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3 Setting the Conditions to Achieve Soldier and TSU Overmatch
Pages 59-74

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From page 59...
... domains and even less practical to implement all of them via the materiel acquisition process. This chapter discusses four essential actions needed to set the conditions for the Army to exploit the potential available for TSU overmatch.
From page 60...
... In particular, the usual solution space of the DOTMLPF domains has traditionally constrained the available options and programmatic implementation to a predominantly materiel acquisition process. Accordingly, the committee urges the Army to tailor its acquisition processes -- within the legally mandated acquisition system -- to ensure that satisfactory solutions are developed and fielded rapidly, with a full complement of training and support.
From page 61...
... MANPRINT as constituted currently would not be expected to seek an optimum TSU configuration, be concerned with TSU collective training, or be concerned with social dynamics within a TSU. MANPRINT's influence is on the course of Army materiel acquisitions, although some of the analytical tools produced for the MANPRINT program could be applied to TSU design and evaluation that fully incorporates the human dimension.1 The Army Medical Corps, led by the (Army)
From page 62...
... This limitation is applicable to all Army acquisition programs, but the scope of this report is limited to the TSU. Finding: An essential principle for achieving overmatch capabilities is to recognize that the human dimension is at the core of all dismounted Soldier and TSU improvements.
From page 63...
... The degree to which individuals are integrated into the small social element that is the TSU is important to collective capabilities. The organization chosen for the TSU provides a framework for decomposing collective tasks into components performed by individual Soldiers and for assigning different loads -- again physical, psychological, cognitive, sensory and perceptual -- to the members of the unit.
From page 64...
... Furthermore, the committee believes the human dimension, as defined and discussed in this report, covers some nonmaterial elements of the DOTMLPF domains, such as leader development and small group dynamics, that are typically not addressed in the HSI context but are critical to overmatch for dismounted TSUs. a See the Air Force Human Systems Integration Office website at ww3.safaq.hq.af.mil/organizations/afhsio/index.asp.
From page 65...
... Moreover, these previous studies were framed largely in the context of providing enhanced capability via materiel solutions, whereas the committee has observed that overmatch capability can best be achieved by considering the full spectrum of applicable DOTMLPF domains, making even more important the need for a full-spectrum systems engineering capability in support of the Soldier/TSU. Qualified system engineering professionals, possibly with centralized leadership located in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology and distributed among the Army Research, Development, and Engineering Centers, would be well positioned to trade off candidate solutions within or among the various DOTMLPF domains while ensuring that specified and required capabilities are achieved.
From page 66...
... Beyond the assessment of task performance for the Soldier and TSU are MOEs, which assess changes in behavior, capability, or operational environment. MOPs measure what is accomplished and help to verify whether objectives, goals and end states are being met -- for example, achieving kills x percent of the time at y meters decreases TSU vulnerability to enemy small arms fires by z percent.
From page 67...
... In all military services, models predicting crew task performance, including cognitive workload, as functions of operator or crew station design have been key design tools for military vehicles from self-propelled howitzers to aircraft. However, the committee could find no evidence that these models have been considered in designing information technology systems and networks for TSUs.
From page 68...
... Assessments of new capabilities -- for instance, the integration of the TSU into the Army information network -- cannot merely measure the performance of a single enabler, such as the materiel interface to an information system, but must rather evaluate all the accompanying doctrinal use, organizational assignment, training, leadership abilities, and personnel skills that must be considered in developing MOPs and MOEs aimed at ensuring TSU overmatch. The committee recognizes that a rigorous methodology will not happen overnight for developing and maturing MOPs and MOEs that: (1)
From page 69...
... STREAMLINING ACQUISITION OF SOLUTIONS TO ACHIEVE TSU OVERMATCH CAPABILITIES As noted in the previous two sections and discussed more fully in Appendix D, multiple studies have advised the Army to train, equip, and sustain the dismounted Soldier as a holistic entity or system, rather than as a user of independent materiel components or "piece-parts." Yet the committee found limited, if any, evidence that the concept has been implemented within the Army. As noted above, the committee was made aware of an effort to develop MOPs and MOEs appropriate for the range of operations expected of a dismounted TSU, but it was unable to determine the nature of the effort or if it was still active.
From page 70...
... Instead, does creating a dismounted TSU and Soldier with decisive overmatch capabilities require assigning higher quality recruits to the TSUs and designing materiel with their higher quality in mind? Compounding the shortcomings of the requirements generation and acquisition processes, the committee believes that the MOPs and MOEs that do exist are much too 70
From page 71...
... Finding. Despite multiple advisory reports, extending back more than two decades, on the critical importance of a holistic approach to developing, procuring, and supporting Soldier capabilities, the Army is still acquiring kit and gear for the dismounted Soldier through separate programs of record (70 separate programs in the fiscal year 2010 budget)
From page 72...
... Finding: The Army acquisition processes can be tailored -- within the legally mandated acquisition system -- to develop and field solutions optimized for system-level effectiveness with a full complement of training and support. Recommendation 4: The Army should establish an executive authority for TSU integration, responsible for option generation and evaluation, requirements currency, and programmatic acquisition for the Soldier and TSU within a metrics-driven, system-ofsystems engineering environment.
From page 73...
... in the System Acquisition Process. Army Regulation 602-2.


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