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Improving the Assessment of the Proliferation Risk of Nuclear Fuel Cycles (2013) / Chapter Skim
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4 Applicaiton of Other Risk Methodologies
Pages 41-47

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From page 41...
... to host-state proliferation risk assessments -- including both qualitative and quantitative approaches -- their benefits, limitations, and the challenges associated with adapting these methodologies to proliferation risk assessment. We consider whether other risk assessment methodologies could be useful in evaluating the larger question of proliferation risk and whether their established practices might address the noted deficiencies of the predefined frameworks.
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From page 42...
... A 2010 report on the use of risk assessment for terrorism concluded: However, with the exception of risk analysis for natural disaster preparedness, the committee did not find any DHS risk analysis capabilities and methods that are yet adequate for supporting DHS decision making, because their validity and reliability are untested. Moreover, it is not yet clear that DHS is on a trajectory for development of methods and capability that is sufficient to ensure reliable risk analyses other than for natural disasters.
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From page 43...
... Some have suggested that value could be added by combining these predefined framework methodologies with results of political science methodologies that seek to establish correlations between country-specific factors and proliferation. To evaluate this suggestion, the committee reviewed selected literature and held a focused meeting on social science–based research to understand factors that may influence a country to pursue nuclear weapons, including some efforts to develop models of how factors such as security concerns, type of government, and technical capability influence decisions (Coles et al.
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From page 44...
... Indeed, one study estimates that of the 184 NNWSs in the NPT, fewer than 10 have cheated on their treaty commitment not to seek or acquire nuclear weapons after they joined the treaty. Fourth, although both democracies and autocracies have developed nuclear weapons and started nuclear programs historically, only autocratic governments have started nuclear weapons programs while they were forbidden to do so under their NPT commitments (Sagan 2011, Way and Weeks 2012)
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From page 45...
... This set of questions and thought processes leads to probabilistic, evidential, and inferential analysis of the response of events, systems, or activities to different challenges. PRA was developed to provide insights on matters for which there was very little information, thus leading to an often-heard phrase, "the less information one has about the risk of something, the more important it is to do a quantitative risk assessment." This of course, is only if it is an important risk that is not statistically obvious or easily exposed by simplified methods.
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From page 46...
... A successful PRA of proliferation risk of a particular fuel cycle in a particular state would therefore require detailed data about the facility, the motivations and thought processes of host-state decision makers, possible clandestine technical capabilities and activities, as well as other information. The committee notes that the risk assessment methods considered by the committee cannot overcome the lack of these important data.
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From page 47...
... RECOMMENDATION 3.1: DOE-NE and NNSA should consider whether elements of a formal PRA approach could improve multidisciplinary assessments of proliferation risk, especially the quantification of uncertainties. Although the committee concluded that work on understanding motivations to develop nuclear weapons and modeling an adaptive adversary do not have evidence-based records of success in real-world situations, it supports the inclusion of such approaches into proliferation risk analysis when and if they have an established quantitative basis.
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Key Terms

  • fuel cycle
  • predefined framework
  • framework methodologies
  • thought process
  • probabilistic risk

  • proliferation resistance
  • predefined frameworks
  • adaptive adversary
  • political science
  • host state

  • particular fuel
  • assessment methodologies
  • technical capabilities
  • detailed data
  • intelligent adversaries

  • multidisciplinary teams
  • assessing proliferation
  • risk analysis
  • started nuclear
  • develop nuclear

  • risk assessments
  • nuclear fuel
  • successful pra
  • pra methodologies
  • assessment methods

  • weapons programs
  • pra approach
  • expert elicitation
  • weapons state
  • guide analysis


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