Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety of U.S. Nuclear Plants (2014) / Chapter Skim
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6 Lessons Learned: Offsite Emergency Management
6 Lessons Learned: Offsite Emergency Management
Pages 196-231
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From page 196... ...
approaches to offsite emergency response had many common features. These included specified incident notification levels; guidance on conditions for each notification level; designation of specific emergency planning zones; protective action guidelines (PAGs)
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However, approaches to managing offsite responses in Japan and the United States were different in some notable ways: the United States uses a "bottom-up" approach to managing offsite emergency response. That is, the responsibility for responding to a disaster begins at the local level, extends to state and tribal governments, and can include the federal government as supplemental resources are requested (Sidebar 6.2)
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Nuclear power plant accidents involving radioactive material releases are just one of the many potential emergencies to which this all-hazards approach applies. The all-hazards approach is based on the notion that there are common features among disasters irrespective of their initiating events; therefore, many of the same planning strategies can apply to all emergencies.
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From page 199... ...
The first and second sections aim to put the radiological consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and the difficulties in responding to the accident due to the competing natural disasters -- the earthquake and tsunami -- into perspective. The third section provides a brief description of the offsite emergency response during the first few days of the Fukushima Daiichi accident.
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. The planning basis is utilized in the joint USNRC and FEMA document "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" (USNRC and FEMA, 1980)
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Emergency responders can use the PAGs for any radiation incident involving relatively significant releases of radioactive materials, including nuclear power plant accidents for the early and intermediary phases. CDC The CDC's roles in radiological emergency preparedness include: 1.
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to the Fukushima Daiichi plant was ordered a few hours after the accident began and at least 12 hours before major releases of radioactive materials from the reactors started (Investigation Committee, 2011)
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. For nuclear power plant accidents where populations are exposed primarily to gamma radiation, such as occurred as a result of the Fukushima Daiichi accident, whole-body dose expressed as effective dose and reported in millisieverts and organ absorbed dose reported in milligrays are numerically equivalent (NRC, 2006a)
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. of the Fukushima Daiichi accident is not intended to downplay other severe long-term health impacts.
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6.2 CHALLENGES OF RESPONDING TO THE ACCIDENT Emergency response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident was greatly inhibited by the widespread and severe destruction caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami: local electrical power and regional communication infrastructure were knocked out and the transportation infrastructure (roads, bridges, ports, and railroads) was damaged.
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, and the Japanese Red Cross Society provided medical and psychological support to earthquake and tsunami victims as well as those affected by the nuclear accident. In addition to the overwhelming relief demands on the emergency response teams, which had to deal with three simultaneous disasters of unexpected scale, emergency response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident was conducted with limited information on the status of the nuclear plant itself.
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Authorities in Japan acted immediately to reduce the consequences of potential releases of radioactive materials from the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Their actions were to be coordinated through the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters (NERHQ)
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These predictions are used to inform decisions by authorities on protective actions.16 The ERSS feeds information on radioactive release sources to SPEEDI; but, as noted previously, ERSS was not functional. Reliable real-time estimates of sources and magnitudes of radioactive material releases from the Fukushima Daiichi plant were therefore unavailable.
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-- to evacuate residents living within a 2-km radius of the Fukushima Daiichi plant. Approximately 30 minutes later, the NERHQ instructed the Fukushima Prefectural governor and all relevant local governments to issue an evacuation order to citizens within a 3-km radius of the plant and to issue a shelter-in-place order to citizens between 3 and 10 km of the plant.
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1) is the Fukushima Daiichi plant; Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant (No.
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These hotspots were named "Specific Spots Recommended21 for Evacuation." These hotspots were more than 20 km away from the Fukushima Daiichi plant and outside the Deliberate Evacuation Area (UNSCEAR, 2013b)
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were detected in topsoil and vegetation near the Fukushima Daiichi plant (Hamada et al., 2012) .23 The Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC)
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26 According to ICRP (2011) , 1-20 mSv/yr is the reference dose recommendation for exposure situations involving, for example, people living in long-term contaminated areas after a nuclear accident or a nuclear emergency.
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: estimated annual dose level is 20-50 mSv; Area 3 (pink) : estimated annual dose level is over 50 mSv and residents are not allowed entry.
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The national government aims to have these interim storage facilities in operation by early 2015.30 6.4 VULNERABILITIES IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN JAPAN FINDING 6.1: The Fukushima Daiichi accident revealed vulnerabilities in Japan's offsite emergency management. The competing demands of the earthquake and tsunami diminished the available response capacity for the accident.
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6.4.1 Lack of Planning for a Severe Nuclear Accident According to an independent Diet investigation of the Fukushima Daiichi accident (NAIIC, 2012) , Japan was not prepared for the severe demands of the triple disaster that occurred on March 11, 2011.
