of dual use research" and to "provide advice on and recommend specific strategies for the efficient and effective oversight of federally conducted or supported dual use biological research." The NSABB was tasked to advise 2 Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security, Scientific Communication and National Security (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1982)
|
From page 11... ...
Regarding research on infectious agents specifically, Relman referred to research that the NSABB specifically identified as worthwhile but which may also need special review.
|
From page 12... ...
ontinuous research by our best scientists is the key to American leadership and true national security." Kerr noted that a later Executive Order stated that "basic science research information not clearly related to the national security may not be classified." He elaborated on the Corson Report's argument against "security by secrecy" and observed that, at the time of the report's 1982 publication, there was no practical way to restrict international scientific exchange without also hindering communication within U.S. borders.
|
From page 13... ...
remain unrestricted." Kerr stated that federal agencies were responsible for reviewing research projects at the time of a funding decision and for periodically reviewing research findings. Shortly after the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax mailings, Kerr said, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice reaffirmed that NSDD-189 would remain in effect.
|
From page 14... ...
Many panelists suggested that people in numerous related fields pay close attention to the H5N1 controversy and associated discussions, because similar dual-use questions are pertinent to synthetic biology, systems biology, biological engineering, chemistry, physics, and many types of engineering.
|
Key Terms
This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More
information on Chapter Skim is available.