Capability Surprise for U.S. Naval Forces Initial Observations and Insights: Interim Report (2013) / Chapter Skim
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Development and Implementation
Development and Implementation
Pages 12-21
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From page 12... ...
or other authorities.18 The options for development and implementation should be considered based on the expected time frame of the emergence of the surprise, the technology readiness level of the requisite counter-capability, and the community resources and schedule capacity to develop the capability. Note that these options may be exercised not only to accommodate anticipated surprises, but also to develop U.S.
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22 The National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) is "a means to capture issues of critical interest to senior intelligence community customers and communicating those issues to the IC for action.
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The primary product of phase 1 in the committee's proposed framework is a standard risk assessment to gauge which potential surprises represent the greatest risk to naval forces in the expected time frame. The expected timeframe would be based partly on trends in technology readiness level (TRL)
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From page 15... ...
of those technologies with greater risk of surprise, including projected timeline, from the Scanning and Awareness phase, and with vetted impact prioritization by an authoritative red teaming community from the Assessing Surprise phase, the Prioritization, Decisions, and Resourcing process can focus on the tradeoff options for the most cost-effective, lowest risk to deliver, and timeliest 24 Naval Research Advisory Committee.
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From page 16... ...
These should be used as appropriate to gain sufficiently accurate predictive data and metrics on a potential capability surprise. Further, some of the potential surprises may be of such a nature that new models must be developed to make adequate evaluations.
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From page 17... ...
For example, in the committee's exploration of potential capability surprises associated with denial-of-space (Scenario #1) discussions with NRL's Tactical Electronic Warfare Division provided examples wherein multiyear acquisition strategies do not appear to be pacing the evolving threat.27 A natural and easy response to why it takes so long to field new potential capabilities (in address to potential surprises by adversaries)
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From page 18... ...
Another suggestion explored formalizing and resourcing mission syndicates composed of the platform, sensor, and weapon research, requirements, resource, and acquisition organizations that provide contributions in delivery of a particular mission's capability. This is an enhancement to OPNAV N95 coordination of a mine warfare enterprise and the naval laboratory warfare center concepts, where the syndicate lead is the holder of resources and "buys" mission platforms, sensors, and weapons from the providers.
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From page 19... ...
Experience teaches time and time again that people do not find a lot of flaws with their own work and, as such, independent red teaming is vital. At the same time, it is reasonable to state that red teams are subject to the same cultural influences discussed earlier and, as such, the committee plans to address these and other areas related to red teaming in greater depth in its final report.31 Rather, this committee's impressions are that it is more typical for naval forces to exercise assuming chat rooms are operating and networks are functioning, because the denial of these would be "too hard" and/or require substantially more resources than available for the exercises.
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While the committee has not yet explored the potential for generating meaningful metrics that might be used in addressing naval preparedness for dealing with potential capability surprise, we believe a cultural shift is needed towards increased flexibility and agility to react when such surprise or "black swan" events occur. This committee believes that integral to the organizations' effectiveness in dealing with surprise is the issue of metrics, and the potential incorporation of surprise readiness into these metrics.
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From page 21... ...
It will also pursue additional interaction with the fleet to explore additional operational concepts for dealing with potential surprise based on hypothesized scenarios. Finally, the committee will explore the potential refinement of organizational concepts and suggested authorities against the committee's postulated framework for addressing surprise.
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