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. Also, SPEEDI results were not initially made public; therefore, local governments could not use those results to plan evacuations.33 6.4.3 Uncoordinated Issuance of Protective Actions As noted in Section 6.3.2.1, a series of evacuation decisions were made as the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi plant unfolded.
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The protective actions issued during the accident were generally successful due to the combination of good execution by the organizations involved, improvisation, and good luck. With respect to "good luck," as noted previously, about 80 percent of the radioactivity released from the Fukushima Daiichi plant was transported to the Pacific Ocean (Kawamura et al., 2011; Morino et al., 2011)
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6.4.3.2 Potassium Iodide As noted in Section 6.3.2.2, little KI was administered to populations living near the Fukushima Daiichi plant because they had already evacuated. Reports indicate that radiation thresholds for KI administration were not exceeded as a result of timely evacuations (UNSCEAR, 2013b)
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of 1-20 mSv/yr for "emergency or existing radiation exposure conditions" including nuclear accidents (ICRP, 2007) , it was difficult for the public to understand "why the dose limit of 1 mSv/yr, which was valid before the accident, could be exceeded after the accident -- at a time when people expect[ed]
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However, it may be reasonably presumed that the counts correspond to measurement of an area equal to the active area of the probe used. 38 According to the IAEA, it is unlikely that skin or clothing contamination from radioactive materials released during a severe nuclear accident would pose a significant health concern to offsite populations.
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preparedness for severe nuclear accidents. Nevertheless, the accident raises the question of whether a severe nuclear accident such as occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi plant would challenge U.S.
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RECOMMENDATION 6.2A: The nuclear industry and organiza tions with emergency management responsibilities in the United States should assess their preparedness for severe nuclear accidents associated with offsite regional-scale disasters. Emergency response plans, includ ing plans for communicating with affected populations, should be revised or supplemented as necessary to ensure that there are scalable and effective strategies, well-trained personnel, and adequate resources for responding to long-duration accident and/or disaster scenarios involving • Widespread loss of offsite electrical power and severe damage to other critical offsite infrastructure, for example, communications, transportation, and emergency response infrastructure; • Lack of real-time information about conditions at nuclear plants, particularly with respect to releases of radioactive material from reactors and/or spent fuel pools; and • Dispersion of radioactive materials beyond the 10-mile emer gency planning zones for nuclear plants that could result in doses exceeding one or more of the protective action guidelines.
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6.5.1 Emergency Response Planning Around Nuclear Power Plants Because of the severe damage to the reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi plant, actions that would normally be associated with the "early phase" of a nuclear incident extended over many days to weeks, rather than the expected hours to days that inform nuclear emergency planning in the United States (see Sidebar 6.1 for definitions of accident phases)
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44 The aim of the USNRC's ERDS modernization program is to ensure that the agency can receive data from all affected reactor units during a multiunit event. 45 Emergency response plans are in place for the plume exposure pathway EPZ to avoid or reduce dose from potential radiation exposure from the release of radioactive materials after a nuclear event.
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. It also revealed that evacuation, when used as a default protective action, is problematic when long-term consequences related to relocation, mental health impacts to the evacuated population, as well as the material impacts such as loss of business or employment are not considered.48 Additionally, the continuing concerns in Japan that dose levels applied for the protection of the population as a whole do not provide sufficient 47 In the United States, the USNRC amended its regulations in 2001 to require that state and local emergency planners consider the use of KI to supplement other protective actions in the case of a general emergency at a nuclear plant (USNRC, 2002c)
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50 In a November 13, 2013, conference call with the committee, a representative of the USEPA indicated that the agency had taken the experiences from the Fukushima Daiichi accident into account when updating the PAG manual. However, the committee did not find explicit evidence for this in that draft (USEPA, 2013)
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was not followed, so there was no declaration of a lead federal agency for the response, and a Joint Information Center with collocated group of representatives from agencies and organizations with the responsibility to handle public information needs was not established.51 During the accident, authorities in U.S. states received a number of inquiries from members of the public regarding potential health effects from radioactive material releases from the Fukushima Daiichi plant; the safety of milk, water, and food; and need to take KI (Salame-Alfie et al., 2012)
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6.5.4 Decision Making for Recovery The ongoing offsite response to the Fukushima Daiichi Accident demonstrates that cleanup and resettlement of evacuated populations (collectively described here as "recovery") are complex processes.
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did not address recovery following a nuclear plant accident. USEPA's recently updated PAG manual (USEPA, 2013)
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may be impractical when contaminated areas are large. International radiation protection agencies, such as the ICRP and IAEA, advocate for the principle of optimization when it comes to protection of populations living in an existing exposure situation such as in the areas contaminated by radioactive material releases from the Fukushima Daiichi plant (ICRP, 2007)
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