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7 Lessons Learned: Nuclear Safety Culture
Pages 232-255

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From page 232...
... . Nevertheless, the committee quickly came to understand that the lack of a strong nuclear safety culture was an important contributing factor to the Fukushima Daiichi accident.
From page 233...
... The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO; see Sidebar 7.2) has published guidance on the nuclear safety culture for the U.S.
From page 234...
... . The IAEA promotes the development of a nuclear safety culture through workshops, written guidance, and peer review.
From page 235...
... 3) There is international acceptance by the nuclear power community that a strong nuclear safety culture needs to be adopted universally: by senior management of organizations operating nuclear power plants, by individuals who work in those plants, and by regulatory bodies and other organizations that set nuclear power policies.
From page 236...
... INPO collects, analyzes, and publishes "lessons learned" from events that oc cur at nuclear plants in the United States and abroad. When appropriate, INPO requires its members to implement enhancements in response to these lessons.
From page 237...
... A Nuclear Energy Agency report asserts that The nature of the relationship between the regulator and the operator can influence the operator's safety culture at a plant either positively or nega tively. In promoting safety culture, a regulatory body should set a good example in its own performance.
From page 238...
... Examinations of the Japanese nuclear regulatory system following the Fukushima Daiichi accident concluded that regulatory agencies were not independent and were subject to regulatory capture. The Government of Japan acknowledged the need for a strong nuclear safety culture by entering into the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
From page 239...
... It was this mindset that led to the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant.
From page 240...
... regulators did not monitor or supervise nuclear safety. The lack of expertise resulted in "regulatory capture," and the postponement of the implementation of relevant regulations.
From page 241...
... 8-1) Nevertheless, analysts who have studied Japan's regulatory structure have shown that Japanese nuclear safety regulators were subject to regulatory capture prior to the Fukushima Daiichi accident.
From page 242...
... XII-13, emphasis added) The government has taken a series of actions to improve its regulatory institutions and its commitment to nuclear safety.
From page 243...
... The U.S. nuclear industry, acting through the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, has voluntarily established nuclear safety culture programs and mechanisms for evaluating their implementation at nuclear plants.
From page 244...
... The agency has documented its expectations for the nuclear safety culture in a series of policy pronouncements, including a 1989 Policy Statement on the Conduct of Nuclear Power Plant Operation. The policy statement declares that [e]
From page 245...
... nuclear industry has also demonstrated a clear and strong commitment to nuclear safety. INPO has taken the lead in promoting a strong nuclear safety culture in the U.S.
From page 246...
... The INPO principles show that implementation of the nuclear safety culture is an organizational obligation that begins at the top of the corporate ladder and applies to every worker at nuclear plants. The principles make clear that the special nature of nuclear power production demands an enhanced level of diligence and that continuous improvement is the expected norm.
From page 247...
... nuclear safety culture because that was not part of its study charge. 7.3.3.1  Independence of the U.S.
From page 248...
... 8  Letter from Senator Barbara Boxer, Chair of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, to USNRC Chairman Allison Macfarlane, November 26, 2013, concerning a USNRC decision to withhold certain information requested by the committee. Available at http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?
From page 249...
... The letters criticized a USNRC staff recommendation that the agency require owners of nuclear plants with Mark I and Mark II containments to install filtered vents to reduce radioactive releases in the event of an accident. Some committee members view these letters as an effort to weaken the agency's regulatory independence.
From page 250...
... Following the Fukushima Daiichi accident, for example, the USNRC's Near-Term Task Force (see Chapter 5) examined the implementation of severe accident management guidelines at U.S.
From page 251...
... A well-documented example is the near-accident at the Davis-Besse nuclear plant in 2002. On February 16, 2002, during a refueling outage, the Davis-Besse plant conducted a routine inspection of the nozzles entering the head of the reactor pressure vessel.
From page 252...
... in 1975. Some nuclear plants have had difficulties in meeting these regulations and have sought exemptions (USGAO, 2008)
From page 253...
... nuclear power industry must maintain and continu ously monitor a strong nuclear safety culture in all of their safety-related activities. Additionally, the leadership of the U.S.
From page 254...
... In fact, the development and maintenance of a strong nuclear safety culture requires a focused and sustained commitment from all involved parties: • Nuclear plant operators, • Nuclear plant management, • Nuclear industry organizations, • Nuclear regulators -- both staff and leadership, and • Executive and legislative branches of government. The committee sees opportunities to improve the transparency of U.S.
From page 255...
... . Including the public by extending communication and engagement is consistent with the principles that underlie a strong nuclear safety culture.


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