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Examples of Surprise
Pages 5-11

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From page 5...
... In addition to reviewing previous case studies of surprises, the committee has, so far, selected the following three surprise scenarios, which it believes are important to U.S. naval forces, as starting points from which it can examine, illustrate by example, and, ultimately, recommend potential changes as requested in the study's terms of reference:8  Scenario 1: Denial of access to space;  Scenario 2: An asymmetric engagement with complex use of cyber attacks in a naval context; and 8 In addition to the surprise scenarios listed in this interim report, the committee anticipates further illustration of surprise in the final report by examining additional scenarios, such as potential nonkinetic effects to counter missile magazine limits, and the potential impact of unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs)
From page 6...
... The committee also recognizes that cyber attacks or other interference in this scenario could originate from imbedded threats in commercial off-the-shelf hardware and software that are widely deployed in present naval systems and could render naval systems and networks inoperable at a critical moment of need. The heavy dependence on certain widely used satellite communications operating in frequency bands that can be more readily jammed is a particular concern.
From page 7...
... , as well as surprises that might evolve from actions such as national strategic decisions and/or national budget priority changes. Examples of national strategic decisions include the recent decision to deploy the U.S.
From page 8...
... , and the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense Program -- as example cases to help illuminate the following:  Impediments that currently exist for certain areas of potential surprise outside of mainstream acquisition programs that may be hampering anticipation and response;  Successful principles and infrastructures that might be integrated into already existing naval organizational structures and processes to address the broader realm of potential surprises;  Structures and processes that could accommodate the above three examples of unaddressed/under-addressed surprises (denial of access to space, flash mob activity via social media, disaster response) ;  Key capabilities, policies, and metrics that support successful structures and processes for dealing with surprise; and  Potential changes to better prepare for, and be more resilient in the face of capability surprise for naval forces.
From page 9...
... Program (whose responsiveness was exemplified by the shoot-down in Operation Burnt Frost of a wayward National Reconnaissance Office satellite.15 The principles and key "ingredients" for dealing with potential capability surprise in each exemplar program are similar: a stable program and infrastructure; a capability thread that includes research and technology development, modeling and simulation, expert staff, acquisition and industrial capability, and testing infrastructure; and very visible senior leadership support and top cover. Furthermore, several organizations, including the U.S.
From page 10...
... Moreover, events in-theater may require tactical or strategic operational adjustments in phase 5 as a result of assessing the adequacy of proposed responses. Scanning and Awareness Phase 1 -- Scanning and Awareness -- involves scanning the horizon for potential technologies, technical applications, and operational behaviors that could cause surprise, which is defined here as "an adverse event whose outcome is worsened by lack of preparedness or awareness to counter unexpected developments." The committee's initial data gathering confirms that certain capabilities are already available to anticipate surprise, including the Office of Naval Research-Global (ONR-G)
From page 11...
... Assessing Surprise Phase 2 -- Assessing Surprise -- includes such key items as effective modeling, simulations analysis, and "red teaming." The somewhat over-used term "red teaming" is applied here to emphasize the dynamic tension required of the operational, technical, and intelligence communities to flesh out potential negative impacts of surprise and prioritize which should be addressed in each timeframe, from short term through long term. Key to the success of this process is application not only of operational experience and campaign-level modeling as it is used currently, but also of the more detailed system- and physics-level modeling, coupled with experiments, as necessary, to determine feasibilities and maturity levels of the potential surprise events as well as their potential operational impacts.


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